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In FY 1969, $690,000,000 worth of U. s. government construction 
was performed under closed competitive bidding. Most construction 
performed by state and local governments is contracted in the same 
manner. Many corporations use the closed competitive bidding process 
to procure construction of facilities. The purpose of this research 
is to develop a dynamic mathematical model from which a contractor can 
optimize his expected utility when submitting a sealed bid for a con-
struction contract. 
There are several ways in which a contractor can increase his 
profit on a construction contract. First, he can perform the project 
using the cheapest acceptable materials and equipment •. Secondly, he can 
schedule the project realistically, using a time-cost trade off, to 
minimize those costs associated with time. Thirdly, the contractor can 
optimize all feasible construction techniques. There has been much re-
search accomplished on methods of optimizing the estimate and scheduling. 
Little has been accomplished on the third method of maximizing profit, 
leaving a fertile area for further research. The final method of 
maximizing profit is adding the maximum amount of profit to a contrac-
to~' s estimate such that he will still be the low bidder. It is obvious 
to even those persons not associated with construction, that the 
monetary difference between the low bidder for a project and the next 
low bidder (commonly known as money "left on the table") is free 
profit lost to the contractor winning the bid. However, absolutely 
minimizing the difference between the low bidder and the next low bidder 
is impossible due to the stochastic nature of the construction industry. 
Therefore, this dissertation uses a utility maximization approach to 
reduce the difference between low bidder and the next lowest bidder, 
hence increasing the profit to the contractor. 
This author has attempted to give credit to all sources from which 
material has been takeno He apologizes for any omissions of this 
character which may, unknowingly, have occurredo 
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Bidding is defined as a competition for the right to perform ser-
vices or acquire property. It assumes many forms in many industries. 
Auction bidding may be used to distribute or acquire object d'art, 
furniture, etc. Negotiated bidding may be used to acquire subcontrac-
tors for services, small construction projects by private industries, 
computer software systems, etco Closed competitive bidding, the topic 
of this treatise, is the submission of sealed tenders to a public 
' 
organization for the right to perform services or deliver products at a 
specified considerationo For brevity, "closed competitive bidding by 
sealed tenders" will be referred to as simply "bidding" for the 
remainder of this treatiseo 
Competitive bidding is fundamental to the economic system of the 
United State so A larg.e portion of services and products provided to 
federal agencies must, by law, be acquired through competitive bidding. 
Legal statutes provide that, except under extremely limited circum-
stances, all government procurement shall be conducted under closed 
competitive biddingo This, along with the fact that most major corpo-
rations use competitive bidding for procurement, implies that a substan-
tial portion of the Gross National Product expenditures is made through 
competitive biddingo To reduce the vastness of the subject, this thesis 
will deal only with bidding for construction contracts, although most 
models developed can be generalized to other procurement areas. 
Of $833,469,000 worth of construction contracts performed for the 
U. S. Government in FY 1969, 87.2 per cent of these contracts were 
acquired through closed competitive bidding (44)o 
2 
This thesis will analyze the competitive bidding problem from the 
contractor's point of view .. The most direct benefit from the develop-
ment of a rational approach to the bidding problem is an improvement in 
contractor profitso However, in a larger sense, better bidding policies 
make it more likely that the most efficient bidder will win the contract, 
which in turn is of extreme benefit to the sponsor. 
An assumption used throughout this dissertation is that the bidding 
is conducted with asymmetrical information, e.go, only one contractor is 
utilizing a rational bid modelo The bidding problem using an assumption 
of symmetrical information suggests a game theoretic approach, an 
approach seeking an equilibrium condition, rather than the decision 
theoretic approach used herein, and is a fertile area for further 
researcho Rothkope (63) has conducted some research into this problem. 
The Contractor Objective 
In any decision process, a fundamental principle is the selection 
of an objectiveo The most common objective that one assumes is that of 
maximizing the contractor's expected profit for each contract. However, 
this objective is not always the objective used by each contractor. 
The highly diverse nature of the construction industry has thus 
far defied any rational business model to define it. In addition to the 
multitude of types of construction accomplished, the engineering firms 
and contractors vary from the small home builder to the struggling, 
limited budget highway contractor to the multi-million dollar public 
construction finno It offends the intuition to hypothesize that all 
contractors in such a diverse business would have the same objectives. 
For instance, it is not at all uncommon for a contractor to bid a job 
at five per cent above his estimated cost and find that he is 15 per 
cent higher than the low bidder; nor is it uncommon for a contractor to 
bid a job at 15 per cent markup and find he is the low bidder. 
As stated before, the predominant and more satisfying objective 
is to maximize profit on a construction contract. Numerous other con-
tractor objectives are prevalent from time to time. Although a more 
thorough discussion of these objectives will be conducted later some of 
the other contractor objectives will be outlined here by way of intro-
duction so that the reader may understand other discussions to follow. 
3 
Because of business trend variations, tight money, stiff competi-
tion and other factors, a contractor might find that he has no construc-
tion to perfonna This means that his equipment is idle and his constant 
supervisory force, although still on his payroll, has no job to perform. 
He may, in this instance, bid a job at a substantial loss, in order to 
meet his overhead requirementsa It might be stated that this contractor 
has an objective to maintain a constant work volume. 
Another contractor may bid a job at an extremely high profit 
margino Since the lowest bidder will be awarded the contract, this 
contractor has a slim chance of being awarded the job. If by some 
chance he is awarded the contract, he should earn an extremely high 
profito This contractor probably would be working to full capacity 
and submitted the bid merely "to keep his fingers in the pie" to 
maintain his good relations with the awarding agencies and associates. 
Other, less likely objectives for a bidding firm might be (5:74): 
a. To minimize the profit of competitors, 
b. To maintain and improve quality of performance, 
Co To reduce the variance of the profit random variable, and 
d. To perform only a certain type of construction project. 
Variables Involved 
The profit obtained on any job is defined as the difference between 
the actual cost of performing the work and the bid price; in equation 
form: 
( 1. 1a) 
where y. is the profit for the ith job, X. is the bid price, and c'. is 
1 1 1 
the actual cost for the same jobo However, in a competitive bidding 
situation, X. must be lower than all of the other bids, X .. , in order 
1 1J 
for the contractor to be awarded the job. This implies that Equation 






if X. < X. . for all j 
1 1J 
if xi > xik for at least one ko ( 1.1b) 
In the unlikely event that X. is equal to X.k, specific regulations for 
1 1 
various agencies govern. This event is insignificant for the purposes 





Figure 1. Profit Versus Bid Price for the ith Job 
5 
It should be noted that there is essentially one variable (X.) that 
l. 
can be controlled and there are three variables (X .. , C '., and Yi) that 
l. J l. 
cannot be controlled in Equation ( 1.1b). The profit, y i, in addition to 
being a function of X., is a function of variables whose values cannot 
l. 
be determined p·rior to the bid letting. In fact, Benjamin (5) has shown 
I 
that the actual cost, Ci' and consequently the profit, yi' are random 
variables with associated probability distributions. 
One further, and more perplexing, problem is associated with the 
bidding problem. That is, "when will 'our' bid be lower than all other 
competitors?" 
I 
Even if the actual cost, C., were not a random variable, 
l. 
the above question requires that the dependent variable, y., be a sto-
1. 
chastic variable, which in turn implies that one can never a' priori 
find the exact value of y. and must resort to predicting the "expected 
l. 
value," E(y.). Thus, Equation (1.1b) may be restated as 
l. 
E ( y. ) = ( X. - C '. ) P ( X. < X. . for all j ) 
l. l. l. l. l.J 
(1.2) 
where P(X. < X .. for all j) is read as the probability that 11 our11 bid 
l. l. J 
is less than all other bids submitted for this specific job. Equation 
(1.2) is graphed as shown in Figure 2. 
E(y.) 
l. 
Figure 2. Expected Profit Versus Bid Amount 
The Problem Restated 
x. 
l. 
The problem can now be restated in more precise tenns. Assuming 
the objective of maximizing profit as the sole objective, the problem 
6 
is now simply to maximize profit over a series of jobs or for a specific 
time period with respect to X., or: 
l. 
I 
max E(y.) = max(X. - C.) P (X. < X .. for all j). 
l. l. l. l. l.J 
(1.J) 
Equation (1.J) may be subject to numerous constraints which will 
enter into the optimization procedure. A discussion of these 
constraints will be presented in Chapter V of this dissertation along 
with additional contractor objective considerations. 
The fundamental purpose of this paper is t'o present a unique 
dynamic bidding model which provides a workable tool from which a con-
tractor can determine his objective function to be used in bidding for 
a specific job, a method of determining his constraints, and a time 
dependent method of measuring his probability of winning the contract. 
Finally, a method of optimizing his bid is developed based upon his 
selected objective function. 
The organization of this thesis is to first present a review of 
the most significant bidding models developed to date in Chapter II. 
Chapter III is a discussion of the shortcomings of these models. 
Chapter IV develops a method of treating the actual cost as a random 
variable. The development of a new dynamic model and the optimization 
of this model is accomplished in Chapter v. Chapter VI is a summary 
with suggestions for further research. Data utilized and lengthy 
computations are added as appendices. 
7 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS MODELS 
It should be noted at the onset that no one has adequately solved 
the competitive bidding problem to a point that a model is available by 
which a contractor can analytically calculate this optimum bid markup. 
From the shape of the curve shown in Figure 2, it is obvious that 
Equation (1.J) could be satisfied if functions were known for the proba-
bility that X. will be less than the lowest bid of all the competitors 
1 
I 
and C. were not a stochastic variable. The procedure would simply 
1 
utilize elementary calculus, that is, to equate the first derivative of 
E(y.) to zero and solve for the X. which corresponds to the maximum 
1 1 
point on the curve, e.g., rewriting Equation (1.2) here for convenience 
I 
E(y.) ( X. - C . ) P ( X. < X. . for all j ) (1.2) 
1 1 1 1 1J 
differentiate with respect to X. and set E 1 (y.) 
1 1 
* = o, solve for the X. 
1 
that would correspond to the maximum point on the curve shown in 
Figure 2. (Note that fundamental conditions of differentiability would 
necessarily have to exist for this procedure to be valid. This is a 
minor problem at this stage of development.) 
To simplify the procedure involved with the above analysis, assume 
I 
that C. is a known constant, C., not a stochastic variable, as it is 
1' . 1 
known to be. Equation (1.2) can now be normalized with respect to C., 
1 




E ( y. ) = ( r . - 1) P ( r. < r. . for all j ) 
1 1 1 1J 
(2.1) 
where r. = X./C. and r .. = X .. /C.. This simply implies that E(y.), 
1 1 1 1J 1J 1 1 
instead of being an absolute amount of money in dollars, is now a 
fraction (percentage if multiplied by 100) of the actual cost of the 
project. Figure 2 is then transformed into Figure J. 
E(y.) 
1 
Figure J. Normalized Profit Versus Normalized Bid 
r. 
1 
Since this is a one-to-one transformation, the maximization of 
E(y.) will be accomplished if the normalized E(y.) is maximized. The 
1 1 
probability that r. will be less than the lowest normalized bid will now 
1 
be assumed to be given by the continuous and differentiable function, 
G(r.). In equation form 
1 
10 
p ( r . < r . . for all j ) = G ( r . ) • (2.2) 
1 1J 1 






(r. - 1) G (r.) + G(r.) e 
1 1 1 










where g(r.) is the value of the first derivative of G(r.). (It should 
1 1 
be noted that G(r.) is a complementary crunulative probability function, 
1 
with a shape as shown in Figure 4, and its slope will always be less 
than or equal to zero; thus ratio of the two functions will always be 
negative.) The condition for optimality is shown graphically in 




1 + jg(/)1 Ci o 
1 
Theoretically, the above procedure is flawlessa As stated 
previously, c'. is a stochastic variable which means that it is not 
1 
(2.5) 
known with certainty until the project in question has been completed. 
However, this is a minor problem when compared to finding an analytical 
expression for G(r.). No proven method is available to find this 
l 
function. Thus, G(r.) is the key to the basic problem. 
1 
In summarizing the proposed competitive bidding models, the model 
presented by Lawrence Friedman in 1956 will be presented first. His 
model, although the first and yet the most outstanding work done towards 
a solution to date, contains several points as yet unresolved. 
Figure ~. Probability Function (Representative) 







Figure 5. Optimality Condition Using Calculus 
11 
12 
Additional models will be analyzed as they pertain to resolving the 
contended points in Friedman's original work. 
Friedman's Model (21) 
Lawrence Friedman earned the first Ph.D. in Operations Research in 
1959 from Case Institute for his work in competitive bidding. Oddly 
enough, the work done on the subject since that time. has mostly been 
modifications of his original model. There are several conceptual 
points in Friedman's work yet to be proven or disproven. However, 
regardless of their validity, his work is the logical place to start 
in any competitive bidding discourse. 
Friedman was the first to outline the possible objectives that a 
firm might have when submitting a sealed bid. These have been lately 
extended as shown in Chapter Ia However, he uses the objective stated 
in this treatise, that is to maximize profit. Benjamin (5:10), an 
advocate of utility theory, states that Friedman assumes a utility 
function linear with dollarso Friedman also recognizes that the actual 
cost of performing work is a random variable and not at all likely to 
be equal to the original cost estimate. Most researchers since 1959 
have failed to utilize this in their modelso 
This author will present Friedman's model, with only the notation 
changed, to facilitate understanding by the reader and to maintain 
consistency in this thesis. 
Let c'. be defined as the actual cost of the ith project, initially 
1 
unknown at the time a bid is prepared and assumed to be a random vari-
able. Let C. represent the initial cost estimate for the i th project. 
1 




for the 1 Job, or 
I 
c. 
s. 1 = c. 1 (2.6) 
1 
Assume the continuous function h(S) to be the probability density 
function of S taken over all jobsa Then h(S)6S represents the proba-
bility that the ratio of the true cost to the estimated cost lies 
between S and S + 6s. This is represented in Figure 6. 
h(S) 
s S+liS 
Figure 60 Reliability of the Cost Estimate (106:21) 
The function h(S) can be determined ~priori from histograms of 
past data. Therefore, a cost bias factor can be developed by taking 
the first moment of the developed distribution, e.g., an estimate of the 





Ci s S h(S)dS , 
0 
(2.7) 
where C. is the estimated cost for the ith job and~'. is the estimated 
1 1 
cost for the same job corrected for bias. The equation for the profit 





if X. < X. . for all j , 
1 1J 
when X. . is the bid of the j th bidder for the i th job. 
1J 
(2.8) 
In tackling the problem of finding the probability that X. < X .. 
1 1J 
for every j, Friedman treats three cases. The first, winning over one 
bidder, is treated implicitly. The second, winning if all bidders are 
known, and the third, winning if all bidders are not known, are treated 
explicitly. 
Winning if All Bidders are Known 
If one assumes that all bidders will bid as they have done in the 
past (this assumption makes Friedman's model, and consequently all 
models to follow, static models), the probability of winning over a 
particular competitor is the area to the right of the ratio X./C. of the 
1 1 
jth bidder's probability density function graph as shown in Figure 7. 
(Note that if this area is graphed as an inverse cumulative probability 
function, its shape will have the same characteristics as Figure 4.) 
D f . t t . f f th . th t • t b . t II II t e ine r. as he ra 10 o all o e J compe 1 or's ids o our cos 
J 
estimates for the same jobs. If all bidders are known, their bidding 
patterns can be as illustrated in Figure 8. 
At this point in the model, Friedman makes his most contested 
assumption; the bids of all competitors are independent of each other. 




Figure 7. BiddiJ:ig _:Pattern of Competitor j 
f'eob. 
.fi.(r) 
Figure 8. Bidding Patterns of Competitors 
and should be kept in mind by the reader. However, following along 
with Friedman's model, this assumption, based on the laws of probabil-
ity, implies that the joint probability that X. <X .. , (j,,,; 1, 2, 
l. . l.J ' 
16 
... ' n), is equal to the product of the probabilities that x. < x.k for 
l. l. 
each k. In equation form 
or 
n 
p(X. <X .. for all j) 
l. l. J 
tr p(X. < X .. ) • 
. 1 l. l.J 
J= 
Simply stated, the probability that X. < X .. for all j is the product 
l. l. J 
of the areas to the right of X./C. as shown in Figure 8. If f.(r) is 
l. l. J 
the probability density function associated with each bidder's bidding 
pattern, assuming continuity for each function, then the expected 

















A I n 
(X. - C.) • 11 
l. l. . 1 
J= 






f. (r )dr 
J 
Cl) 





recalling that C. is the estimated cost corrected for bias. 
l. 
Winning if All Bidders are Not Known 
( 2. 10) 
Friedman assumes that in a majority of situations, all bidders for 
a project will not be known prior to the opening of the sealed bids. 
17 
This presents a special problem in the above model; namely, Equation 
(2.10) cannot be calculated. As a partial solution (a solution in 
1959), Friedman introduces the concept of the "average bidder. 11 To 
find the probability density function for the average bidder, he simply 
develops a histogram with frequencies derived from data of all known 
competitors. In keeping with the consistent notation, let f(r) repre-
sent the probability density function of the "average bidder. 11 
One more problem remains, that is: how many bidders will bid for 
this particular job? Friedman's solution to this problem is to perform 
a linear regression relating the expected number of bidders to "our" 
cost estimate. This is merely an assertion that the number of bidders 
expected to bid for a particular job is a function of the expected cost 
of the job. An example of this regression is shown in Figure 9. It 
should be noted that this is an assertion with no attempt at proof. 






Figure 9o A Method of Obtaining an Estimate of 
the Number of Bidders Based on 
Previous Bidding History (110:21) 
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Friedman assumes that a probability density function that k 
bidders will bid for a contract can be found which he calls g(k). If 




E(y.) = (X. - c.) • l g (k) 0 (S f(r)dr) • (2.11) 1 1 1 
k=O r. 
1 
The summation sign is used since the probability density function for 
the expected number of bidders is a discrete distribution. 
Optimization of X. for Each Job 
1 
It is obvious that Equations (2.10 or 2.11) cannot be optimized 
as simply as the theoretical Equation (2.1). In fact, Friedman asserts 
that a solution does not exist in closed form. An optimum sol.ution for 
this model can, however, be found through an iterative process. Casey 
and Shaffer (12) evaluated the applicability of this model for highway 
construction projectso Due to the unavailability of cost estimate data, 
which presents a real problem to the researcher, they assumed that the 
estimated cost of each project was 85 per cent of the bid amount, which 
was quite unrealistic. Actual markup for a particular job will normally 
vary from 1 to 15 per cent and is seldom constant (5, 9)o Casey and 
Shaffer did, however, show how an iterative process could be used to 
obtain an "optimum" from this model if one makes a normality assumption 
throughout. 
Shortcomings of Friedman's Model 
Friedman's work was an outstanding contribution toward developing 
a rational approach to competitive bidding. Like Newton's development 
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of "the method of fluxions" which paved the way for modern calculus, it 
was the first published rational approach to the problem. Hence, the 
long discourse on his model. However, there are numerous conceptual 
problems inherent in his model. 
(1) The assumption that all bidders bid independently of one 
another has not been proveno In fact, this concept offends 
the intuition of a practical contractor. Marvin Gates (2~), 
whose model will be presented later in this paper, asserts 
that this assumption does not follow his extensive experi-
ence in analyzing bid data. One can argue that in a com-
petitive environment collusion among bidders would not be 
commono In fact, there would probably be very little, if any. 
Park (62) argues that the bids must be independent. 
A counter argument would consider the fact that all 
bidders are bidding based on roughly the same materials and 
labor cost, perhaps the same subcontractor bids, etc. However, 
all arguments are superfluous; the mathematical definition of 
stochastic independence is all that is of consequence in order 
for the product of probabilities to be valid~ That definition 
is: 
The probability of occurrence of event A is 
independent of the probability of occurrence of 
event B if, and only if, P(A) o P(B) = P(A and B). 
(95:115) 
To prove that events satisfy this definition is difficult; 
indeed, many times impossiblea 
(2) Based on the above counterargument, it would appear that the 
concept of the "average bidder" is invalid since the 
probabilities cannot be multiplied together to obtain the 
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probability of winning. Gates (23) has proposed and Benjamin 
(5:18) has provided a derivation for a formula which more 
closely follows the "real world" results in competitive 
bidding.· This formula and its assumptions will be discussed 
in the next section; the point being here that the absence of 
the independence assumption does not invalidate Friedman's 
"average bidder" concept. The basis upon which the idea that 
the "average bidder" concep.t is questionable lies in an 
assertion by Broemser (11) that, based on an idea presented by 
Howard (36, 37), it is necessary only to study the distri-
bution of the low bidder for each job. This concept, to be 
presented in more detail (it should be noted that neither 
concept has been developed beyond an assertion) could render 
Friedman's concept of the "average bidder" invalid. 
(3) Friedman's method assumes implicitly that each bidder will bid 
as he has done in the past. In other words, there is nothing 
in the model which would indica~e any change in the bidding 
trends of competitors. This element of the problem has been 
omitted from every model developed to date. All bidding 
models based on Friedman's work are "static models. 11 
(~) Friedman's model uses a straight line utility function based 
on dollars as shown in Figure 2. This concept has been 
challenged by Howard (37) and Benjamin (5). Benjamin examines 
in detail the risk associated with bidding and uses profit 
lotteries, linear, bi-linear and non-linear, to exhibit a 
contractor's willingness to accept the ri·sk of a loss on a 
job. 
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(5) Friedman's model, as all following models, has no closed form 
of optimization. 
Biasiolli's Modification of Friedman's Model (7) 
Gerald Biasiolli's unpublished paper, written at St. Mary's Uni-
versity in 1966 has received little or no reference in more recent works 
on competitive bidding. However, this author, not necessarily granting 
significance to the model, feels that it provides a transition for 
models to follow. 
Biasiolli modifies two aspects of Friedman's model and only treats 
the case in which the number and identity of the competitors are not 
known. The first disagreement involves the "average bidder" concept. 
Biasiolli asserts (again, merely an assertion; no proof) that the 
"average bidder" concept neglects to discriminate between the strata 
bid distributions, e.g., he feels that a distribution exists and is of 
pertinence, for the lowest bidder, the second lowest bidder, and on 
th 
through the n bidder. If the probability of winning over each of 
these strata for various profit margins could be determined, then the 




= (X. - C.) 1( p(r. < r 1.k) 
1 1 k=1 1 
(2.12) 
where all variables are as defined previously except that rik is the 
ratio of the "average bidder" bid in the kth strata to "our" cost 
estimate when k = 1, 2, ••• , n; k = 1 being the lowest bidder strata. 
The second significant difference that Biasiolli made to Friedman's 
model was the method of determining probabilities. He felt that there 
was little evidence which would lead to the conclusion that a probability 
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density function of a bidding model should follow a known distribution. 
Therefore, Biasiolli used a simulation technique based on non-parametric 
statistics to obtain the probability of winning over various competi-
tors. This concept is mentioned here since it may have some significant 
merit. It has been also attempted by Gates in some of his earlier 
research. Table I shows the effect on a contractor's profit for eleven 
contracts of using Friedman's model and Biasiolli's modifications versus 
using no model at all. 
TABLE I 
COMPARISON OF PROFIT ATTAINED WHEN DIFFERENT BID 
TECHNIQUES WERE USED (7:32) 
Bid Predictor Old Technique Friedman's Model 
Stratified 
Bid Model 
Profit for past 
eleven projects $21,379.22 $59, 721.28 $52,297.80 
Profit increase 
resulting from 
use of the model -0- 38,342.06 J0,918.-58 
Percentage in-
crease in profit 
from using the 
model -0- 279% 244% 
Percentage of 
contracts won 36% 45% 45% 
It should be noted that Friedman's model yielded somewhat better 
results than did Biasiolli's modification. Biasiolli makes the 
observation: 
This relatively small disagreement between Friedman's model 
and the stratified model can be attributed to the size of 
the sample. It is believed that when a much larger amount 
of past data is available, the stratified bid model becomes 
the more accurate predictor (7:29). 
Howard's Model (37) 
Howard's model differs from Friedman's model in basically two 
aspects. First,- like Biasiolli, Howard feels that the "average bidder" 
concept is invalid when treating the case when all bidders are not 
known. Howard asserts that it is only necessary to bid lower than the 
lowest bidder among the competitors. In doing this, he immediately 
simplifies the data collection problem and makes Friedman's "indepen-
dence among bidders" assumption unnecessary. 
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Secondly, Howard makes a vague attempt at developing a less static 
model by conditioning the probability of winning on prior experience to 
some degree. Just how this prior experience is used is not clearly 
developed in Howard's work and will be discussed to a great extent in 
this author's development of a dynamic model in Chapter V. 






where r.L represents the ratio X.T/C. as defined by the probability 
1 1u 1 
density function of all previous lowest bidders taken together in one 
distribution, eog., the function described by Figure 10 is developed 
from the frequency histogram tabulated by taking the ratio of the bids 
of all previous low bidders to "our" cost estimate. The symbol "e" 
represents an experience factor. 
I 
The variable C., as stated in 
1 
Friedman's model, is still the cost estimate corrected for bias. Howard 
assumes the actual cost as a random variable as does Friedman. The 
advantages to Howard's assertion that it is necessary to bid less than 
the lowest bidder are: 
(1) It simplifies the data collection problem. This is a major 
effort in applying Friedman's model. 
(2) It reduces the problem to one of finding a single function 
to describe a single distribution. 
(J) It eliminates the requirement of the independence assumption. 
(~) On the surface, it is more pleasing to one's intuition. 
The disadvantages to this approach are: 
(1) It assumes that all bidders will bid as they have done in the 
past, thus allowing no method of corrections based on 
individual trends. 
(2) Based on disadvantage (1), this assumption makes the model 
even more static than does Friedman's assumptions. 









Broemser's Model (10) 
Broemser, like Howard, assumes that it is only necessary to bid 
lower than the lowest bidder. His major contribution to the competitive 
bidding problem is the hypothesis of a single bid model which provides 
a method for calculating p(X. < X.L). Broemser's model is based on 
. 1 1 
Christenson's (1J) work in bidding for corporate securities. They are 
similar in both notation and conditions for optimality. 
Broemser's model is as shown in Equation (2.1), repeated here for 
convenience 
E(y.) = (r. - 1) • p(r. < r;L) 
1 1 1 ~ 
(2.1) 
where r iL represents the ratio of previous lowest bids to 11 our11 cost 
estimate for the same job. If G.(r) represents the function described 
1 
on page 10, Equation (2.1) becomes 
E( y. ) = ( r. - 1) • G. ( r) 
1 1 1 









The uniqueness of the following model is that it gives a method for 
approximating Gi(r). To accomplish this task, Broemser uses a multiple 
linear regression model. The dependent variable is the lowest com-
petitor's bid expressed as a fraction of 11 our11 cost. The independent 
variables are characteristics of the job which influence the profit that 
the contractor should expect from the job (5:2J). These are: 
z. - 1 JO 
zj1 -
( -1 estimated per cent of work not subcontracted) 
zj 2 _ (estimated per cent of work not subcontracted) 
2 
zjJ _ (estimated per cent of work not subcontracted) 
-2 zj4 _ (estimated job duration) 
-1 
zj5 _ (estimated job duration) 
-1 
z. 6 _(estimated job duration/estimated cost) ,] 
2 
zj? _ (estimated job duration/estimated cost) 
- (estimated cost)-2 (97:9) 
~ 





where the superscript 11T 11 represents the transpose of the matrix, S is 
the vector of regression coefficients, Z is the matrix of n independent 
variables for each of m jobs, and L is the vector of the lowest competi-
tor's bid, for each of them jobs, expressed as a fraction of "our" cost 
estimatea The variance of the prediction is found by 
• (2.15) m - n 
A general contractor's bidding history over a one year period was 
examined by Broemser in developing this model. Benjamin performed 
sequential tests on the data subsequently for a different contractor 
and observed three specific shortcomings of the model (5:24). These 
were: 
(1) The coefficient of multiple determination, R2 , varied within 
the range of about 0.25 to 0.50 as additional data were 
considered with time. 
(2) The values of the regression coefficients varied depending 
upon the amount of bidding history that was considered in 
determining the coefficients. 
(J) The success of this model, as measured by the cumulative 
profits obtained by applying the model to the data sequen-
tially in time, varied with the amount of previous bidding 
history that was considered. 
Broemser casts this single bid model into a constrained linear 
optimization problem. He used as constraints such items as limited 
bonding capacity, limited supervisory personnel, number of jobs 
acceptable and limited dollar volume. 
The significance of this model is that it attempts to provide a 
rational approach to find the probability of winning a contract. To 
anyone familiar with construction, it is obvious that the model is not 
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a complete solution since it contains as independent variables so few of 
the seemingly infinite variables that go into establishing the proba-
bility of winning and consequently profit. 
Gates' Model (24) 
Marvin Gates is probably the most authoritative writer on construc-
tion bidding today, having conducted research in the problem since the 
late 1950 1 s. Essentially, his papers (23, 24, 25) present practical 
methods of applying previously developed models. However, he has 
developed some new concepts which shed light on the competitive bidding 
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problem. Two aspects of Gates' works will be discussed. First, he 
contends that the independence assumption is not valid and presents a 
formula for handling the problem. This is an implicit rejection of the 
assumption by Howard and Broemser that one must only consider the proba-
bility density function of the lowest bidder; secondly, Gates uses non-
parametric statistics for determining probabilities as does Biasiolli. 
However, Gates uses straight line assumptions to facilitate optimization 
procedures. 
All Bidders Known Strategy; No Independence 
Assumption (24:84) 
In developing a strategy to be used against bidders when all were 
known, Gates found that, in all of his bidding experience, that the 
probability of being lowest bidder in this situation differed greatly 
from the product of the probabilities of bidding lower than each bidder. 
Based on this, he rejected the independence assumption. (This is a 
valid reason for rejection noting that the stochastic definition of 
independence is an "if and only if" definition.) He found, based on 
experience, that if the probability of winning a bid at a specific price 
over the ith bidder were p., then the probability of winning the bid 
l 
over n of these bidders was closely approximated by the formula 
p(win Ir.) 
J 









l (P~) - (n - 1) 
i=1 - l. 
To emphasize the logic in this assumed formula, the following is a 
derivation supplied by Benjamin (5:16). 
Assume that A and B are the only bidders. The probability that A 
wins is given by 
p(A IA + B) = 
p(A(A + B)) 
p(A + B) • (2.17a) 
Since the event that A wins is mutually exclusive of the event that B 
wins, the event (A(A + B)) which is read 11A wins and A or B wins," is 
simply the event that A wins (note that this is the probability of an 
intersection of events); the probability of occurrence that A or B wins 
is the sum of the probability that A wins and the probability that B 
wins, e.g., Equation (2.17a) is transformed into 
p(AIA + B) 
p(A) 
(2.17b) p(A) + p(B) • 
If one considers other competitors, say competitor c, D, E, ••• , N, the 
sum of the probabilities that each will win exhausts all possibilities 
which implies that 
p(A) + p(B) + p(C) + ••• + p(N) = 1 • (2.17c) 
To solve for the unconditional probability that A wins, the probabilities 
of each of the other competitors winning must be expressed in terms of 
the conditional probability that A wins given that only two competitors 
are bidding and the unconditional probability that A wins. In the case 
of competitor B, solving Equation (2.17b), 
p(B) p(A) - + B) = 
and in the case of competitor C, 
p(C) (A) - p(A) 
(A A + C) 
= p(A A + C) • 
Assuming that A, B, and C are the only competitors 
p(A) + p(B) = p(C) = 1 
and substituting into Equation (2.17f), 
p(A) + p(A) - rA)p(AIA + B) p(A) - p(A)p(AIA + C) = 1 
p(A A + B) + p(AlA + c) 
or solving for p(A) 
p(A) 
1 - p(A IA + B) 
p(A IA + B) 
1 
1- p(AlA + C) + 1 








Using an inductive proof, Equation (2.17h) can be generalized into 
Equation (2.17). Using Equation (2.17) in Friedman's model that treats 
the case in which all bidders are known, Equation (2.10) is converted 
into 
I 
(X. - c.) 
E(y.) l. l. (2.18) = 
l. n 
I 1 - (n - 1) llD 
j=1 s f .(r)dr J 
r. 
l. 
which, complex as it may seem, is intuitively more satisfying than 
Friedman's product of probabilities. 
This formula can be generalized into the strategy wherein all 
bidders are not known, by converting Equation (2.11) into 
31 
eo 
(X. - c'. > . ~. f(r)dr n 1 1 
E(y.) l g(k) 1 (2.19) = 
. ~ 
• 1 




Since f(r) is the probability density function of the "average 
bidder," it appears that Gates gives tacit approval to the concept of 
the "average bidder," in contention with Howard and Broemser. However, 
this does relieve the reader of the independence assumption required in 
Friedman's model. 
A Method of Finding the Probability of Winning Over 
A Single Bidder - A Non-Parametric Method 
Gates' method of determining the probability of winning over a 
single bidder is given here simply because it is a practical man's way 
of finding a solution to a complex problem. Its validity at this point 
will not be questioned. The method will be illustrated by an example 
taken directly from Gates' paper (2~:80) 0 However, several aspects of 
this example will be changed. First, all bids were not submitted by the 
same competitor; and secondly, the markup of "our" bid is assumed to be 
five per cent of the bid price since Gates did not know the actual cost 
estimates. The beauty of this example will be seen as the straight line 
approximations that can be generalized to other models. 
Let Ck be "our" cost estimate and ~1 be the bid of one competitor 
for the kth job. Table II is arranged from top to bottom in descending 
order based on the value of rk1 = ~1/ck. 
TABLE II 
BIDDING PATTERN OF ONE COMPETITOR* 
Order No. rk =~/Ck p = t/T 
1 1.102 0.033 
2 1.064 0.067 
3 1.060 0.100 
4 1.053 0.133 
5 1.050 0.167 
6 1.0J9. 0.200 
7 1.037 0.233 
8 1.036 0.267 
9 1.034 0.300 
10 1.031 0.333 
11 1.029 0.367 
12 1.029 o.400 
13 1.012 o.433 
14 1.012 o.467 
15 1.008 0.500 
16 1.oo6 0.533 
17 0.994 0.567 
18 0.989 0.600 
19 0.977 0.633 
20 0.975 0.667 
21 0.974 0.700 
22 0.953 0.733 
23 0.953 0.767 
24 0.927 0.800 
25 0.906 0.833 
26 0.903 0.867 
27 0.894 0.900 
28 o.886 0.933 
29 o.8l.i6 0.967 
JO 0.821 1.000 
*This table has been modified from the original table from Gates (80:22) 
to provide a better illustration of his technique. 
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If t is the order number of the ratio rk1 and T is the total number 
of variates considered, then the probability that the random variable r 
is less than the r corresponding to order number t(rt) is given by 
p(r <rt) = t/T (2.20) 
Hence, column three is the value of the probability in question. The 
resulting complementary cumulative probability function is plotted in 
Figure 10. Since a contractor is most often concerned with making a 
profit and assumes that his cost estimate is close to the actual cost, 
he will be concerned with that portion of the curve with r > 1.00. 
Gates approximates that portion of the curve with a straight line equa-
tion derived using elementary algebraic techniques. The equation which 
approximates this particular curve is given by Equation (2.21): 
(2.21) 
While many theoretical flaws exist in this procedure, one can readily 
see that it gives results that can easily be manipulated. For instance, 
the elementary calculus procedure given on page eight can readily be 
applied to optimize a bid against a single bidder, or Equation (2.17) can 
be used in an iterative optimization procedure if all bidders are known. 
The fundamental question here is whether or not the ogive shown in 
Figure 11 is the most valid method of handling the collected data. 
Non-parametric procedures are generally accepted as valid only when 
parametric methods cannot be used. In this case, it would appear more 
valid to describe the complementary cumulative frequency histogram, 
using a frequency analysis and apply the same approximating procedure. 
If this method were used, a practical method would probably have the 
edge over the multiple regression analysis presented by Broemser in 
both validity and. acceptance by the industry. However, as seen in 
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Figure 11~ Probability Versus Markup of Bid 
' CHAPTER III 
DISCUSSION OF,PREVIOU~ MODELS 
Before making a comparison of the proposed models, it should be 
noted that one recent model is conspicuous by its absence. That is a 
model presented by Benjamin (~) in July, 1969. This model has been 
omitted summarily based on the following considerations: 
(1) It presents an entirely new approach using utility theory 
which relates only to the contractor's objective and 
willingness to accept risk only as actual cost relates to 
estimated cost and not to the fundamental problems 
presented in this paper. 
(2) This author considers Benjamin's model to be conservative to 
the extent that no contractor would bid a job if he were to 
use Benjamin's criteria. 
(J) Benjamin's paper contains an excellent treatment of the 
actual cost as a random variable and will be discussed along 
with this author's views on the subject in Chapter IV. 
There are three basic elements of the competitive bidding problem 
if the objective of profit maximization is useµ. They are represented 
by these questions: 
(1) What will be the actual cost of the project? 
(2) What is the probability of winning the contract at a given 
price? 
(3) What is the optimum bid based on questions 1 and 2? 
In comparing the proposed models, these three questions will be 
addressed. 
What Will Be the Actual Cost of the Project? 
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Most researchers are in agreement that the cost of a project is a 
random variable. Friedman proposes the development of an ' priori dis-
tribution of the ratio of cost to cost estimate in order to find a cost 
bias factor. Since the cost of performing the work is a random variable, 
the profit or loss is also a random variable at the time that a bid is 
prepared; the variation being caused by unforeseen costs that arise 
during the job. The variance of the probability distribution associated 
with Friedman's ratio is an indication of the riskiness of the job. 
Common logic indicates that if this distribution is maintained 
current, the cost estimate should be modified concurrently until the 
estimate will approach the actual cost of the job or, using Friedman's 
terminology, the cost bias factor should approach one. 
Therefore, the mode of handling the cost estimate as given by 
Friedman, Howard, et alo, is a valid method which approximates the real 
world situation in an abstract senseo The researchers that fail to con-
sider the cost as a random variable and treat the estimated cost as a 
constant for a particular job have treated the problem unrealistically. 
What is the Probability of Winning the 
Contract at a Given Bid? 
The models presented in this treatise have treated essentially two 
bidding situations in which a contractor might find himself. The first 
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is a situation in which "local structure" of the bidding is known, ioe., 
a contractor can predict with a high degree of confidence who his com-
petitors will be on a specific project. The second situation is repre-
sented by a competitive structure in which a contractor cannot predict 
with a high degree of accuracy who his competitors will be on a specific 
project. Within this second situation lies the possibility that the 
number of competitors may or may not be predictable with a high degree 
of accuracy. 
For ease of reference in comparisons, the following types of models 
will be defined: 
(1) The multi-distribution model (MD) is defined as the model in 
which all competitors are known with a high degree of 
certainty. 
(2) The average bidder model (AD) is defined as a model in which 
the bids of all previous competitors are placed together into 
one distributiono 
(J) The low-bidder model (LD) is defined as a model in which the 
bids of all previous competitors who were low bidders in 
competition with "our" bids are placed together into one 
distributiono 
These definitions are after Shaffer and Micheau (72:8) with slight 
modificationso 
The MD Model 
On page 1~, Friedman introduces the MD model. He developed dis-
tributions based on past data of the ratio of competitors bids to "our" 
cost estimate. He implies that these distributions can be related 
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parametrically to known distributions. He then assumes that all bidders 
are independent of each other and asserts that the probability of 
winning is equal to the product of the probabilities of winning over 
each competitoro Park, Biasiolli and many others agree with this 
assertion. 
Gates implicitly agrees in principle with the MD model in that the 
individual probabilities may be found~ priori; on the other hand, he 
proposes that an ogive curve, based on non-parametric statistics, be 
used to compute the individual probabilities. Gates rejects the inde-
pendence assumption and presents a formula that more adequately 
describes his experience in computing the probability of winning over 
several bidders. 
The AD and the LD Models 
These two types of models are discussed in the same sub-paragraph 
since both deal with the competitive situation in which the identity of 
the competitors on a specific project cannot be predicted with a high 
degree of confidence. 
The AD model was first presented by Friedman's "average bidder" 
concept. As alluded to earlier, this concept may be used with Friedman~ 
independence assumption or with Equation (2o17) provided by Gates. The 
unanswered question that remains is this: 11 Is the probability of 
winning equal to the probability of winning over the average bidder?" 
Friedman simply makes this assertion (21:107). Biasiolli agrees with 
the concept if extreme data are rejected from the distribution and the 
average bidder is stratified into the "lowest average bidder," "second 
lowest average bidder," etco Park (61:147), in favoring the use of the 
AD concept states: 
By using this concept, the general level of bids likely to 
result in maximum profits can be identified and used as a 
guide in setting an exact price, or in identifying the 
potentially profitable jobs. 
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(It should be noted that Park's model was not included in this treatise 
since it is merely a recapitulation of Friedman's work with experimental 
data included. He has presented a unique model (6~) in a later article; 
however, the validity of it is severely questioned by this author and 
consequently it has been omitted.) 
Howard has suggested that it is only necessary to bid lower than 
the lowest bidder among the competitors; hence, the LD model. The LD 
model consists of a distribution made up of all previous "lowest 
bidders" bids as a fraction of "our" cost estimate. This concept has 
been expounded by Casey and Shaffer (12) and Broemser (11). Benjamin 
(5:30) finds the LD model "more pleasing to one's intuition." Broemser 
does develop a method, not necessarily valid, for finding a probability 
distribution for the LD model through the use of multiple linear 
regressiono For the AD model, Friedman assumes that a known distribu-
tion can be found whereas Casey and Shaffer assume nonnality as always. 
In summary, one may assert that the MD model is valid if the local 
structure of the competitors is known with a high degree of certainty. 
However, there is no known distribution nor a method of finding a work-
able distribution for the MD model. The validity of using the AD or LD 
model is still in question. It appears from a cursory analysis that the 
AD model is the most conservative as it relates to winning the contract 
in question whereas the LD model should be used with a strategy of 
leaving as little money as possible on the table. Three methods have 
been noted in thi_s study for finding a distribution function to approxi-
mate either of these distributions. They are: 
(1) Broemser's multiple linear regression, single bid method. 
(2) Gates' straight line approximation to a non-parametric ogive. 
(J) Friedman's assumption that each distribution can be approxi-
mated by a known distribution. 
Experimental Results by Shaffer and Micheau (72) 
Shaffer and Micheau have used experimental data to study the reli-
ability of the MD, AD, and LD model applications. Interestingly, in 
testing 50 project bids of one contractor, they found that this contrac-
tor met 118 different competitors but only 19 more than once. This 
experience matches the experimental data collected previously by this 
author. Based on this fact, unless a unique situation exists, the MD 
model is of little use. 
In conducting these experiments, Shaffer and Micheau used a running 
average of distributions for the MD, AD, and LD models in an attempt to 
find an upper and lower bound for the bidding range in which a contrac-
tor should bid. In using the LD model, they have modified it to conform 
not only to the low bid distribution but to Biasiolli 1 s stratified 
bidding model of the lowest, next lowest, third lowest, etc., without 
combining the distributions. Since this procedure has no basis other 
than experimental in all cases except those in which the MD, AD, and LD 
models have been used as described in this chapter, only those results 
will be presented. 
To optimize the bid to be submitted, Shaffer and Micheau used an 
iterative technique with profit margins from zero to JO per cent, 
picking the maximum expected profit in this range for each job. The 
number of bids won, the profit margin and the volume of work was noted. 
Table III shows the results using the models of this text. (Note: 
Data used in Table III considers only data available for the 50 jobs 
considered; neglecting the running averages for 10, 20, JO, and 4o jobs 
as presented in the stated reference. The interested reader may refer 
to this paper soon to be published in the Journal of~ Construction 
Division, ASCE. 
TABLE III 
COMPARISON OF BIDDING MODELS 
TtPE NO. OF TIMES WORK TOTAL PROFIT 
MODEL LOW BIDDER VOLUME PROFIT MARGIN 
LD 4 $2,029,511 $ 67,748 J.44% 
AD 8 J,956,050 209,068 5.28% 
MD 2 1,2J6,659 70,000 5.66% 
LD 6 J,246,376 146,139 4.19% 
(excl. 11 our11 bid) 
Before analyzing the results of these data, it should be noted that 
this experiment assumed that the estimated cost equaled the actual cost 
and was constant for each job. The optimization calculations were not 
included in the reference, and therefore, could not be verified. 
It is evident from Table III that the AD model gave the best 
result in this experiment if one uses a linear objective function. 
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However, this should not be considered by the reader as proof that the 
AD model is most valid. This is only the result of one sample from an 
extremely large population. It should be considered only as an example 
in which the "average bidder" concept obtained the best results. 
What is the Optimum Bid? 
It has been noted that none of the presented models have a method 
for finding the optimum bid in closed form. If the probability of 
winning and tne probability tbat the estimated cost equals the actual 
cost could be defined by a nice differentiable function, then the 
optimum bid might be found by calculus as stated in Equation (2.5). 
However, it should be obvious to the reader that this simple method 
cannot be used at the present "state of the art. 11 Therefore, no method 
has yet been developed to find an optimum solution in closed form and 
only iterative or sequential search techniques can be used. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE PROFIT AS A RANDOM VARIABIE 
CONDITIONAL ON WINNING 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and provide a solution 
to the acute problem of predicting the cost of a construction project 
prior to completing the project. The essential element of risk in a 
construction project is the inability to adequately estimate the true 
cost. Friedman (21), in the development of tne first published bidding 
model recognized that the estimated cost in any industry is only the 
estimate of the mean of a random variable which describes the actual 
cost of a project. Since that time, most bidding models have treated 
the actual cost as a predetermined constant. Recently Benjamin (5:J1) 
provided a treatment of the cost as a random variable but failed to 
provide a practical solution useable to the construction contractor. 
His method is solely dependent on the assumption of a cost distribution 
function. 
The Cost Estimate 
Since one of the major elements of uncertainty in construction 
contracting is the actual cost of construction, the problem should be 
discussed in terms of its basic elements. The cost of a construction 
project can be synthesized into seven elements. The cost estimate 
structure with these seven elements and profit is as shown in Figure 12. 
The majority of these seven costs are extremely sensitive to random 
influences of nature and human beings. Thus, these cost elements can be 
termed random variables. Over the course of time, the fact that vari-
ables behave randomly is not as imponderable as one might think. The 
fact that they behave randomly implies that each will follow a specific 
probability distribution. This fact can assist the contractor in more 














Figure 12. Cost Estimate Structure 
The Direct Cost 
First, a discussion of the specific cost elements and why they 
behave randomly is in order. The estimation of direct cost has been the 
subject of much study and literature over the past years. Although for 
specific contractors costs may be categorized differently, this author 
prefers to consider the direct cost of a project as consisting of the 
following five elements: subcontractor costs, material costs, equipment 
costs, labor cost, and job overhead costs. 
The subcontractor costs are perhaps the most nearly stable costs 
estimated for a project. Once a contractor decides to estimate a job, 
subcontractors are requested to submit bids for certain phases of the 
job. Once a bid has been submitted to the contractor and a contract 
signed, the subcontractor is legally bound to perform the work at the 
quoted price. Only errors, accidents or acts of God can change the 
price of a subcontract and these must be either absorbed by the sub-
contractor, negotiated or handled by legal action. For the purpose of 
this discussion, subcontractor cost· will be treated as a constant as 
it applies to the competitive bidding problem. 
The cost of material in a properly prepared estimate will be quoted 
at the time that the estimate is made. Ideally, the quoted price should 
remain in effect for the duration of the project. However, there are 
many instanceswhereexternal factors cause prices to change during the 
course of a project. These factors might be due to increased manufac-
turing costs, changes in the economy, shortages, strikes, etc. There-
fore, unless special precautions are taken to insure a firm materials 
cost for the duration, which usually means paying premium prices, there 
exists the possibility of material price fluctuations during the con-
struction of a project. In addition to price fluctuations, other 
factors affect the material cost of a project such as loss or damage to 
material on hand, miscalculations of quantities involved or expediting 
required due to inaccurate scheduling. 
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Hadley (97:40) gives an intuitive definition of a random variable 
as "any numerical quantity whose value will be determined by the outcome 
of a random experiment." The material costs of a project is a numeri-
cal quantity that varies; its true outcome depends on nature, the actions 
or nonactions of many individuals and human errors. The composite of 
these influences may be defined as a random experiment, thus qualifying 
the material cost as a random variable. 
Labor cost, equipment cost, and job overhead costs are extremely 
sensitive to the duration of a project. The prescheduling and planning 
of the duration of a project has been researched extensively in recent 
years. It has been recognized that estimated durations are extremely 
stochastic in nature, the fact which led to the development of PERT 
(Program Evaluation and Review Techniques) as a scheduling vehicle. 
The time, cost, and knowledge associated with the use of PERT has 
hindered its use in the construction industry. A more common scheduling 
technique, CPM (Critical Path Method), which itself has not been widely 
adopted, is simply a deterministic form of PERT. Neither of these two 
scheduling techniques are adequate for scheduling and controlling a 
construction project. CPM will give one person's best estimate of a 
project. PERT, with its Beta distribution assumption for each activity 
will result in an expected duration with an associated variance for the 
duration of the project. Since the random influences of human error, 
weather, and a plethora of other factors affect the duration of con-
struction projects; the time involved in construction satisfies the 
definition of a random variable. 
There are two methods of estimating labor cost. The first, and 
probably most accurate, is a time-cost method. The labor force required 
for each activity is estimated, the time cost of this crew is calculated 
and the time of the activity is taken from the schedule. The labor cost 
for that activity is simply a product of the three estimates. If the 
labor force and costs are considered predetermined constants, the 
activity cost is the product of a constant by the time random variable 
which itself is a random variable. The labor cost for the project is a 
sum of these random variables, and consequently, a random variable 
itself. 
The second method of estimating labor costs is by unit costs. Unit 
costs for various activities are calculated both rationally and from 
historical data. This method of labor cost estimating is generally less 
accurate than the previous method but is used extensively in building 
construction. The unit cost is simply an average labor cost for a 
certain amount of constructioninplace divided by that amount of con-
struction measured in terms of some dimension, such as per cubic yard, 
per brick, etc. The unit cost, in actuality, is simply a mathematical 
manipulation of the time cost of labor, and therefore, can also be 
classed as a random variablee 
' The estimated equipment cost of a project involves numerous calcu-
lations, and its effect on the total job cost varies from slight as in 
the case of pure vertical construction to predominant in the case of 
pure horizontal constructione As mentioned previously, the estimate of 
equipment cost is very time-dependent. Basically, the equipment hourly 
cost is calculated from the fixed cost plus the operating cost of each 
item of construction equipment to be used on the project. The major 
element in the fixed cost of. equipment is the depreciation of the equip-
ment which is in itself time dependent upon the expected useful life of 
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the item. The operating cost varies directly with the scheduled time of 
the job; therefore, time provides the random influence on the operating 
and fixed cost of the equipment. 
The costs that are considered job overhead vary from contractor to 
contractor. Most generally, the job overhead costs are those that are 
incurred for the duration of the job which do not directly account for 
construction in place, such as supervision, inspection, bonding and 
insurance, etc. These costs are again a direct (not necessarily linear) 
function of time which is the randomizing influence. 
The Indirect Costs 
The indirect costs associated with a project are more elusive to 
the estimator than direct costs. They are difficult to identify and 
even more difficult to unitize. The indirect costs consist of the 
general overhead cost and "other costs." 
The general overhead actual cost remains constant with time. 
However, it is roughly hyperbolic when related to the volume of work on 
hand. For instance, if a contractor has $JOO,OOO of work in progress, 
his general overhead might be six per cent. This figure would consist 
of the proration of the cost of engineers, managers, office staff, physi-
cal plant, and other fixed business costs.necessary for contractor oper-
' 
ations. If this contractor's volume dropped to $100,000, then his over-
head costs assuming no managerial corrections, would be 18 per cent of 
the cost of each project. Intuitively, since the actual general overhead 
costs per dollar volume are a function of the volume of work on hand, the 
estimate of the general overhead costs requires that a prediction of the 
average volume of work over a period of time be predicted in advance of 
estimating a job. The volume of work on hand depends on the state of 
the economy and the construction industry, the actions of competitors, 
the contractors estimating competency, and a multitude of other factors. 
Thus, these influences can only be considered by assuming that the 
general overhead cost is a random variable. 
"Other costs" is a category of the cost estimate that depends upon 
the sophistication of the contractor and ideally should be zero. 
However, there will often be the case that certain costs associated with 
a project can more suitably be considered as "other costs" rather than 
categorized within other cost groups. For instance, a recent financial 
system developed under contract for Armco Steel Corporation (92) 
suggests that the contractor cost associated with labor costs (workman's 
compensation, health benefits, employer portion of F.I.C.A., etc.) be 
separated from direct labor cost to facilitate managerial cost control. 
This is an effort to make cost control compatible with necessary book-
keeping procedures so that accounting procedures may be accomplished 
with one system rather than two or thvee systems. Since this procedure 
reduces contractor overhead, it is advisable to include these costs in 
the category of "other costs." Other items that might fall into this 
category might be mobilization costs, contingency costs and interest on 
money invested. Since this cost category and its use is nebulous, 
"other costs" will heuristically be assumed to be a random variable. 
The Profit Random Variable 
A random variable, to be completely defined, requires that a par-
ticular sample space upon which it is defined be designated and a 
function which relates a unique value to each point in the sample space 
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be formulated (97:39). Based on this definition, the sample space upon 
which each of the seven elements of the cost estimate is definedconsists 
of all real numbers greater than zero; the random experiment is the project 
itself and the function relating the outcome of the experiment to the 
sample space is unknown but can be assumed for the purpose of this dis-
cussion. Having met the defining conditions, let the set C be defined as: 
C1 _ subcontractor costs 
c2 "" 
job overhead costs 
CJ - labor costs 
cl± - equipment costs 
c5 - material costs 
c6 - general overhead costs 
c7 - other costs. 
Let h.(c)6c be defined as the probability that the random variable C. 
1 1 
will lie in the interval from c to c + Ac. If y is defined as profit 
and X is the total bid amount for the project, then 
y (l±.1) 
Let X be considered a constant for any particular bid (this is valid 
since the profit is considered conditional on winning). Then y is only 
a function of the seven random variables and is therefore a random 
variable itself (97:5~). The expected value of y is given by 
7 
E(y) = µY = E(x - I ci) 
i=1 
7 




= x - l E(C.) l. 
i:1 
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Uy = x - I Uc. = x - µ c ( 4:. 2) 
i=1 
l. 









Thus, y is a random variable with a mean, ~y = X - ~C and a variance, 
O'~ = ~-
The effect on the profit from a contract at a specific bid amount 
is shown in Figures 13 and 14:. If the contract is bid at the mean cost, 
~C' the probability that the actual cost will be equal to or greater 
than the amount planned is 0.5 if one assumes a symmetric, unimodal 
distributed cost. If the anticipated profit is µy' bid at ~C' y 2 
represents the greater profit should the actual cost actually fall below 
the estimated cost, say at c2• However, should the actual cost be above 
the true mean cost, say at c1 , y1 illustrates the loss that will occur. 
Using the illustrated curve as the probability density function, it is 
quite apparent that the probability that the cost will fall as high as 
c1 is quite small. 
If no method of obtaining the distribution parameters is used 
during the bidding process, Figure 14: illustr~tes what might be the 
effect should a bid be submitted and won when the cost is estimated much 
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and bid the project at an amount X, the profit that he would expect to 
make is represented by y1• However, under the assumed distribution, 
there is a high probability that the actual cost of the completed 
project will be as great as~ or even c1 , resulting in losses of~ c y 
and y2 , respectively. 
The shortcomings of this type of analysis is obvious. The proba-
bility density function for the cost random variable, and hence, the 
profit is not known. There are no mathematical or physical character-
istics associated with these individual random variables that would 
intuitively lead to the selection of any describing distribution such 
as the Gaussian, Beta or any other. A curve fitting approach for the 
selection of a distribution would, in all probability, be economically 
infeasible. Were the distribution of the costs known or assumed, the 
function could be included directly in the bid optimization as suggested 
by Friedman and Benjamin. 
Based on the foregoing discussion and granting that the profit, 
should the bid be won, is a random variable, one must either ignore 
the random influences and treat the estimated cost as a known constant 
or find some means of handling it in a bidding process. Many authors 
have chosen to ignore the cost and hence the profit as a random variable 
when winning is assumed. The prudence of this assumption is question-
able at this point. Should one choose not to ignore the random nature 
of the cost, then three alternatives exist. First, one may assume a 
type distribution for the cost and calculate the parameters associated 
with that distribution. This is an extremely hazardous method of 
treating the cost estimate as most often an estimator is overly opti-
mistic and, rather than having his estimates distributed nicely 
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according to some classical distribution, his estimate is skewed to the 
right as shown in Figure 15 (5:JJ). This implies that normally the 
estimator will estimate at a cost less than the mean true cost. A 
second method of analyzing the cost is to use multiple linear regression. 
The major drawback to this type is the extent to which one must research 
the variational characteristics. As discussed previously, the influence 
factors that affect the cost estimate are extremely numerous and the 
economic feasibility of this approach, with the inclusion of a signifi-
cant number of variables, is questionable. 
Figure 15. A Skewed Distribution 
The third and final method, and the method proposed by this paper, 
of treating the estimated cost is essentially a compromise between the 
deterministic approach and the fully stochastic approach as proposed by 
Benjamin. The method proposed here is not a clear cut mathematical 
approach, but must be included in the total construction management system 
of a contractor. The method is called the variance minimization approach. 
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Cost Variance Minimization 
Since the bidding process is essentialJy a four stage lottery --
which job to consider -- which objective to use in bidding -- how much 
markup should be added to win -- what will the job cost -- the determi-
nistic approach to cost reduces it to a three stage problem. This 
approach greatly simplifies the optimization calculations also. But, 
as mentioned before, it is necessarily inaccurate to profit estimation. 
Therefore, to gain the benefits of the deterministic approach and to 
improve a contractor's business situation, the estimator's objective is 
to make the estimated cost approach the actual cost. Since the spread 
of any distribution about the mean actual cost is measured by its 
standard deviation, this objective becomes a minimization problem; that 
is, to minimize the variance of the cost estimate. 
Equation (4.J) gives the variance of the cost estimate as a sum of 
the variances of the individual elements in the cost estimate. Those 
elements of the cost estimate with the greatest variance in cost are 
the elements which add the risk to construction contracting. Those 
elements depend primarily on the type of construction in which one is 
involved. For instance, Figures 16a, 16b, and 16c show qualitatively 
the amount of cost associated with various types of construction 
contractors. These graphs, developed intuitively while observing many 
cost estimates, indicate that the predominant direct costs of a building 
contractor are labor, materials, and subcontractor costs. For heavy 
construction, the direct cost is predominantly equipment cost and, 
perhaps, subcontractor cost. Therefore, since the variance in subcon-
tractor cost can be taken as zero, a building contractor should expend 
most of his effort in reducing his labor and material cost variance 
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Figure 16., Equipment, Labor, and Materials Costs 
57 
whereas a horizontal contractor should expend the same efforts on mini-
mizing the variance of his equipment cost. Figure 17 shows a flow chart 
of the recommended estimating system whereby the cost variance can be 
minimized. This chart depicts, not a definite statistical method, but 
a portion of an integrated construction management system for a building 
contractor. The reports required for a heavy contractor are similar. 
Based on the definition of the variance of a random variable, as 
each value of the variable approaches the mean, the variance tends to 
zero. The purpose of the system prepared in Figure 17 is to provide a 
feedback system to the estimator so that costs can be updated towards 
the mean cost~ In addition, the complete system, with elements to be 
explained in Chapter V permit tne contractor to establish a method of 
maximizing profit while at the same time maintaining a cost accounting 
and control system which has the same meaning to the bookkeeper, 
accountant, estimator and field staff (92)~ The system outputs only 
two reports. 
The first, the weekly payroll report, is simply the standard 
payroll report used by most contractors and requires no major changes 
in operation procedures. The second, and most meaningful report is the 
monthly cost and unit cost report. Although this report is used in 
establishing job control, completed job analysis and tax analysis, its 
purpose in this chapter is to provide feedback to update the estimator's 
cost records. 
Prior to instigating this cost updating system, a contractor must 
code each activity of a jobo This is nothing new or unusual since most 
contractors code activities as a matter of record for cost control. 
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Figure 17. Integrated Cost Estimating Procedure 
for a Building Contractor 
*These items will be discussed in Chapter V. 
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combination of both. This author prefers the combination of major 
activities designated by alphameric characters with subactivities 
designated by numbers. Although this method is more difficult to 
program, it is easier for field personnel to learn; this being the most 
crucial element in the success of a report. As a matter of course, the 
estimated duration of each activity should be entered along with the 
estimated cost of the activity. Internally, the computer can calculate 
a straight line expected duration-cost curve; and when the actual cost 
exceeds this estimated cost by a certain percentage (allowing for the 
straight line approximation to a logrithmic growth curve), the job and 
activity can be "flagged" on the report. This is an aside however, 
since it provides for cost control and not directly to cost estimating 
feedback. The quantities of units in place may be entered by delivery 
voucher or separately, according to the characteristics of the activity. 
The portion of the report of intimate concern to the estimator is 
the ACTIVITY CODE SUMMARY which is printed on the report after the final 
job summary. From this section of the report, the estimator can find 
both the mean and variance for each activity code for the month, the 
mean and variance for each activity code to date. From these data, he 
can compare his estimated and actual costs. If the monthly unit cost 
variance changes significantly, he must examine each job to determine 
the reason for the significant changes. Then, based on his judgment, 
he updates his cost book accordingly. The format for the MONTHLY COST 
AND UNIT COST REPORT is shown in Figure 18. 
Finally, after a job is completed, the actual cost of each activity 
code is analyzed. The mean and variance of the unit costs are tabulated, 
MONTHLY COST AND UNIT COST REPORT 
ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTl"1ATED ACTUAL TOTAL TOTAL MONTHLY MONTHLY TOTAL TOTAL IN 
LABOR LABOR MATER UL MATL ESTIMATED ACTUAL UNIT UNIT TOTAL UNIT UN IT PLACE 
COST COST COST COST COST COST LABOR MATL UNIT LABOR MATL THIS 
JOBNR CODE TO CATE TO DATE TO CATE TODA TE TO DATE TO DATE COST COST COST COST COST MONTH 
70-10 FC15 12550 13520 37500 33360 50050 lt6880 .:no o61t0 .728 .210 .518 ltZO 
................................................................................................................. 
JOB SUMMARY 
ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTIMATED ACTUAL 
LABOR LABOR MATOIAL MATL 
COST ·ccsT COST COST 
JOBNR TO CATE TO CATE TO CATE TO DATE 
70-10 312020 321500 711730 617510 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
ACTIVITY CODE SUMMARY 
MONTHLY MONTHLY TOTAL TOTAL MONTHLY MONTHLY TOTAL TOTAL 
MEAN LABOR "1EAN USOR MEAN MATERIAL MEAN MATL 
LABOR UNIT LABOR UNIT MATERIAL UNIT MATL UNIT 
ACTIVITY UNIT COST UNIT COST UNIT COST UNIT COST 
CODE COST VARIANCE COST VARIANCE COST VARIANCE COST VARIANCE 
FC15 .237 .0015 .211 .0009 .121 .0012 ... 90 .0011 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Figure 18. Monthly Cost and Unit Cost Report 
g' 
the actual cost and estimated cost compared, and the estimated cost is 
corrected for biaso 
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Traditionally, the general overhead cost analysis has been a point 
of contention between accountants and estimators (92). Estimators 
desire to unitize it but lack an adequate tool with which to do so. 
Accountants tend to argue that it should not be unitized but should be 
added to the markup and separated from profit annually. The Associated 
General Contractors of America has even published percentage guidelines 
from time to time. 
In order for a contractor to avoid bankruptcy, he must maintain a 
sufficient volume to cover his direct costs, "other costs," and his 
general overhead. Pending further research and relying for the time 
being on the present state of the art, the method of considering general 
overhead in this integrated system is to consider annually the general 
overhead per dollar volume as derived from the tax analysis and add this 
percentage to each bid cost as general overhead. This method tacitly 
assumes that volume remains constant from year to year. This percentage 
should be modified by the contractor if current information is known 
about future annual volume or expansions which will increase the general 
overhead cost. 
This system differs from Friedman's original method of bias cor-
rection in that no distribution has been assumed and the individual 
elements of the cost estimate are constantly updated towards the mean 
thus reducing the variance. Benjamin's method of handling the profit 
random variable conditional on winning is also distribution oriented; 
and, when included in the final stage of the lottery, causes the bid 
model to be ultra conservative. 
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In summary, this chapter presents a compromise between those who 
treat the cost estimate as deterministic and those who treat the cost 
estimate stochastically. The latter deviate extremely from reality, 
whereas no practical method has been devised with which the former can 
be used. The procedure presented here gives the manager the tools 
necessary to make his bid conservative or non-conservative based on his 
judgment and his VT function as presented in Chapter v. It provides 
the contractor with a management tool whereby his entire organization 
can be controlled using one system. Finally, it is a practical proce-
dure which is easy to be put into use. 
CHAPTER V 
A DYNAMIC BIDDING MODEL 
Each model discussed in Chapter III was a static model in that 
neither the contractor's profit function nor his probability of winning 
changed with time. Because of its very nature, the construction 
industry cannot be described in a static sense. Each element of con-
struction operations is ever changing with time. This is not to say 
that the contractor utilizing one of the models discussed in Chapter II 
does not have an advantage over the contractor who uses no rational 
approach to bidding. The models presented are unsuitable from the 
standpoint that they do not represent the dynamic situation in the con-
struction industry. 
The model presented herein adds three characteristics unavailable 
in any other bidding model. First, a method of analyzing a contractor's 
own objective is presented utilizing a volume-time (VT) function with 
associated constraints. Secondly, based on the contractor's objective, 
various utility functions ar~ hypothesized. The third aspect of this 
model presents a dynamic approach to determining the most crucial 
aspects of the competitive bidding model, that of determining the 




In all previous sealed bid models, the only contractor objective 
considered has been the intuitively pleasing objective of maximizing 
profit. Yet, it is not uncommon to go to a bid letting and see 
contracts won at five, ten, or even fifteen per cent below the cost 
estimated by a contractor. As paradoxical as this may seem, there are 
circumstances that make it feasible, or even necessary, that a contrac-
tor bid a Job below cost. The reasons for this are varied. A contrac-
tor may bid a job below cost to pay for mobilization cost for a larger, 
more attractive job. He may bid below cost because he may feel it will 
put his firm in a better position to obtain negotiated work in the 
future. But, these reasons are rare. By far the most predominant 
reason for bidding a job below cost is overhead absorption, e.g., a 
contractor's volume reaches a point that a contractor must get the job 
or risk bankruptcy. 
On the other hand, it is also not uncommon to see a bid with a 
markup of twenty per cent or more at a bid opening; the contractor sub-
mitting the bid knowing that he has very little chance of winning the 
contract. 
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to suspect that the contractor 
utilizing this bid model might have an objective other than that of 
maximizing profit. 
The mathematical model fo~ determining the contractor's objective 
is taken from the VT function which has been developed from the work 
load diagram presented by Miller (99:114). The VT function is a 
functional representation of the volume of work on hand versus 'time. 
65 
The VT function, rather than using a logarithmic decay curve as in the 
workload diagram, approximates each project as a straight line for ease 
of computation and construction. Therefore, the current volume of work 
on hand in dollars can be represented in linear form by 
m(t) 
V(t) = I °kt + ~k 
k=1 
(5.1) 
where m(t) is the number of jobs on hand at time t and °kt + ~k is the 
equatl.on of the kth J"ob. A 1 k 1 d d" · h · F" samp e wor oa iagram is s own in igure 
19 and a sample VT function is shown in Figure 20. 
Each contractor will implicitly set a lower bound on his desired 
volume of work. This is necessary because a contractor must keep a 
certain volume of work just to pay his necessary overhead. If the 
contractor is normally involved in heavy horizontal construction, he 
must pay his straight time employees, make his equipment payments and 
pay his other fixed costs. A vertical contractor has the same consider-
ations and in addition he must provide a certain amount of work for his 
normal subcontractors in order to remain competitive. 
All contractors have an explicitly established upper bound. This 
may be a bound set by the manager or owner determined by the volume that 
he feels he is staffed to accomplish. Most often, however, this bound 
is set by the bonding capacity of the contractor which is based on fixed 
and quick assets. These two bounds, VL' the lowest volume of work that 
a contractor desires to have on hand, and VU' the highest volume that 
the contractor can accept, are two major factors that influence his 
bidding objectives. 
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Figure 20. Example of Actual VT Function for a Small Building 
Contractor 
In analyzing the contractor's objective prior to a particular bid 
I 
letting, let the time in question be represented by t • Let X repre-
o 0 
sent a rough estimate of the value of job to be bid. Then if 
m(t ) 
VL <·I 0 
k,;1 
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the objective will be to maximize the expected profit for the contract. 
If, on the other hand, 
(5.3) 
then two choices are open to the contractor. First, he can omit the 
job entirely. On the surface, this would appear the most feasible 
solution •. However, other factors must be considered. The contractor 
must consider his public relations. A sound contracting business 
structure consists of a balanced amount of negotiated contracts with 
competitive contracts, the negotiated work forming a substantial base 
to the contractor's volume. Therefore, a contractor must bid work for 
sponsors in order to maintain his position for obtaining negotiated 
work. A contractor can, at times, exceed his normal bonding capacity. 
This is done normally with the acceptance of a certain risk. High risk 
performance bonds are inherently more costly and, if the normal bonding 
capacity is exceeded, the contractor is, in all probability, over-
extending himself. Another factor to be considered is a contractor's 
strategic position. Even though he is working to capacity, he must 
still meet his competitors in competition. Not to do so would alert 
his competitors to the fact that he is working to capacity, thereby 
permitting an astute competitor to more accurately analyze his bidding 
trends. Therefore, if Equation (5.3) holds, the objective of the 
contractor will be to increase his profit margin to a point that he 
actually minimizes his probability of winning. 
The third region of interest on the work load diagram is the 
region in which 
m(t0 ) 
VL? l a.t + 13k 
k=1 k 0 
( 5. '-!) 
If one assumes a constant general overhead cost, GOH, to a contractor, 
it is readily apparent that GOH is related to the volume of work on hand 
V(t ) by the equation 
0 
y GOH/V(t ) 
0 
(5.5) 
where y is the general overhead cost per dollar volume. This function 
is represented in Figure 21. The function is an equilateral hyperbola 
and y becomes extremely high as the volume of work decreases. Therefore, 
as a contractor's volume of work approaches the region of the VT 
function represented by Equation (5.'-1), he becomes most anxious to 
obtain more work. Thus, his objective changes to one of maximizing his 
probability of winning the contract. 
By examining the general shape of the function which represents 
the probability of winning as shown in Figure 22, it is apparent that 
if one were to maximize his probability of winning the contract, he 
would bid at the least loss such that the probability of winning is 
equal to one. In many instances, this loss would be too large to 
absorb. Therefore, the third objective must necessarily be modified by 
y 
V(t) 










some constraint. Three constraints are proposed in this paper. They 
are: 
(1) Bid only so low as to absorb the direct cost plus overhead 
cost associated with the jobo (Accept no loss.) 
(2) Bid to accept a loss of a specific percentage. 
(3) Bid only as low as necessary to absorb the direct cost 
associated with the contract. 
There are additional factors that influence the choice of a bidding 
objective that can be analyzed from the VT function. The optimum volume 
of work on hand should be balanced to correspond to the organization of 
a contractor. For example, consider a building contractor with a 
bonding capacity of $350,000 and a field supervisory staff capable of 
handling fouf jobs. This contractor's optimum business situation is to 
have $350,000 of work on hand which consists of four jobs. In a 
dynamic situation, this will seldom be the case. If, at time t , 
0 
and he has four jobs in progress, none of which will be completed prior 
to the time that he must start on the job that has been announced, he 
must decide (1) not to bid the contract, (2) bid the job at a markup 
which will minimize his probability of winning, or (3) analyze the 
feasibility of establishing an additional job supervisory staff. If he 
decides on the latter, this changes his normal business situation and 
increases both his job and general overhead. This discussion shows 
that other constraints can be determined from the VT function. If A 
is defined as the number of projects capable of being managed by the 
field supervisory staffs available and m(t ) is the number of jobs in 
0 
progress at time t , then the additional constraint that affects the 
0 
contractor's objective is 
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m( t ) S A (5.6) 
0 
It should be noted that field supervisory staff capability is only an 
example constraint. There may be many others such as equipment avail-
able for similar jobs, specialty personnel for similar jobs, general 
supervision span of control, etc. 
It should be noted, on the other hand, if m(t ) is much less than 
0 
A, then idle field supervisory staff (or equipment, as the case may be) 
will increase general overhead per dollar volume and, like the situation 
denoted in Equation (5.4), cause the contractor's objective to sway to 
that of maximizing his probability of getting the job. 
The Contractor Utility Functions 
Having arrived at a rational method for selecting contractor 
objectives, they must be represented in such a manner so as to be 
compatible with the decision theoretic approach to be used in this 
bidding model. The common objective function used in most previous 
bid models has been the well known linear relation between bid, cost, 
and profit as represented in Figure 2J. This objective function has 
two distinct disadvantages. The first disadvantage is that it repre-
sents only one contractor objective. The second is that it permits no 
contractor preference towards profit and loss. Therefore, in order to 
adequately demonstrate contractor objectives, it becomes necessary to 
use utility theory as presented by Hadley (97:81). 
Utility theory has been developed in an attempt to more adequately 




Figure 2J. The Common Profit Objective Function 
x 
that the decision maker is rational in that he will choose the lottery 
that will maximize his expected utility (95: 116). A "lottery" is 
completely defined by a set of prizes together with the probability 
distribution of the occurrences of the different prizes (5:42). 
Therefore, in order to define the optimal lottery, one must be able to 
describe a contractor's utility function. The formulation of this 
utility function depends upon the theory that has been developed based 
upon six axioms: 
(1) Orderability. 
for different prizes in 
B and B is preferred to 
It is possible to order preferences 
such a way that if A is preferred to 
C then A is preferred to C. 
(2) Reduction of Compound Lotteries. A rational 
decision maker is indifferent between a compound lottery 
and a single stage lottery having the same expected 
utility. 
(J) Continuity. If A is preferred to B and B is 
preferred to c, then there exists a probability, p, such 
that the decision maker is indifferent between receiving 
B with certainty and playing the lottery having the 
prize A occur with probability p and the prize C with 
probability (1-p). B is defined as the certainty equivalent 
of the lottery. 
(4) Substitutability. If the decision maker is in-
different between two prizes, then one prize may be 
substituted for the other without changing the. lottery. 
(5) Transitivity. Preference and indifference among 
lotteries satisfy the transitivity property. 
(6) Monotonocity. If the prizes of two two-prize 
lotteries are the same one lottery is preferred to the 
other orily if the probability of getting the more preferred 
prize is greater (5:43). 
The question now becomes "How does one arrive at a contractor's 
utility function'?" Assuming that a contractor is a rational decision 
maker obeying these six axioms, one can say that his utility 
function is a mathematical model for the contractor. Axiom number 
three provides, theoretically, a method of formulating a utility 
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function. To determine the utility function u. = u.(e.) where e. is 
J J J J 
the prize associated with the jth lottery, one simply asks the decision 
maker what probability, u., must be associated withe. in a lottery 
J J 
with prizes consisting of only e 1 and em such that he would be indif-
ferent to selecting prize e. with certainty and playing this lottery 
J 
with the outcome equal to u.e1 + (1-u.)e. The number that he gives J J m 
becomes the utility associated withe .• One should note that, since 
J 
the value assigned u. comes from a probability, then the functional 
J 
limits of the utility function will be zero to one inclusive. However, 
since any linear function of this utility function may also serve as 
the utility function, the limits are arbitrary. 
The theoretical approach to deriving the utility function has 
little application in competitive bidding. The value of a bid for a 
construction contract is essentially continuous and the convex combi-
nation approach used by Hadley has little application. Contractors 
think in terms of dollars and the measure of utiles has little appeal. 
And finally, few contractors could actually state their preferences as 
a rational decision maker without a sound tool to assist them. 
Hadley provides relief from the utilization of utiles as a measure 
of utility by his "criterion for using expected monetary values" as the 
utility measure. 
Given a set of lotteries in which the prizes are completely 
characterized by monetary values, then if the rational 
decision maK.er' s utility is related to discounted monetary 
values by a linear equation, monetary values can be used 
as utilities, and if the decision maker selects the lottery 
which maximizes the expected discounted profit he will 
select the lottery which is highest on his preference 
list (95: 123). 
The method for constructing the utility function for a contractor 
is based on a subjective evaluation of the contractor objective as 
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determined from the VT diagram presented previously in this chapter. 
It is inconceivable that identical utility functions would apply to the 
four objectives stated in part one of this chapter. Maximizing one's 
expected profit relates to quite a different utility function than does 
maximizing one's probability of winning based on self-prescribed con-
straints or minimizing the probability of winning. 
Bidding for a construction contract can be considered as a four 
stage lottery. The four stages·may be enumerated as: 
(1) Selecting the project to consider. 
(2) The selection of an objective. 
(3) Deciding th~ amount to bid for th~ contract. 
(4) Determination of the actual cost,. 
The lottery stage governing the selection of a project to consider 
will not be investigated in depth in this paper and is, therefore, a 
subject available for further research. This author's initial approach 
to this investigation would be to consider this lottery as a queueing 
problem, assuming Poisson arrivals for each job. With this state 
addition to the decision tree, the objective of the study would be to 
maximize the rate of return on investment over time. An interesting 
aspect to be discovered by this addition would be the derivation of a 
minimum overhead absorbing volume of work to keep on hand. 
The second stage of the lottery might be considered as a determi-
nistic stage since information is available from the VT function from 
which the contractor can select his objective. In a practical sense, 
it is meaningless to assign probabilities to each branch of the objec-
tive selection stage. Although the state space will initially be 
determined by nature, the deterministic approach is an adequate 
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approximation. For each objective selected, at least one new objective 
function is necessary. 
The third stage of the lottery is the selection of the optimum bid 
amount based on the objective selected. Rather than the selection of 
an absolute bid amount, this model is developed to select the optimum 
mark up, 
r = x/c 
where x is the bid amount selected and c is the estimated cost of the 
project. The action required is the selection of r, the state of nature 
is determined from the probability distributions of winning and the out-
come is the expected utility based on the estimated cost. 
The fourth stage of the lottery is the determination of the actual 
cost of the project. Considering the actual cost as a random variable 
as discussed in Chapter IV, the action is determined from stage three, 
the state space is determined by the distribution of the cost random 
variable and the outcome is the true expected utility considering the 
actual cost. The decision tree representing the three stage lottery is 
shown in Figure 2~. 
The Expected Utility Function for the 
Objective of Maximizing Profit 
If one considers the expected profit function used in all previous 
models, the question arises as to whether or not it represents an 
adequate utility function for the objective of maximizing expected 
profit. If one lets u = y/c then 
u (r - 1) (5.8) 
4 
M~)(IM\"1.E Pl20FIT 
STAGE II : before bid 
STAGE Ill: 
bid markup 
ut (.r, I w•fJ) 
uf (rj I w1u) 
uf (r,., I WtN) 
u!, (r,,.. ( 1<J11J) 
ut,(r,,./ wr") 
U ;~ lr,.. / lc/rN) 
u\ (J-,.. /t-.11tJ) 
STAGE IV: 
resulting utility 
Figure 24. The Three Stage Bidding Lottery 
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is the equation of the expected profit as a fraction of the estimated 
cost. The feasible region for the bid markup, in order to maximize 
profit, is necessarily greater than one. 
The state of the art in establishing a true utility function for 
any one contractor is still in a state of infancy. It is doubtful 
whether a contractor, much less a researcher questioning a contractor, 
could adequately define his utility function at any given instance. 
However, for the objective of maximizing profit, the utility function 
as given in Figure 25 is intuitively plausible since, in this instance, 
utility is linear with monetary value. 
1 r 
Figure 25. The Expected Profit Function for the 
Objective of Maximizing Profit 
The Expected Utility Function for the Objective 
of Maximizing the Probability of Winning 
If a contractor has decided, based on his VT function, that his 
objective is to maximize his probability of winning the contract, then 
as shown in Figure 2~ he has three alternatives as defined in this 
paper. It is necessary to define these alternatives since one could 
maximize his probability of winning by bidding with a markup equal to 
that fraction of his estimated cost which from an ~priori probability 
distribution would provide a probability of winning equal to one. 
However, experience has shown that to win a bid at this markup could 
result in as much as a 25 per cent loss; a loss which can be absorbed 
by few contractors for many jobs. 
The three alternatives selected for discussion here are: 
u21 : Bid at a markup so as to accept no loss. 
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u22 : Bid at a markup so as to accept a loss of the general overhead 
cost (GOH) associated with the project, e.ge, the bid will be 
at the estimated direct cost (DC) of the project. 
u23 : Bid at a markup so as to accept a certain percentage loss, h, 
of the estimated cost. 
The root of each of the above utility functions is easy to define. 
However, the shape of the curve is not. The exact nature of the curve, 
at this stage of development of utility theory, is impossible to define; 
however, axiom three can possibly give some insight into its character-
istics. According to axiom three, in order to establish a utility 
function for an individual, the following question should be posed to 
the individual. 
Consider two events (in the bidding problem say two markups) r 1 and 
r 2• Let r 1 represent the root of the utility function, the markup where 
the utility of winning is zero. Consider r 2 as an arbitrary markup 
such that r 2 > r 1• Since the assumption has been made that the contrac-
tor is a rational decision maker, he has a preference of r 2 over r 1• 
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The question is then posed to the contractor, 11At what probability, u., 
J 
given an arbitrary markup, rj' such that r 1 < rj < r 2 , would obtaining 
r j with certainty be equivalent to obtaining by chance ujr 2 + ( 1 - uj )r 1 ?" 
The resulting probability is the utility attached to r. by the contrac-
J 
tor. This must be done for each markup. Consider now Figure 26. 




Figure 26. Utility Functions for Discussion 
Let rj ~ r 1 from the right. Curve u' implies that the utility 
associated with r. varies as the utility function associated with 
J 
maximizing the expected profit. This in no way indicates that there is 
more importance attached to winning the bid than to making a large 
profit, which is the basic assumption here. Curve u" indicates that the 
utility associated with r. is always less than that assigned by curve u'. 
J 
Again, this curve does not show an increased preference to winning the 
contract. Curve u"", on the other hand, attaches a relatively high 
value to the utility associated with rj in the vicinity of r 1 ; which 
BJ 
implies a great importance assigned to winning the bid, the assurance 
that the optimum markup will remain greater than r 1 and a lesser impor-
tance is associated with making a large profit. Thus, a curve with the 
same general shape as curve u'" satisfies the basic requirements for a 
utility function describing the objective of maximizing the probability 
of winning. 
It should be noted that this discussion is purely qualitative and 
the shape of the utility function is purely conjecture, particularly as 
regards the degree of the curve. Should it be a straight line or a curve? 
For the purposes of this paper, the shape of this utility function will 
be assumed to be exponential in nature with its equation expressed as 
( -b(r-k) u r) = a - ae (5.9) 
where a and b are parameters defined by the individual and k is the root 
of the utility function. Therefore, the assumed utility functions for the 
objective of maximizing the probability of winning are given in Figure 27. 
The Expected Utility Function for the Objective 
of Minimizing the Probability of Winning 
In the previous section, the reasons for selecting this objective 
were discussed. In the establishment of a utility function, the results 
of the selection of the objective of minimizing the probability of winning 
sum to one consequence, that is additional cost will be incurred should 
the contract be won. These costs may be cost associated with hiring 
additional crews or buying equipment, additional bond cost or intrinsic 
cost to cover the risk that a contractor would expose himself to should 
he be awarded the contract. Therefore, the root of this utility curve 
is simply the markup, ri' that will cover the additional cost. 
' 
(a) The Utility Function Associated With Accepting No Loss 
-bi(r-(COH/C)) 
U22 • ~ - ~e 
(b) The Utility Function Associated With Accepting a Loss 







(c) The Utility Function Associated With Accepthing h% Loss 
Figure 27. The Utility Functions Associated With the Objective 
of Maximizing the Probability of Winning 
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If one considers axiom three to establish the shape of the utility 
curve, there is little evidence which would indicate a unique character-
istic of the curve. The shape of the utility function for the objective 
of maximizing profit was obviously a straight line with a one-to-one 
slope of profit versus markup. The utility function associated with the 
objective of maximizing the probability of winning was deduced to be 
capable of being represented by an exponential function. The character-
istics of this utility function depend entirely on the personal prefer-
ence of the contractor. With the root established (meaning essentially 
that the contractor will be paid handsomely should he be awarded the 
contract) his utility function might be a straight line with a one-to-
one slope as the first utility function. On the other hand, even 
though his additional costs are covered, he still may have reservations 
about taking the job. Therefore, the utility function for this objec-
tive will be assumed linear with an undetermined slope which may have 
any value set by the contractor. The equation is given by 
• (5.10) 
where m1 is the undetermined slope and c 1 is the additional cost decided 
upon by the contractor divided by his estimated cost. This curve is 
shown in Figure 28. 
The Probability of Winning the ~ontract 
1n all previous static models, the probability of winning over any 
other contractor has been assumed to be a function of the markup, r, 
alone and the probability of winning over n competitors has been con-
sidered as a function of r and n. However, if one considers that each 
r 
Figure 28. The Utility Function Associated With the 




individual contractor's business trends can be examined by a VT function 
as shown in Figure 20, it is readily apparent that the probability of 
winning can be considered as a function of n, r, and t. 
This discussion will first treat the case of winning over a single 
competitor, extend it to the case of winning over n bidders, then 
extend it to the case where some, but not all, competitors are known. 
The Probability of Winning Over One 
Known Competitor 
The underlying assumption in this discussion is that the following 
data has been maintained on one competitor, say competitor k. 
(1) The amount of money in dollars that competitor k has bid for 
each contract for which both competitor k and "our" 
contractor has bid. 
(2) The cost estimate, in dollars, that "our" contractor has 
made for each job. 
(J) 110ur11 contractor's estimated duration for each job. 
(4) 110ur11 contractor subscribes to one of the many contractor 
information reports which give as a minimum the following 
information: 
a - Contracts to be let in the near future. 
b The names of contractors expected to bid on a 
specific contract. 
c - The results of the bid letting, e.g., the name of 
the contractor to which the contract has been 
awarded and the amount of the winning bid. 
There are numerous national and local publications of this 
type, such as the "Dodge Reports" (105), "Southwest 
Construction News Report" (106), and others. 
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The purpose of elements (1) and (2) are to develop a static proba-
bility density function (P.D.F.) to be used in determining the proba-
bility that competitor k will bid at a markup as related to 11our11 
estimated cost greater than some r • Since it is as easy to develop a 
0 
complementary cumulative relative frequency histogram or assume a 
complementary cumulative probability density function (C.C.D.F.) using 
high speed data processing machines as to develop a P.D.F., the pro-
cedures in this paper will use the C.C.D.F. direct~y. The purpose of 
elements (1)~ (2), arid (~) are to develop a relative VT· function 
for competitor k. 
Let the random variable ~ be defined as the random variable 
representing ~c, where ~ is a random variable representing the bid 
of competitor k, c is "our" cost estimate (considered here as a determi-
nistic real number) and ~ is related to the set of real numbers r ~ 0 
by the function 
(5.11) 
The function, F~(r), to prevent confusion as this development continues, 
may be represented by a discrete complementary cumulative relative 
frequency histogram, or by an assumed or derived c.c.n.F. 
r • 
F~(r) = 1 - s fl\c(r)dr s f~(r)dr. (5 .. 12) 
C) r 
As the number of data points for F~(r) become infinite, the function 
will have a characteristic shape as shown in Figure 29. It should be 
noted that as data are collected in time, the effect of individual data 
points tend to affect this function less and less as the number of 
points become large. Based on this fact, this author considers the 




function to be a static function and is essentially the same function as 
developed in previous models. The purpose now is to transform F~(r) 
into a non-static model. 
The basic assertion to transform 
that, rather than being a function of 
function of time. More specifically, 
F~(r) into a dynamic model is 
r alone, F~(r) is indirectly a 
F~(r), is a function of the 
business situation of competitor k as related to his VT function. 
Graphically, if one assumes a non-static situation, the function F~(r) 
is a surface varying with time such that for a specific time, t 1 , and a 
markup, r 2 , the probability that ~ ;;:.. r is the ordinate to the surface 
Qualita-F~(r, V(t)) where V(t) is a parameter, depending on time. 
tively, this function is described by Figure JO. The problem now 
becomes, how does FR (r) depend on V(t). 
k 
The model to be developed here consists of a number of assertions. 
It begins with a known marginal distribution function, adds an experi-
ment which provides another variable about which no known or assumed 
marginal distribution exists and provides a practical solution for 
finding the conditional probability distribution function. The method 
for finding the expectation and variance of the conditional distribution 
is based on sound statistical assumptions. The assertion about the 
actual form of the conditional distribution, which is asserted to be the 
same as the marginal distribution function, is a conjecture which seems 
reasonable to this author. 
Consider the three stage lottery as shown in Figure 2~. After the 
objective and utility function have been selected, in Stage II, one 
refers to the marginal CoC.DeF., in this case F~(r), to determine the 
probability of winning at various markups. If some methods exists to 
F {r,y(t)) 
1 
Figure JO. The Probability of Winning Over 
Competitor k as a Function of r 
and V( i;) 
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obtain further information about Fl\:(r), Stage III of the lottery will 
have an additional stage added to it. This stage consists of an experi-
ment, in the purest sense of the definition, in which additional infor-
mation is obtained about competitor k. Let the possible outcomes of 
this experiment be the set Vk such that 
which are functions of competitor k's business situation as determined 
from his relative VT function. The practical fact that contracts are 
bid in dollars and cents requires, from a theoretical viewpoint, that Vk 
be discontinuous, consisting of a countably infinite set of elements. 
The decision tree for Stage III will be modified as shown in Figure Jl. 
It was assumed at the beginning of this section that sufficient 
data have been maintained on competitor k to permit the evaluation of a 
relative VT function. Since the results of all public contracts must 
be available to the public by law, since there exist publications which 
·announce the results of both public and private contracts when possible, 
and since most private project sponsors will release bid results to 
bidders as a courtesy, a VT function can be maintained on competitor k 
if "our" contractor is willing to expend the necessary effort and 
resources. This VT function will be relative in the sense that only 
competitive work will be included. As mentioned earlier, the sound 
contractor will maintain a volume of negotiated work in addition to 
competitive work. This ne~otiated work will not appear on his VT 
function. However, this will not affect the usefulness of the VT 
function since the resulting function will simply have its ordinate 





Figure J1. Stage III of the Bidding Process With 
an Experiment Added 
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That is, Figure 20, rather than beginning at an ordinate base of V = O, 
will now have an ordinate base at V equal to some V • 
0 
To construct a model for updating F~ using the additional infor-
mation obtained from the added experiment, assume that the value of the 
random variable ~ can be stated as a function of the random variable V~ 
say 
(5.1Ja) 
as shown in Figure 32. If this relation holds, then 
(5.1Jb) 
and once a value, say v1 , is known for Vk, then r 1 = g(v1 ) and conse-
quently FR (g(v1)), are uniquely determined. At this point, it is 
k 
asserted that a curve can be calculated relating ~ to Vk and this curve 
will be a monotonic increasing curve. However, it is obvious to anyone 
familiar with the competitive bidding problem that factors other than 
competitor k's volume on hand affect the manner in which competitor k 
will bid. In this model, these factors will be considered as random 
influences since they cannot be enumerated. Therefore, the basic re-
lationship between Rk and Vk must be stated as 
where C is the error associated with the other random influences 
affecting competitor k's bidding pattern. 
The next step in the development of this model is to establish a 
procedure by which the probability of winning, F~(r), can be updated 
using the additional information provided by the experiment Vk. The 
r 
f.:C,.) 
Figure 32. Complementary Cumulative Frequency Histogram 
for Competitor k 
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~priori distribution, Fl\..(r), and its P.D.F., fl\..(r), are the marginal 
probability distributions of 1\.. over all Vk. The marginal probability 
distribution function for vk is unknown as is the joint probability 
distribution of the two variables. Hence, a conditional c.c.D.F., 
FR Iv (r), cannot be found by traditional methods. 
k k 
To find Fl\..lvk(r), one must be able to calculate g(Vk). It has 
been assumed that the marginal c.c.D.F., Fl\..(r) is known. During the 
bidding process over time, matched data pairs, [(r1 , v1 ), (r2 , v2 ), 
... ' (r , v )} can be observed by simply noting the value of Vk at the n n 
time of each bid and associating it with the value of competitor k's 
markup, 1\-.' at that time. The function g(Vk) can then be calculated 
by the method of Least Squares. Once the function has been calculated, 
parameters concerning the conditional C.C.D.F. can then be calculated. 
Least Squares theory, in its basic form, requires three 
assumptions: 
(1) The values of the independent variable are fixed; 
(2) The expectation of the error term in the least squares 
formulation be zero; 
(J) 2 The variance of (R/V) = a = constant. 
Ideally, both variables, 1\.. and Vk' should be normally distributed in 
order to use the method of Least Squares for calculating g(Vk). 
However, in this model, this is not the case and only the marginal dis-
tribution for 1\.. is known. Assu~ption (1) and (2) can reasonably be 
applied to this model and will, therefore, be considered assumptions 
in this model. However, assumption (J) requires further consideration. 
There is no evidence available to preclude the homoscedasticity 
assumption providing the variance of the conditional probability density 
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function is less than the marginal variance. Huang (98:41) states that 
the best linear unbiased estimator of the variance of the error term in 




I [r. - g(v.)]2 1 1 
Therefore, the model for updating the marginal distribution proposed by 
this treatise is 
F~lvk(r) FR (r) (5.16) 
k 
where 
E(r/vk) = g(vk) (5.17) 
and 
n 
2 1 I [r. - g(vk)]2 • (5.18) 0 (r/vk) n-2 1 
i=1 
Thus, this model translates the mean of the marginal distribution 
of ~ over all Vk to the value predicted by the regression equation and 
contracts the distribution by the calculated variance. It implies that 
the conditional distribution retains the shape of the marginal distri-
bution. It should be noted that this is an assertion, practical in 
• 
nature, but has no theoretical basis. It does provide a workable method 
for updating the marginal C.CeD.F. 
In the example that follows, the marginal c.c.D.F., F~(r), is a 
discrete complementary cumulative relative frequency histogram developed 
from historical data. The relation between the volume of work on hand 
for competitor k, vk, and his markup, rk, is found to be linear and 
given by an equation of the form 
r = Ctv + ~ 
Therefore, the expected value of the conditional C.CeD.F. is 
E(rlv) = Ctv + ~ 




I [r. - ( Ctv. + ~) ] 2 1 1 
where n is the number of data pairs of r and v collected. To find the 
conditional C.C.D.F., the abscissa is first scaled by the ratio 
cr I ~ cr then the mean of the marginal c.c.D.F. is translated to the 
r v r 
mean of the conditional C.C.D.F., e.g., if r' is the calculated variate 
of the conditional C.C.DoF. and r is the original variate, then r' is 
given by 
r' cr~lv (r) - [cr~lv E(r) - E(rlv>] 
r r 
For a discrete complementary cumulative relative frequency histogram 
with equally spaced intervals and letting 6 - r - r 1., Equation (5.19) - i+1 
can be calculated by the recursion relation 
r! 1 1+ (¥) 
r 
6 + r! 
1 
(5.19a) 
The data presented in Table IV and computed in Table V have been 
developed for competitor k over a three-year period. The values of r 
were taken from bid tabulations and the VT function has been derived 
DATE 
02 23 6B 
04 09 6B 
04 24 6B 
07 02 6B 
09 27 6B 
10 31 6B 
02 05 69 
05 OB 69 
05 15 69 
05 22 69 
OB 26 69 
10 27 69 
09 20 70 
TABLE .IV 
DEVELOPMENT TABLE FOR Vk VERSUS t, 
rk VERSUS t, AND rk VERSUS vk 
"our" BID EST rk 
25B407 235B17 100957 
12251 9B67 1.2416 
19B911 153700 1.2941 
225010 219500 1.0250 
46o1 4129 1.1143 
245120 226225 1oOB21 
194ooo 172127 101270 
41790 36491 1.1452 
266ooo 239944 1.10B5 
166416 136239 1.2215 
34o125 32541B 1.0450 
B9B4o 73003 1.2306 
116551 93620 1.2447 
TABLE V 
DEVELOPMENT TABLE FOR COMPETITOR k COMPIEMENTARY 
CUMULATIVE RELATIVE FREQUENCY HISTOGRAM 
r l:rk >r l:f/n >r 
1.00 13 1.000 
1.02 13 1.000 
1.04 12 .923 
1.06 11 .B46 
1.oB 11 .B46 
1.10 9 .692 
1.12 7 .53B 
1.,14 5 .JB5 
1.16 4 .JOB 
1.1B 4 .JOB 
1.20 4 .JOB 
1 .. 22 3 .231 
1.24: 3 .231 
1.26 1 .077 
1.2B 1 .077 



















from both bid tabulations and publications listed in assumption four. 
Figure 33 graphically illustrates competitor k's VT function super-
imposed on a time graph of his markup as related to "our" estimated 
cost. A least squares fit was used in finding r as a function of v. 
A linear relationship fit was found adequate. 
By arbitrarily omitting one extreme point, a coefficient of determi-
nation of 0.74 and a correlation coefficient of o.86 were found to 
exist. Figure 34 shows a graph of the points of r versus v which gives 
a visual indication of the dependence of r on v. Thus, the relation-
ship for competitor k markup and volume is determined to be 
-4 R = (6.75 X 10 )V + 0.9320 (5.20) 
From Table V, the C.C.DoF• for competitor k has been developed and is 
shown in Figure 35. From Equations (5.16) and (5.19) the function 
FR Iv (r) can be found. Given competitor k's volume, v1 , as taken from 
k k 
his VT function at any time, t, then the conditional expected value of 
r, E(rlv1), is calculated by Equation (5.17)0 
The value of the conditional variance, cl' riv' is given by Equation (5.18~ 
The conditional C.C.D.F. for competitor k can now be given from 
Equation (5.16) as 
r I Va.) 
l.~ I 100 I 
&oo I 
u. I 500 I 
400 I 
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v + 0.932 
10"""'------.....i.--------'--------_,_ ______ ....,.. ________ _ 
100 1AO -,oo 'oo \IOUJMI! 
Figure 34. Bid Ratio of Competitor k Versus His 
Volume 
"" • • 2000 
Fl\c (r 1 ) 
where r' is given by Equation (5.19). 
In this example, E(r) 2 = 1.1565 and cr = 0.0056. 
r 
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Suppose that at 
time, t , competitor k has a volume of work on hand equal to $400,000, 
0 
a:lv = 0.00168 by Equation (5.18) and E(rl4oo) = 1.202. Therefore, 
r' from Equation (5.19) 
r' 0.5466 r + 0.5699 
and 
The marginal C.C.D.F. for competitor k is shown in Figure 35a and 
the calculated conditional C.C.D.F. 1 s for Vk = $200,000, $300,000, and 
$400,000 are shown in Figures 35b, 35c, and 35d, respectively. 
Thus, knowing competitor k's volume at the time of a bid letting 
provides a considerably "tighter" and more accurate probability dis-
tribution for winning over competitor k than does the original marginal 
C.CoD.F. 
This example was taken from a competitor against whom 11 our11 con-
tractor has bid only 13 times in three years. This small amount of 
data is not at all uncommon in the construction industry. Later in 
this chapter a curve fitting procedure using an asymptotic distribution 
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It should be noted in the case of this particular contractor, 11our11 
contractor in this study bid against 81 different contractors over a 
three-year period, meeting one particular competitor a maximum of 
17 different times. He bid against only three specific competitors 
out of 81 at ten bid lettings or more. 
The Probability of Winning Over 
n Competitors 
Numerous methods have been proposed to develop the probability of 
winning over n competitors, both when n is known or n is unknown. Each 
of these methods have been discussed in Chapter II. If all competitors 
are known and sufficient data is available on each such that probability 
distribution functions can be developed for every competitor, then the 
results can be combined and the probability of winning can be expressed 
by: 
p(R < r) = 1 
n 







where f. is the PoDoF. developed for the i bidder and n is the number 
]. 
of bidders. This method is seldom, if ever, possible. As mentioned 
* This is Gates' formula as derived in Chapter III by Benjamin. 
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previously, a small building contractor bid against less than four per 
cent of his competitors in excess of ten times over the course of three 
years. Johnson (39) found that out of 136 contractors bidding for 286 
contracts let by the State Highway Department of Oklahoma, only five per 
cent of the contractors bid against the same competitor in excess of 
11 timeso Therefore, unfortunately, this straightforward method cannot 
receive universal utilization by a researcher. However, rarely in real 
world situations will idealized mathematical models apply. As a conso-
lation to the reader, the science of operations research, rather than 
handing a decision· maker a cut-and-dried solution to a problem, attempts 
to provide him with additional information upon which to make his 
decision. The situation in which a construction contractor usually 
finds himself is thus: he knows who and how many bidders will bid for 
a specific contract, and he has a sufficient data record on several key . 
competitors. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will develop a 
system from which an envelope of curves can be presented to the contrac-
tor which will provide a range in which the optimum bid will be. The 
decision maker then has a choice, based upon his own information, 
feelings, intuition or hunches, as to his bid markup. 
Since the development of recent publications as mentioned in 
assumption four eliminates the number n as a random variable, the first 
envelope of curves can be developed simply by considering the distri-
bution of the average bidder (AD) and the low bidder (LD) in terms of 
the ratios of bids to 11our11 cost estimate for all competitors and for 
all low bidders respectively. The equation for the probability of 
winning over the average bidder is given by: 
p(winjAD) = -----1------
n l _ao __ 1 ___ - (n - 1) 
i=1 s fAD(r)dr 
r 
1 





n - (n - 1) ~ fAD(r)dr 
r 
and the equation for winning over the lowest bidder is given by: 
• 






It is evident that the probability of winning over the AD is a function 
of n as well as ro Nonnally, the LD distribution will give the more 
conservative bid where as the AD will give the higher optimum bid given 
a small no To complete the family of curves, the probability of winning, 
using the conditional distributions for the key bidders (KD) is 
combined with the AD to give the fonnula 
P(winlAD and KD) = ,..., -------1---------n-m 
__ m ___ + l 1 - (n - 1) 
S• i=1 FRilvi fAD(r)dr 
r 
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where m is the number of bidders excluding the key bidders. The family 
of curves to be developed, idealistically, will be as shown in Figure J6. 
Prior to further development of this discussion using actual data, 
there are integrals in Equations (5o22) through (5o24) which, although 
valid expressions, cause difficulty in application. Since it is almost 
as easy to develop complementary cumulative frequency histograms as it 
is to develop relative frequency histograms on high speed computers, and 
the expressions f(r) must either be handled discretely, assumed or inte-
grated numerically, a more feasible approach is proposed in the next 
section of this chapter. That is to provide an analytic expression for 
the complementary cumulative frequency distributions directly. The 
purpose of this is threefoldo First, with an analytic expression to 
replace the integrals, formulas (5.22) through (5.24) are easier to 
handle. Secondly, the variable r, which will be the independent vari-
able in the optimization procedures, is a continuous variable and can 
assume any value greater than zero; eogo, the increments of markup may 
be as small as one hundredth of one per cento Finally, although there 
generally exists a unique global optimum for the objective function, 
actual data when treated discretely, will result in small, local peaks 
and valleys when calculatedo Thus, unimodality of the objective 
function cannot be assured for local conditions. Hence, no efficient 
search techniques can be used since all search techniques, with the 
exception of inefficient exhaustive or random search, require that the 





(a) The Probability of Winning Over the LD; KD, and 
AD Bidders 
(b) The Expected Utility for the LD, KD, and AD Bidders 
Figure J6. The Probability of Winning and the Expected 




A Curve-Fitting Procedure; The 
Griffis-Weibull Method 
According to Waloddi Weibull (t02:293) any distribution function 
such that P(X S x) = F(x), where Xis a random variable, can be 
expresse~ by the function 
F(x) = 1 - e -!P (x) (5.25) 
where !P(x) is a positive, nondecreasing function. Since for the 
competitive bidding problem, the random variable R is always expressed 
as P(R ~ r), then, mathematically, the function F(r) can be expressed 
by: 
F(r) = 1 - (1 - e-!P(r» -!P(r) e 
The problem, of course, is in finding the required function !P(r). 
Rothk.ope (67) proposes in his discussion of bidding with symmetrical 





This author has developed a method of fitting a curve to this type of 
Weibull distribution. This procedure is to assume that the probability 
of winning over any competitor, the average bidder or the low bidder can 
be approximated by the function 
( ) -a(r-r )m P r = e · o (5.28) 
where a and m are the Weibull parameters, as yet unknown, and r is the 
0 
maximum value of r, such that the prebability of winning is equal to one. 
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The mean and variance of this distribution function are of little value 
in this analysis but can be expressed as rather complex functions of 
Gamma functions. 
Given that there exist data points (p., r.) sufficient to develop 
1 1 
a complementary cumulative relative frequency histogram, the basic 
approach to fitting this data with Equation (5.25) is the same as the 
least squares method. 
The first step in this development is to take the natural logarithm 
of Equation (5.28) in an attempt to linearize the function. This 
results in 
log P(r) log P - a(r - r )m 
0 
(5.29) 
Attempting to minimize the squared deviations of this log function will 
still result in a messy polynomial of degree m, therefore, it would be 
desirable to take the natural logarithm again, thus linearizing the 
partial derivatives. However, since the function P(r) is actually a 
probability and its value lies between zero and one, the log log P(r) 
does not exist. Realizing this approach is infeasible, an alternative 
approach must be used. 
The function to be minimized is 
n 
h(a, m) = I 
i=1 
m 2 
[log P. + a(r. - r ) ] 
1 1 0 
(5.30) 
This function is differentiable with respect to both a and m. However, 
differentiating with respect to m will be of little value since the 
expression will still contain an m degree polynomial in r as mentioned 
previously and for which a general solution procedure in closed form 
112 
does not exist. Hence, the function is differentiated with respect to 
a, considering m as a varying parameter. A Fibonacci search is used to 
find an m such that Equation (5.30) is minimized. Thus, one necessary 
condition for a minimum with respect to the plane is 
n 
oh I (2)(r. - r )m[log P. + a(r. - r )m] 1 0 1 1 0 
Solving for a gives the expression 
a 
n 
- \'log P.(r.-r )m L 1 1 o 
n 
I (r. - r )2m 1 0 
0 (5.31) 
(5.32) 
Essentially Equation (5.32) defines a plane perpendicular to the a axis 
upon which the minimum value for Equation (5.30) must lie. This is 
illustrated in Figure 37a. To use a single variable Fibonacci search, 
the expression for the variable a as given by Equation (5.32) is 





\ log P. (r. - r )m L 1 1 o 
i:1 log P~ - ~~~~~~~~~~ 
1 n 
l (r. -r )2m 1 0 
which is a function of m alone. 
m 




However, in order to use a Fibonacci search, it is essential that 






L;,,,·'S 6 0 
I ~ 
5 I I 0 " .., z 8 I #[ l°!P;(,ci-·"'> 1 'J("") • Z:... loj fi - • (,.;- .61. 
4 o\ /o / 
i•Z (JJ..;- .84)2-. 
l.•1 
·~ / 8 
3 ·~ '&,-~ 
I I 
I · I 
z I ""' I I .1', / / I I . .........._ ___ . ...-AD;#l•I 
I I ·-............ 
1 : : --·--,.-·--· 
I I I 
I I I 
'·' / .'I /.~ /.'- /.7 I l ·B 1.9 z..o Z..I t.z : L_ 1.1110 Z.13 z.'# Z.S 24 ;z.7 2.8 z .9 f .O I m 
L-- l.5Z'T9 L--2.3096 
(b) 
Figure 37. Graphical Display of Minimization Technique 
procedure can possibly select a local "valley" of the function as 
the minimum value, missing the global minimum entirely. Since there 
is no guarantee that there exists a unique m which will minimize 
Equation (5.33) unimodality cannot be assured in this single variable 
search. However, in view of the fact that the right hand side of 
Equation (5.28) can be expanded into an infinite Taylor series with 
unique coefficients, it seems reasonable that there exists a unique m 
which will give the best fitting curve, thereby assuring unimodality of 
Equation (5.33). For the data used in this thesis, function values for 
Equation (5.33) have been calculated for m in the interval from 0.5 to 
5.0 in increments of 0.01. The results have shown the function to be 
unimodal at least to the second decimal place. Figure 37b shows a 
representative plot of Equation (5.33) for the AD distribution with 
n = 1, 5, and 10. 
When unimodality has been assured, the Fibonacci search algorithm 
as shown in Figure 38 can be used to find the optimal value for the 
Weibull parameter, m. The second Weibull parameter, a, can be found by 
substituting the optimal m into Equation (5.32). The efficiency of this 
search routine is evident in that less than thirty function evaluations 
were required to find the Weibull parameters for a single set of data 
with an interval of uncertainty of less than 0.001. 
As a check to determine the validity of the assumptions, a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness-of-fit test is made at the end of the 
algorithm. This test was selected since the distribution of its test 
statistic can be determined exactly and a confidence band for the 
distribution function established. For 35 or more data points, the 
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Figure J8. Algorithm for Fibonacci Search Routine 
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the 0.05 level of significance. The actual data plot for collected data 
of the low bidder over 38 different jobs is shown in Figure 39 and the 
plot of the fitted Weibull function is superimposed. The value of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic relating the actual data points of the 
LD C.C.D.F. to the Weibull function 
is d = 0.3075 which is considerably less than the critical value of 
1.36. Hence, the hypothesis that the LD distribution conforms to the 
Weibull distribution cannot be rejected. 
Since the AD data vary with n, the data points have been calculated 
for n = 1 through 10 and plotted in Figure !±() for n = 1, 5, and 10. 
In fitting these data with a Weibull function, extreme data must be 
eliminated. 
The various markups for the "average bidder" ranged from a low of 
o.84 to a high value of t.47. From the discussion of the VT function of 
competitor k, it is obvious that those bids with extremely high markups 
were either using an objective of minimizing the probability of winning 
since the contractors submitting these did not want the work, there was 
a mistake in the contractor's bid, or some other factor affected the 
contractor's objective. 
The highest markup of the distribution of low bidders in this case 
was 1.21. Using the LD distribution as a basic distribution and 
integrating the basic PoDcFo, it follows that the probability of a low 
























0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2, 
Figure 39G Actual Curve and Calculated Weibull 






0·9 1.00 1.10 
Figure 40o Actual Data Curves for the AD Function 
for N = 1, 5, 10 
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r 
Using the actual low bidder data with the parameters 
u. = 1.01=1: 
a = 0.09 
it is seen that the maximum markup that could occur within three 
standard deviations of the mean is 
1.01=1: + J(0.09) = 1.31 • 
119 
Therefore, conservatively, all markups in the AD distribution in excess 
of 1.JO can be eliminated. The Weibull functions representing the AD 
distributions for n = 1, 5, and 10 are plotted in Figure 41. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics calculated for each of these fits 
are shown in Table VI. These are all less than the critical test 
statistic of 1.J6 at the .05 level of significance. 
Thus the hypothesis that these functions can be fit by the 
calculated Weibull functions cannot be rejected. 
The Probability of Winning Continued 
It is apparent from the foregoing discussions that, with the number 
of bidders no longer an unknown and the identity of the individual 
bidders often known, the most accurate method of determining the proba-
bility of winning is to develop a c.c.D.F. and a VT function for each 
competitor. For a researcher, this is impractical. However, for a 
contractor working in one area for many years, this capability does 
exist. Even if a sufficient amount of data is not available for a 
C.C.D.F., subjective probabilities can be updated according to the 
developed VT function and the probability of winning can be found by 
P(R <r) 
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Figure 41. Calculated Weibull Distribution for the 




AD n = 1 
AD n = 2 
AD n = 3 
AD n = 4 
AD n = 5 
AD n = 6 
AD n = 7 
AD n = 8 
AD n = 9 
AD n = 10 
* 
TABLE VI 
RESULTS OF GOODNESS OF FIT TEST USING KOLOMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TEST STATISTIC 
m 
(P = e-a(r-0.84) ) 
r S 1.30 r S 1.21 
-
NR * NR 
PTS a m d PTS a m 
-- -- -- -- 38 -90.2005 3.0534 
44 -16.0451 203096 1.0373 35 -42.1193 3.0916 
44 -16. 7360 2.0503 1.1783 35 -40.4911 2.7477 
44 -16.9261 1.9087 1.2427 35 -38.3853 2.5448 
44 -16.9913 1.8130 1.2450 35 -36.5174 2.4oo3 
44 -17.0011 1. 7410 1.2159 35 -35.0006 2.2900 
44 -16.9779 1.6831 1.1740 35 -33-7252 2.2009 
44 -16.9475 1.6353 1.1262 35 -32.6421 2.1265 
44 -16.9161 1.5949 1.0768 35 -31.7158 2.0631 
44 -16.8781 1.5596 1.0287 35 -30.8794 2.0071 


















Equation (2.17). However, for the purposes of this paper, the more 
universal approach will be continued. 
Based on the curve fitting procedure presented, the probability of 
winning over the average bidder can be expressed by: 
P[winlAD;n] 
m 
-aAD· ( ) AD;n e ,n r-r0 
n - (n 
-a (r-r )mAD;n 
1 )e AD;n o 
(5.33) 
and the probability of winning over the lowest bidder can be expressed 
by: 
P[winlwJ (5.34:) 
with the parameters as determined by the Griffis-Weibull method. 
If key bidders are known and sufficient data maintained on some, 
but not all key bidders, then there exists two methods of handling the 
probability of winningo One, FAD(r; n) and FLD(r) can be found omitting 
data for the key bidders and the optimum markup found as shown in the 
next sectiono Then the key bidders can be examined separately and 11our11 
contractor can make a decision based on his utility function at that 
time. Secondly, a more analytical but less practical choice, the AD 
and key bidder distributions can be combined by the following equation: 
P[winlAD and KD; nJ 
1 
m 
aAD· M(r-r ) AD; M 
M e ' o + 
n-M 
I 1 F.(r) - (n - 1) 
J. 
(5.35) 
where M is the number of expected competitors less the number of key 
bidderso 
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Optimization of the Utility Functions 
The three utility functions to be optimized are: 
(r - 1) o ( 1) u 1 
(2) u = 
2 
~ ~ -Y(r - k) 
'::> - '::>e ' where S and y are constants determining 
the shape of the utility function and k is the root of the 
utility function depending on the self-imposed constraint of 
the contractor of accepting no loss, accepting the loss of 
his GOH or accepting a certain percentage loss in return for 
a higher assurance of winning the bid. 
(J) u3 = g(r - c) where E; is the slope of the utility function 
and c is the ratio of the additional cost incurred (either 
real or intrinsic) should the contract be won. 
These utility functions may be subject to constraints mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, thus this may be classed as a non-linear con-
strained optimization problem. However, as a practical matter, the 
constraints, such as equipment, crews, supervisory staff, etc., are 
known or can be visually noted on his own VT functiono Also, these 
constraints are difficult to define in terms of the independent variable 
and the marginal propensity of doing so is questionableo Therefore, the 
optimization of these three utility functions will be case as an 
unconstrained optimization problem although constraints will be con-
sidered by the contractor implicitlye The problem becomes, therefore, 
to find an r* which will maximize the expected value u.(r) for 
]. 
i = 1, 2, or Jo 
For all three of the utility functions listed, there exists two 
methods for finding the optimum valueo Consider first the optimization 
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of u 1(r). Treating the maximization of u 1 (r) classically, one finds 
that the optimum using the LD distribution is given by differentiating 
the function 
(5.36) 
with respect to r and setting the derivative equal to zeroa The results 
give the implicit function of 
r* (5.37) 
Using the AD function to find another r* so that an optimal range can 
be established, one differentiates 
-a mAD·n 
AD;n(r-r0 ) ' 
(r-1) -e~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
-a mAD AD·n(r-r ) ;n 
n-(n-1)e ' o 
(5.38) 
with respect to r and sets the derivative equal to zero, from which one 
obtains the unpleasing implicit function 
m 
-a AD;n 
n - (n - 1)e AD;n(r-ro) 
r* = 1 + -------------------------------
-a mAD·n 
m~1 [ m-1 J AD·n(r-r ) ' 
amn ( r - r ) - amn ( r - r ) + 1 ( n-1) e ' o 
0 0 (5.39) 
Neither Equation (5o37) nor Equation (5o39) can be solved for r* 
explicitly. Although there exists numerous methods of approximating 
solutions for them, the most efficient method of solving for r* would 
probably be a Balzano search (104:). However, the resulting single 
value of r*, although unique, would give the contractor no information 
as to the sensitivity of his expected profit to a change in r. 
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Therefore, this author proposes to solve for the optimum markup for 
Equations (5.36) and (5.38) directly using a Fibonacci search (other 
sequential search techniques could be used) technique (102). Prior to 
doing so, however, the functions must be proven to be unimodal. 
Consider the function 
m 
f ( r) = ( r - 1) e -a ( r - r 0 ) ., (5.4oa) 
This function is continuous and differentiable over all r which includes 
the interval r E [o.84,m), the interval of interest in this problem. 
Therefore, from well known theorems in basic calculus, there exists an 
absolute maximum and an absolute minimum on any closed interval. 
Considering the half closed interval [o.84,m), f (r) = 0 when r = 1 
and f(r) ~ O as r ~ m. Hence, on this half closed interval, there 
exists a point, r* ' such that f
1 (r) = o. This is based on Rolle's 
Theorem as found in any standard basic calculus texto If a function is 
convex, the function is unimodal (100:101) although the converse is not 
necessarily true. Therefore, to prove unimodality, one can prove that 
the function is convexo 
Since there exists a point r* such that f'(r) = 0 on the interval 
of concern, let 6 be a number, however small, greater than zero. 
Consider the two functions 
f' (r* - 6) 
1 -a(r*-6-r )m 
[-am (r* - 6- r )m- (r* - 6- 1) + 1]e 0 (5.4ob) 
0 
and 
f 1 (r*+6) 
m 
m 1 -a(r*+6-r0 ) 
[-am(r*+6-r) - (r*+6-1)+1]e • (5.4oc) 
0 
The first term in both Equations (5.40b and 5.4oc), 
(5.4od) 
strictly decreases as r increases due to the negative sign on a; the 
same holds true for the second term. Consequently, the following 
inequality holds 
fl (r* - ti) > f 1 (r*) > f 1 (r* +ti) • 
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However, f 1 (r*) = O which implies that f 1 (r* - 6) > O and f 1 (r* + 6) < o. 
Thus, there does not exist an inflection point in the function for any 
r in the interval. Therefore, the function is convex and consequently 
unimodal. Hence, a Fibonacci search may be used to find the optimum 
r. The same proof can be given for the utility functions u2(r) and 
UJ (r) • 
The results of the Fibonacci search for the optimum markup for 
utility function u1 are shown in Table VII for the LD and AD distri-
butions. A graph of the expected u 1(r) curve using actual data is shown 
in Figure 42 and the expected u 1(r) curves using the theoretical 
distributions are shown in Figure 4J. Results are shown for u2(r) 
and u3 (r) with assumed parameters in Tables VIII and IX, and Figures 
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OPTIMUM BID FOR Ut = (r - 1)P(WIN) FOR 
LD AND AD OR n = 1, 10 
ACTUAL DATA CALCULATED DATA 
DISTRIBUTIOlf OPr. BID EIP. UTILITY OPl'. Bm EXP. UTILITY 
LD 1.09 0.0288 1.073 0.0254 
AD n•l 1.09 o.059E1- 1.1)4 0.0519 
AD n•2 i.09 o.0443 l.ll4 0.0351 
AD n •) i.09 0.0354 1.104 0.0274 
AD n•4 1.09 0.0294 1.098 0.0228 
AD n•S 1.07 0.0254 l.O~·f 0.0191 
AD n•6 1.07 0.0225 1.090 o.c173 
AD n•? 1.07 0.0202 1.088 0.0156 
AD n•8 1.07 0.0184 1.085 0.0141 
AD n•9 1.07 0.0168 1.084 0.0129 
AD n • 10 1.07 0.0155 1.082 0.0120 
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TABLE VIII 
OPTIMUM BID FOR u. = (1-e-: 1?.0 <i;-- 0 •· 94 >)P{WIN) 
LD A~D AD FOR n = 1, 10 
FOR 
ACTUAL DATA CALCULATED DATA 
DISTRI:etJTI(I{ OP!'. Bm ElCP. UTILITY OPl'. Bm EXP. UTILITY 
LD 0.91 0.7127 O.C/l 0.7955 
AD R•l 0.99 0.9039 0.98 0.0273 
AD n•2 0.91 o.8426 O.C/l 0.7)61 
AD n • 3 0.91 0.7915 0.91 0.6732 
AD n ··4 0.91 0.7569 O.C/l o.6240 
AD n•5 O.C/l 0,7203 O.C/l 0,5837 
AD n•6 O,CJl 0.6871 0.91 0.5495 
AD n • 7 O.C/l o.6.568 0.9'l 0.5201 
AD n•S 0.'1/ 0,6290 0.97 o.4~ 
AD n•9 0.91 0.6035 0.91 0,4716 
AD D • 10 0.'1/ 0,5800 0.'1/ o,4510 
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TABLE IX 
OPTIMUM BID FOR utl == (r - 1.06)P(WIN) FOR 
LD AND A FOR n == 1 1 10 
AC'!UAL DATA CALCULATED DATA 
DISTRIBUTION OPT. BID EXP. UTILITY OPT. BID EXP. UTILITY 
LD 1.11 0.0110 1.11 0.0095 
AD n • l i.20 0.0280 1.19 0.0318 
AD n • 2 i.20 0.0136 1.16 0.0198 
AD n•J i.09 0.0118 1.15 0.0147 
AD n•4 1.09 0.0098 1.15 0.0118 
AD n • 5 i.09 0.0084 i.15 0.0098 
AD n • 6 1.09 0.0073 1.15 0.0085 
AD n•7 i.09 0.0069 1.14 0.0075 
AD n•8 1.09 0.0059 1.14 0.0067 
AD n • 9 1.09 0.0053 1.14 0.0061 
AD n • 10 1.09 0.0049 1.14 0.0055 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A method by which a construction contractor can analyze his ob-
jectives prior to bidding for a contract, develop his utility functions 
representing his objectives, determine the probabilities of winning the 
contract with a dynamic probability function and finally optimize the 
amount of his bid has been presented. The bidding process has been 
developed as a three stage lottery, using a conditional update of prob-
abilities associated with winning the contract. A compromise has been 
made between considering the estimated cost as a deterministic variable 
and considering it as a stochastic variable. This was done using a cost 
variance minimization approach outlined in Chapter IV. 
Basically, a mathematical model representing a contractor, his 
competitors and the state of nature has been developed both analytically 
and with experimental data. This is the concept of Operations Research 
or scientific management which is so rarely applied to construction 
operations. Considering this as a mathematical model, it is apparent 
that absolute answers are not the result. It is merely one more 
package of information available to the decision maker to add to his 
own information system, experience, and guesses, and should be 
considered as such. 
Six additions were made to the state of the art of competitive 
bidding by this work. 
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(1) A Volume-Time function was introduced whereby a contractor 
can graphically determine his objectives when bidding for a 
contract according to his volume of work on hand at any time. 
(2) Utility functions were proposed to correspond to selected 
contractor objectives. 
(J) A method of determining the probability of winning a contract 
was presented. This method is a fully time dependent process 
which, using a decision theoretic strategy, updates the 
a' priori distribution of a particular competitor to his 
present probability density function. 
(q) If all competitors are not known or if sufficient bidding 
data is not available to obtain a priori probability density 
functions on all competitors, a method of combining the 
probability distribution of the "Average Bidder" and the 
"Low Bidder" with particular 11Key Bidders" has been developed. 
(5) The Griffis-Weibull technique of fitting a complementary 
cumulative probability distribution function to a Weibull 
asymptotic distribution' has been developed. This was done 
to obtain a unimodal function to which sequential search 
techniques would apply. This technique is not only applicable 
to the competitive bidding problem but to any other problem of 
science which requires fitting data to a Weibull distribution. 
(6) Finally, a nonconstrained optimization procedure using a 
Fibonacc~ Sequential search technique has been illustrated. 
The results of experimental data utilized indicate that the 
expected utility using actual data and data fitted to a Weibull curve 
decreases significantly as the number of bidders increase. 
1)8 
Using actual data, the optimum markup for a contractor's bid as a 
percentage of his estimated cost varied from nine per cent for one 
through four expected bidders to seven per cent for five to ten expected 
bidders. Using data fitted to a Weibull distribution, the .optimum bid 
varied from eleven per cent with two expected bidders to eight per cent 
with ten expected bidders. These optimum bids were based on a con-
tractor1 s normal linear utility function, e.g., profit maximization. 
This author feels that the data fitted to a Weibull distribution 
gives the more accurate optimum markups since it is an asYl_llPtotic distri ... 
bution. Although there is no method other than extensive experimenta-
tion to prove this assertion, the Weibull fitted data does provide the 
more conservative bidding policy. 
The reader, at this point, has probably noted from Table VII that 
the expected utility (profit) for the normal contractor objective 
function appears extremely small. It should be remembered that this 
is percentage of estimated contract cost. It does not represent the 
percentage of return on the contractor's investment. In actuality, a 
contractor will rarely have more than 20 per cent of the estimated cost 
invested in a construction project. Using this figure, a two per cent 
return on the estimated cost results in a ten per cent return on 
invested capital. 
This author has treated the competitive bidding problem with 
asymetric information as a three stage lottery. As mentioned in 
Chapter V, it is actually a four stage lottery; the stage omitted in 
this work is the first stage. The first stage should answer the 
question: "Which projects should a contractor consider?" This could 
be treated as a queueing problem and the utility function would 
incorporate the volume of work and the specific projects necessary to 
absorb the contractor's overhead and required return on investmento 
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APPENDIX A 
BID COLLECTION DATA FORM 
1L..A 
Bid Collection Data Sheet 
Contractor File No·~~~~~~- Date of Award 
Description of Pro.ject 
Contractor Bid Contractor Est. Mat'l Est. Labor Est. Eg1 ET I I' I . I * 
Est 1 Dur1 A~tuitl Co~t JOH E~t 1 GO!! E13t 1 Qtb~!: 
I I ** I' I . I . 
Rank Name of Bidder Bid [{@marks 
* Not necessary in the bid analysis; useful as a management tool. 
*" Helpful in correcting cost. bias. 
APPENDIX B 
COMPUTED RESULTS FOR THE UTILITY FUNCTION 
u = (r - 1)p(win) 
1i:::n 
THIS IS A~ LO FU~CTION 
THE fQUATICN OF THE NEIBULLFUNCTION IS EXP!- 90.Z576•1R - 0.841•• 3.05391 




NE !BULL ACTUAL CALCULATED 
Q p PROB DIFFERENCE DATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
c. 84 0,97 l oOO -0.0300 -0.1552 -0.1600 0.0048 
o. 85 0.'17 l.co -0.0299 -0.1455 -0.1500 0.0045 
0.86 0.95 l.oo -0.0494 -0.1330 -0.1399 0.0069 
o. e7 C.95 l .oo -0.0480 -0.1235 -0.1297 0.0064 
o.ee Q,95 1.00 -o. 0452 -O. ll<tO -0.1194 0.0054 
o.sc;i 0,95 0.99 -o .0404 -0.1045 -0.1089 0.0044 
c.c;ic C.95 0.98 -0.03)4 -C.0950 -0.0983 0 .0033 
0.91 0.92 0.97 -0.0535 -o. 0828 -0.0876 0.0048 
C.92 0.90 0.96 -0.0605 -o .0120 -0.0768 0.0048 
O,'l3 0.9C O,<l4 -C.0439 -0.0630 -0.0661 o.oon 
O.'l4 0.85 c .92 -0.0734 -0.0510 -0.0554 0.0044 
0.'15 c. 82 C.90 -0.0788 -o .0410 -0.0449 0.0039 
O.'lb 0 .82 0.87 -o. 0501 -0.0328 -0.0348 0.0020 
o. <;7 0.75 c.e4 -o .0872 -0.0225 -0.0251 0.0026 
c. -;e o. 72 o. 80 -0.0803 -0.014" -0.0160 0.0016 
0.99 0.67 c. 76 -0.0896 -0.0067 -0.0076 0.0009 
1. 00 0.65 o. 72 -0. 0654 o.o o.o. o.o 
1.01 0.65 0.67 -0.0183 0.0065 0.0061 -0.0002 
i.02 0.60 0.62 -0.0188 0.0120 0.0124 -0.0004 
l.Cl 0.52 0.57 -0.0478 0.0156 0.0110 -0.001" 
i.e .. 0.52 0.52 0.00"2 0.0208 0.0206 0.0002 
i.cs 0."7 0 .46 0.0063 0.0235 0.0232 0.0003 
l.C6 C,45 0.41 o. 0376 0.0210 0.0247 0 .0023 
1.07 0.40 0.36 0.0374 0.0280 o. 025" 0.0026 
lo CB 0.35 o.31 0.0350 c.02eo 0.0252 0.00211 
1.09 o. 32 o. 27 0.0498 0.0288 o. 02"3 o.coo 
1. lC 0 .2 .. C.23 0.o113 0.0240 0.0229 0.0011 
l. 11 0.22 0.19 o. 0290 O.C242 0.0210 0 .0032 
1.12 0 .14 ~ .16 -0.0173 0.0168 o. 0189 -0.002• 
1.13 0.13 0 .13 0.0024 O.Olb9 0.01611 0.0003 
1. 14 o.13 0. IC\ o. 0281 0.0182 0.0143 0.0039 
1.15 0.11 c.oe 0.0299 0.0165 0.0120 0.0045 
l.lt o. 05 o. 06 -0.0120 o.oceo 0.0099 -0.0019 
i. 17 0.04 o. C\5 -c. 0071 0.0068 o.ooeo -0.0012 
l.1e 0.02 c .C\4 -0.0152 0.00311 0.0063 -0.0027 
1. l 'l c.02 o. 03 -o.oose C.0038 0.0049 -o .0011 
1.20 0.02 0.02 0.0014 O, 004C 0.0037 0.0003 
l.21 a.oz (\ .01 o. 00b9 0.0042 o.002e 0.0014 
V1 
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Tt115 l> AN AO fUNCTICN, r.. z 
THE EC~ATICN Of THEwEIB~LL FUNCTICN IS EXP!- lb.045l*!R - Oo84l** 2o309bl 
TH 15 IS A CCMPARISON OF THE PROBABILITIES ANO THE EXPECTEO PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS AND THE WEIBULL FUNCTION 
EXFECTED EXPECTED 
UllL ITY UTILITY 
lolEIBULL 
lolElllULL ACTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROS CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
Oo84 C.99 lo CO -0.0100 -c.15e4 -0.lbOO O.OOlb 
Oo85 0.99 l.oo -O.OC9b -C.1485 -0.1499 0.0014 
Co8b 0.99 l.co -o.ooe1 -C.l38b -0.1397 0.0011 
o. 87 o.c;e loOO -0.0151 -0.1274 -0.1294 0.0020 
o. 88 0.98 0.99 -O.ClOb -Coll Tb -0.1189 0.0013 
0.89 o.9& c.c;9 -0.0043 -0.1018 -0.1083 0.0005 
0.90 0.98 0.98 0.0039 -c.cc;50 -o.oc;1b -0.0004 
Oo'il 0.98 0.97 0.0139 -c.cs82 -0.08b9 -0.0013 
C.<;3 C.97 0.94 0.0298 -C.Ob79 -O.Ob58 -0.0021 
0.94 Oo9b Oo9Z o.o35b -C.CHb -0.0555 -0.0021 
C.95 Oo96 o. 91 D.0534 -C.0480 -0.0453 -0.0021 
0.96 0.95 c. 89 000629 -C.C38C -0.0355 -0.0025 
o.c; 1 0.94 o.a7 O.Cl43 -c.c2e2 -0.0260 -0.0022 
C.98 0.9Z o. 84 0.0773 -C.0184 -0.0169 -0.0015 
C.99 Oo9l o.ez OoC918 -c.ccc;1 -o.ccaz -0.0009 
l.oo 0.90 o.79 OolC78 c.c o.o o.o 
1.01 0.9C Oo1b o. 1351' C.C090 o.001b o.0011o 
l.oz o.88 o.74 o. lt,3't CoC176 o.011t1 0.0029 
lo04 0.83 Oob8 0.1529 0.0332 0.0211 O.OObl 
1.05 o. 79 Oo65 0.11,37 CoC395 0.0323 0.0012 
1.011 0.11 Oob2 0.1549 C.Ct,1>2 0.031>9 o.0093 
l.07 o. 7t, 0.58 c. l 5bt, c.051e 0.0409 0.0109 
i.ce Oob9 0.55 o. 1380 C.C552 0.041,2 0.0110 
1.09 Oobb o.s2 o. 1395 C.C5S4 0.041!>8 O.Ol2b 
lolO 0.55 Coio9 0.01>07 c.C550 0.0489 O.OObl 
loll 0.45 Oo46 -o.oce5 C.C495 0.0504 -0.0009 
lol2 0.39 O.t,3 -0.0382 c.0468 0.0511, -0.0046 
1.13 0.33 0.40 -O.Ob8b c.c4zc; 0.0518 -0.0089 
1.14 0.31 o.37 -O.C598 c.C434 0.0518 -0.0084 
1. 15 0.21 0.34 -O.C720 0.0405 0.0513 -0.0108 
i. lo 0.24 0.32 -C.Ci52 C • C3 84 0.0504 -0.0120 
lo l 7 0.22 0.29 -O.Cb95 C.C37't o. 0492 -0.0118 
1.18 0.21 0.21> -0.0550 c.0378 o.01on -0.0099 
1.20 o.2c 0.22 -O.Cl97 C.C400 0.0439 -0.0039 
I. 21 0.18 0.20 -O.Cl90 C.C378 o.041B -o. 004C 
l.u C.17 o. re -o. CC9b C.C374 0.0395 -0.0021 
1.23 Oo 14 Oolb -O.C215 C.C322 0.0371 -0.0049 
1. 24 C.13 0.14 -0.0147 c.0312 0.0347 -0.0035 
1.25 c.12 0.13 -c.cc-;2 C.0300 0.0323 -0.0023 
lo2b 0.12 0.11 O.CC51 c.012 O.C299 o. 0013 
l. 2 7 c.12 o. l 0 0.0182 C.C324 0.0215 0.0049 
lo ze o.1c 0.09 0.0101 c.czec o. CZ 52 o.0028 
lo29 0.10 o.os 0.0209 c.cz;c 0.0229 O.OObl 
lo3C a.cs o. 01 o.01c1 C.C24C o.02oe 0.0032 ,... 
\.Jl 
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T~IS IS A~ AD fJNCTICNo N • 2 
THE EQUATION Of T~EREIBULL FUNCTICN IS EXFI- lt.7360•1R - 0.841•• 2.05031 




liE IBULL ICTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERE!'.IC.E tHA DATA DIFFERENCE 
o.a ... 0.98 1.oc -C.Cl98 -C.15U -C.l600 0.0032 
o.a5 C.98 1.00 -O.CH5 -C .147C -0.1498 o.002e 
0.86 o.c;e C.'il9 -O.Cl43 -c.1312 -0.1392 o.co20 
o.s1 C.9c. c.9<i -C.C267 -c.121o9 -0.1284 0.0035 
O. clS o.96 0.98 -0.0167 -C.1153 -0.1113 o.co2c 
0.119 C.96 0.'16 -O.OC39 -C.1057 -0.1061 0.0004 
O.'lo 0.96 o.95 o. 011 7 -C.C961 -0.0949 -0.0012 
C.CH 0.96 0.93 c.0100 -C.0865 -0.0838 -0.0027 
C.93 C.94 0.89 O.C51t9 -C.Ct59 -0.0621 -0.0038 
C.9t, o.c;2 0.86 o.0616 -C.C554 -o.osi 1 -0.0037 
C.95 c.qz o. e3 o. c 888 -C.C462 -0.0417 -0.0041t 
C.96 C.90 o.ei o.C'l95 -C.C362 -0.0322 -OoOOltO 
c .. H C.89 Oo11 0.1121 -c.ci61> -000232 -Oo0034 
Oo9& o. 8!: c. 7t, o. 1C89 -c.cnc -Oo0llt9 -000022 
0.99 Oo83 o. 71 o. 121t 7 -cocce1 -000071 -000012 
1. cc Co 82 0.68 Co 1416 CoO OoO o.c 
l • 01 o.s2 Oo64 Ool757 Co CC 82 Oo0C61t 000018 
1oc2 o.79 Oo6l o. 1176 C.CU7 0.0122 0000311 
loOlt C.71 Oo54 Oo 1101 C.CZ84 0.02111 0000118 
lo05 0.65 0.51 Ool"75 CoC32t 0.0253 000014 
lo06 0.63 0.47 Ool51t0 C.0376 0.0283 000092 
loC7 Oo5'l Ooltlt Oo 1'o 79 C.C411 0.0309 o.0101t 
l.os 0.53 Coltl c. 1190 C.C42l 0.0326 000095 
1. O'l 0.4'1 0.38 0.1156 C.C4'i3 0.0339 o.0101t 
lo 10 o. 3E Co35 0.03['; c.cnc; o. 034 7 Oo00)2 
loll 0.29 0.32 -000288 c.c11c; CoC351 -C.0032 
lo 12 C.24 o. 29 -c. 01t98 C.C291 o.o3so -000060 
1.13 0.20 c.21 -O.C6ija C.C257 0.0346 -0.0090 
lo 14 o.1s o.21t -o.cses c.0251 0.0339 -000082 
lo l 5 0.16 0022 -o. C~31t C.C234t 0.0329 -000095 
lo 16 c.1 .. 0.20 -C.C619 c.c2u 0.0317 -0.0099 
lo l 1 0.12 c.18 -0.0548 "C .CZ 10 0.0301 -o.coc;3 
lo 18 0.12 C.16 -c. C427 c.0211 o. 0288 -000077 
lo20 0.11 0.13 -O.Cl63 c.c222 0.0255 -0.0033 
lo 21 0.1 c c.11 -c. Cl4Z c .c zc 8 0.0238 -O.C03C 
lo22 c.cc; 0.10 -O.CC72 C.C4:C4 c.c220 -C;;,COlt. 
lo23 OoCS 0.09 -C.0130 C.Cl73 0.0203 -0.003C 
1.2 .. o.c1 Co Ce -C. CC BC C.Cl67 o.01st. -O.COl'l 
1. 25 o.oi. 0.07 -C.C04tl C.CHC O. Cl 70 -0.0010 
lo26 o.oi. O.Ob 0.0041> C •Cl cc O.Cl5io c.co12 
lo27 c.ce: o.cs o.01a C.Cl72 0.0139 O.OOB 
1.28 o.os c.04 c.ccao c.ci .. 1 O.OlZ5 o.co22 
lo29 0.05: C.C4 c. c 141 c.Cl53 o.ouz O.C041 
1.30 c.o .. 0.03 c.cces c.c12s c.0100 c.oc2s ,.... 
\J1 
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THIS IS AN AC FUhCTICh. h • 3 
THE EOUATION OF THEWEIBULL FUNCTICN IS EXPI- l6.926l•CR - 0.841•• 1.90871 




WEIBULL .ICTUAL C.ILCULATED 
R p PROB Cl FF Ell ENCE CAT& D.ITA DIFFERENCE 
o.a4 0.97 l.oo -o. 0294 -c.1553 -0.1600 0.0041 
0.85 0.97 l.oo -0.0268 -C.1456 -0.1496 0.0040 
0.86 0.9l C.'19 -0.0198 -0.1359 -0.13117 o.002B 
o.e1 0.94 0.98 -O.C369 -C.1225 -o.12n 0.00411 
0.1111 C.94 Oo96 -0.0220 -c.1131 -0.1157 o.OOZ6 
O.tl'i C.94 C.95 -0.00311 -Col03l -0.1040 000004 
0.90 0.94 0.92 c.ou1 -C.C'i42 -000924 -o.oou 
0.91 0.94 Co'lO 0.0426 -0.0848 -Oo08l0 -0.0038 
0.93 C.92 o. e4 o. 0 721 -CoC64l -o.0590 -0.0050 
Oo94 Ooll9 Ooll OoC714 -cocsn -0.048l -0.0046 
Oo95 0.89 O. l8 Oo 1105 -000444 -0.0389 -Oo0055 
Oo96 0086 Oo l4 o. 1197 -CoC345 -0002911 -Oo004B 
0.97 Oot14 Oo 71 o. uc11 -C.C252 -0.0213 -000039 
o.c;a 0.79 Co67 0.12011 -C.0159 -Oo0l34' -0.0024 
Oo99 0.11 Ooll4 C.1354 -c.con -Oo006"' -0.0014' 
1.00 0.15 Oo60 Oo 1509 OoC o.o OoO 
loOl 0.15 Co511 Oo 1814 CoCC75 0000511 000019 
1.02 0.11 0.51 00101 CoCl42 000105 oooon 
lo04 0.1>2 Oo411 Ool629 Oo02411 0001n Oo0065 
1.05 Oo56 Oo42 Oo 1335 Coc21a 0.0211 000061 
lo06 Oo53 0.39 Oo 1371 CoC316 000234 0.00112 
lo07 Co4'i 0.311 Ool277 Co034l 0.0251 0000119 
i.oe 0.43 0.33 O.C'i66 CoC3't1 OoC263 oooon 
loC'l 0.39 0.30 OoC919 CoC354 0.0211 o.oon 
1.10 Oo29 Oo27 O.C153 C oC2119 0.0274' o.oou 
1.11 0.21 0.25 -O.C3411 C.C236 0.0274 -o.oo:sa 
1.12 OolB 0.23 -O.C49b 0 .0211 0.0210 -0.0059 
1.13 0.1 .. 0.20 -O.C621 CoCl83 o.02114 -Oo0081 
lo 14 o.u o. u -o. 0524 Coc1e2 0.0251> -0.0013 
lo 15 0.11 0.11> -O.C539 c.0165 0.0245 -000081 
lo 16 OolO Ool5 -Oo C509 CoCl52 o. 0234 -0000111 
1.11 0.09 o. u -OoC44l C.Clltb 000221 -Oo00l5 
1018 Cote 0.12 -o. C340 c.ol't7 o.02oa -000061 
i.20 0008 OoC9 -Oo0131 C.Cl5<, o. 0180 -000026 
lo2 l Oo07 O.OB -0.0109 Oo0llt3 o.Olbb -Oo0023 
lo22 Co Cb 0.01 -OoC053 CoC14l Oo0U2 -0.0012 
lo23 Oo05 0.011 -O.C090 c.cue 0.0139 -Co0021 
lo 21t Co05 C.05 -0.0052 CoOlllt 000121> -000012 
1.25 c.o .. o.c5 -000022 CoClC'I Oo Oll<t -0.0005 
lo26 OoOlt Oo04 Oo COloO coc11; 000103 000010 
lo27 Co04 Oo03 o.ccc;., coc111 oocon 000026 
lo28 C.04 Oo03 cooo115 c.0100 c.cca2 o.cou 
lo29 OoC'4 Oo03 o.01c1 CoCl04 Ooocn 0.0031 
lo3C Co03 Oo 02 0.001>8 coco es 000064 000020 ..... 
Vl 
,+:'-
THIS IS AN AC FUNCTICh, N • 4 
THE EQUATION OF THEwEll!ULL FUhtTICN IS EXPI- l6o99U•IR - Oolltl** 1.81301 
1'HIS IS A COMPARISON CF THE PROBABILITIES ANO T"E EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS ANO THE llEJBULL FUNCTJOh 
UPECTEC EXPECTED 
IH ILITY t.i1'1LITY 
llEIBULL 
liEIBULL ACTUAL CILCUU1'ED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
o.e ... o.c;6 lo CC -O.C318 -C.1531 -0.1600 o.oou 
o.es Co96 loOO -0.03411 -C.1442 -0.1494 000052 
0.116 o.96 Oo99 -0.02..,a -C.1346 -o. uao 000035 
Ool7 Oo92 Oo'i7 -O,C464 -c.1202 -0.1262 000060 
0.111 Oo92 o.c;5 -0.0270 -C. llC9 -c.11..,2 000032 
o.8c; Co92 o.n -0.0038 -e.1cn -0.1021 0.0004 
Oo9C C.92 Oo90 OoC229 -C.C925 -0.0902 -0.0023 
Oo9l 0.92 o.n 000525 -CoC832 -0.0785 -0.0047 
Oo93 0.89 0.11 c.ca41 -C.0623 -0.0564 -0.0059 
0.94 0086 o.n c.oen -C.C514 -0.0462 -0.0052 
Oo95 0086 o. 73 Oo 1242 -C.C429 -0.0366 -0.0062 
Oo96 0.83 Oo70 o. u10 -c.cno -0.0278 -0.0052 
0.97 o.ao 0066 Oo 1399 -C,C239 -o. Cl97 -0.0042 
Oo98 Oo74 Oo62 Ool238 -C.01411 -0.0124 -0.0025 
0.99 o. 72 0.58 0.1368 -c.oc72 -0~0058 -0.0014 
1.00 0.69 Oo54 0.1505 c.c o.o o.c 
1.01 0.69 0.50 o.un CoOC69 0.0050 0.0019 
1.02 C.65 Co47 0.1788 0.0129 O~OC94 000036 
1.0 ... o.55 Oo40 0.1505 c.c220 o.01i.o 000060 
lo05 C,48 o.n o. uao 0.0242 0.01113 0.0059 
lo06 Oo46 0,34 Oo 1199 c.c2n 0.0201 0.0072 
1.01 Oo42 0.31 0.1094 CoC29l 0.0214 o.oon 
loC8 0.311 o.2a c. c 789 C.C286 o.c223 o.oou 
lo09 0.33 c.25 CoC742 c.c2c;4 0.0227 o.oou 
1.1c o.2! 0.23 0.0059 0.0234 0.0228 o.ooci. 
loll 0.11 c.21 -C.C357 c.c1e1 000226 -0.0039 
1.12 Ool4 c.11 -C.04b7 CoCl65 0.0221 -c.oo5i. 
lo 13 0.11 0.17 -0.0555 CoCl43 0.0215 -0.0012 
lo 14 0.10 0.15 -C.C4t3 C.Cl4l 0.02011 -0,0065 
1.15 0.011 o.u -0,0463 c.c121 Oo0lll6 -0.0010 
lol6 0.01 c.12 -0.0429 c.c111 0.0186 -o.COll'ii 
1.11 0.01 0.10 -C.C368 c.c112 o. 0174 -0.0062 
lo 18 o.ot o.cci -0.0281 c.c112 c.011,3 -c.0051 
1.20 C.06 o. 07 -0.0107 c.cua 0.0139 -0.0021 
1.21 0.05 0.06 -o.ocn t.ClC'i 0.012& -o.001a 
•• 22 o.os C.05 -0.0041 t.01C7 0.01111 -0.0009 
lo23 0.04 o.os -o.OCll8 C.CC90 0.0105 -0.0016 
lo24 o.o .. o.01o -0.0037 C.CCEll 0.0095 -0.0009 
lo25 c.c3 Oo03 -C. CCll c .cc 82 O.CC86 -0.0003 
10211 0.03 0.03 O.CC35 c.ccet o.ocn c.0009 
1.27 c.03 0.03 O.CC77 c.coa9 o.ooc.a 0.0021 
lo28 c.c3 0.02 011 C054t c.CC7t> o.ooc.o 0.0015 
1.29 o.o3 0.02 c.ocei. C.C078 C.OC53 0.0025 
1.30 c.02 0.02 O.OC511 C.C064 0.0047 .C.0017 ;-' 
VI 
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T~IS IS AN AO FUNCTICho ~ s 5 
THE EO~ATIOh OF THE•EIB~LL FUNCTICN ts EXFI- 17.00ll•IR - o.&41•• l.74101 
THIS IS A COMPARISON CF THE PROBABILITIES ANO THE EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS AND THE WEIBULL FUNCTION 
EXl>ECTEC EaPECTEO 
IJTIL ITY tHILITV 
lllEISULL 
WEIBULL "TUAL CALCULAU.D 
R p PllOB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFEltENCE 
0.14 0.95 l.oo -o. C48l -C.1523 -0.1600 o.oo 11 
OoB5 0.95 Co99 -O.Ot,25 -C.1428 -0.1492 0.0064 
0086 0.95 c. c;e -0.0295 -C.1333 -0.1374 0.0041 
Oo8T C,91 C.9o -o.o5s4 -o. uao -0.12 52 0.0012 
o.se 0.91 Oo94 -O.C319 -c.1cn -0.1121 o.ooJe 
o.ec; c.91 0.'H -0.0044 -0.09'l8 -0.1003 o.ooos 
0.9C Co'll o.ea O.C265 -C.C9C7 -0.0881 -0.0021 
0.91 Co9l o.e5 o.0603 -c.cei 1 -0.0762 -C.0054 
0.93 c.e1 c.n 0.0927 -C.C606 -0.0541 -o.cot.5 
Oo91t o.83 o.n o.t'>32 -Oo C4'i7 -O.C44l -000056 
0.95 0.63 C.6'i 0.1330 -0.0414 -0.0347 -0.0061> 
0.96 o. 7'l 0.65 Oo l 372 -0.0317 -0.0262 -0.0055 
o.97 0.10 Oo6l O.H38 -c.c221 -000184 -0.0043 
Co 'iB Co 7C Co57 0.1226 -0.0139 -0.0115 -0.0025 
Oo9<; 0.67 Oo54 0.1340 -C.CC67 -0.005.r. -Oo00l3 
loOO Oo64 o.so Ool461 c.c o.o o.c 
loOl Co64 Oolt6 o. te33 C.CC64 000046 oooou 
lo OZ Oo59 Oo42 C, 1709 0.0119 o.coes 0.0034 
lo Oto Oolt9 Co36 o. un C.Cl'iS OoOlO 0.0055 
lo05 C.43 Oo33 o. 1041 c.c215 0.0163 o.0052 
1.011 Oo .. C 0.30 0.10~2 CoC21ol 0.01 n 0.00111 
lo OT 0.36 Oo27 0,0945 000251o 000188 0.0066 
lo CB Oo31 Co 24 c.ctisi. CoC246 O.Ct94 000053 
loC9 OoZB Oo22 0.0613 toC252 Oo0l'l7 o.0055 
lo l C co20 0.20 000003 CoCl'ib 0.0196 o.oooc 
loll Ool4 o.1e -Oo 0349 Co0l55 o. 0193 -0.0036 
lo 12 Ooll 0.11> -OoCto33 c.ou6 000188 -000052 
loll OoC9 Oo lto -O.Cto97 coc111 o.01e1 -0.0065 
lo 14 o.ce c.12 -Oo0412 c.ous Co 0173 -0.005& 
lo 15 0.01 c.11 -Co0405 c.0103 Oo0l64 -Oo006l 
loll> coci. OolO -c.c371 c.ccc;s 0.0154 -000059 
lol7 Co05 o.oe -Oo0314 CoCC'il o, Cl41o -0.0053 
lo le o.os Co CT -OoC.239 C.CO'll ooou.r. -0.0043 
1.20 OoC5 CoCI> -CoCC90 CoCC'l5 Oo 0113 -Oo00l8 
1.21 Coe" ooo~ -c.cc12 c.ooee 0.0103 -0.0015 
lo22 o.Oto Oo Clo -000033 C.CCE7 000094 -oocoo1 
lo23 Cio03 OoC4 -0.0053 Coton ooooe5 -0.0012 
lo 21o 0.03 CoC3 -0.0028 OoCCTC 000076 -OoOOC7 
l.zs Oo03 Co 03 -c. CCC 8 cocci.i. CoOo6e -Oo0002 
lo2b OoC3 0.02 o.co31 C.CC6'l OoOOl>l Ooooce 
lo2 7 Oo03 coo2 OoCC65 cooc12 o.0054 OoOOlS 
lo28 o.cz c.cz Co CC<, 7 Co CCU O.OC48 000013 
lo 29 Oo(IZ OoOl c.0012 OoCC63 00001o2 Ooco21 
t.3C o.cz CoOl o. CCtoS coccs1 000037 000011o .... 
\J1 
Q'\ 
THIS IS AN AD FvhCTICht h • 6 
THE EOUATICN OF T~EWEl!ULL FUNCTICN IS EXPI- l~o9779•1R - Oo841•• 1068311 




llEIBULL iCTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DAU DIFFERENCE 
Oo84 Oo94 loOO -Oo0571 -Col5C'i -Ool600 000091 
Oo85 Co94 Oo99 -Oo C499 -Col414 -Ool489 000015 
0086 Oo94 Oo'i8 -~00340 -Co 132C -Oo U68 Oo00411 
Oo87 Oo89 Oe'i5 -Co0637 -Ooll58 -0.1241 o.0083 
0.1111 c.8'i 0.93 -Oo C365 -C.106'1 -0.1113 Oo0044 
0.119 o.e'i c.o;o -0.0052 -CoC'iBC -O.O'i86 Ooooc6 
0.90 0.89 0.86 0.0294 -C.C891 -0.0861 -0.0029 
Oo9l 0.89 0.82 C.0666 -c.c802 -0.0742 -0.0060 
0.93 0.84 o. 74 0.0989 -C.C590 -0.0521 -0.0069 
Oe94 c.80 c.10 Oe0'i69 -C.0480 -0.0422 -o.oo5e 
0.95 o.8c 0.66 o. un -C.C4CO -o. 0331 -0.0069 
Ce96 0.111 0.62 0.1404 -Co0304 -0.02"8 -c.oos6 
0.97 c.12 o.s8 o. 1448 -c.c211 -Oo0173 -oo0043 
o.98 0066 Oe54 o. 1195 -c.cu 1 -0.0108 -Oo002't 
0.99 0.63 c.so 0.1295 -0.0063 -o.ooso -o.oou 
l.oc Ce60 Oe46 o. 1402 c.c o.o o.o 
1. 01 Oe6C Oo42 o. 1170 C.C060 0.0042 00001e 
1.02 o.55 C.39 0.1622 000110 0.0078 000032 
le04 0.45 0.32 0.1259 C.Cl79 0.0129 000050 
1.05 0.39 0.29 OeC924 C.Cl93 0.0146 0.0046 
lo06 0.36 o.z1 O.C'l3l c.c2is 0.0159 000056 
1.01 0.32 0.24 O.C827 CoC225 0.0167 Oo005e 
i.ca 0.21 0.21 c.o5s6 0.0216 0.0112 Oo0044 
l.C'i 0.24 Ool'i o. CSl 7 c.0220 0.0173 0.0041 
lelC 0.11 0.11 -0.0010 CoCl6'i 0.0112 -0.0003 
le ll 0.12 0.15 -0.0335 Coou2 0.0169 -0.0037 
1.12 0.10 0.1 .. -0.0400 C.Cll6 o. 016 .. -0.0048 
loll o.oa O.H -0.0449 CeCC9'i 0.0157 -0.0051 
le 14 0.01 0.11 -O.CHO CoC098 0.0149 -000052 
1.is 0.06 0.09 -0.0359 o.con 0.0141 -0.0054 
lel6 o.o5 o.oe -0.0325 c.coeo 0.0132 -0.0052 
lo 17 0.04 o.c1 -0.0274 C.C076 0.0123 -0.0047 
le 18 0.04 o.Ob -0.02C7 C.CC76 o. 0114 -000037 
lo20 0.04 o.o~ -o.ccu 0.0080 OoCC96 -0.0016 
1.21 o.04 o.o .. -C.OC6l CeCCH o.oca1 -o.oou 
i.22 OoC3 o.o .. -o. CC27 c.ccn O.OC79 -0.0006 
1.23 c.C3 O.Cl -0.0044 C.CC6l 0.0011 -0.0010 
1.24 0.02 C.C3 -0.0022 c.cose 0.0011 .. -0.0005 
lo 25 c.02 c.02 -c.coos C.C05b 0.0057 -0.0001 
1.26 0.02 O. C2 c.cc2s c.ccse o.ocso 0.0001 
loZl 0.02 0.02 C.OC57 c.cce.c O.OCltS C.0015 
le ZB 0.02 O.Cl OoCC4l c.cos1 0.0039 0.0012 
1.29 0.02 0.01 OoOCbZ C.CC53 O.CC35 o.oou 
lo30 o.c1 0.01 O. CC'-2 C.C043 o.oo.>o 0.0013 ~ 
Vl 
-J 
THIS IS Ah AC FUhCTIC~, h • 7 
THE EQUATION OF T~ENEIBULL FUNCTICN IS EIPI• lf:o9475•1R - Oo841•• lo63531 
THI~ IS A COMPARISCN CF THE PR08A!ILITIES AND T~E EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS AND THE NEIBULL FUNCTION 
ElPECTEC EKPECTED 
tllLITY UTI LI T1' 
11E18ULL 
11El8ULL ACTUAL CALCULATED 
II p PltOll CIFFEllENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
Ooe4 Oo93 lo cc -OoC660 •Col4'i4 ·Oo lf>OO o.otc6 
Ooe5 Oo93 Co c;9 -000570 -Col401 -Ool486 000085 
0086 Co93 CoS7 -Co c 382 •Col3C8 -Oo 1361 000053 
Doil Oo87 Co95 ·Oo C717 -Col137 -001231 Do0093 
Ooee Co2 7 Co c;z -OoC410 ·Col050 -Ool099 000049 
Oo8'il Oo& 1 Oo8& -Oo00t3 -C.C'if:2 -Oo0969 000007 
Oo9C Co87 Oo84 0.0315 -Co0875 -Oo0843 -000032 
Oo9l Co87 Cose 000717 -CoCl78T -Oo0723 -Oo00f:5 
Oo93 o.az Co 72 Co l031o -CoC575 •Oo0503 -000072 
Co94 Oo77 0068 Oo0988 •Co01o65 •Oo0405 ·OoC059 
Oo95 Oo 77 Co63 Col42l •CoC38T -.0.0316 •Oo0071 
Oo96 Oo73 Oo59 Oo 1415 -coczc;z •Oo 0236 •Oo0057 
C.97 o.c.c; C.55 0.109 -000201 •Oo0164 •Oo0043 
0.98 Oo62 Oo5l Oo 11!2 -coc121o -Oo0101 -0.0023 
Oo99 o.59 0.47 o. 1240 -c.cc5c; •Oo0047 -0.0012 
1.oc Co Sf> Oo43 o. 1336 c.c o.o OoC 
1.01 Oo56 0.39 Col6'ii8 CoC056 000039 000017 
lo02 Oo51 Co36 Oo l 533 000102 0.0012 000031 
loO .. Oo4l Co JO Oo 11~4 Co0164 0.0118 O.OOlo6 
lo05 Oo35 c.021 oocezs Cotl75 o. 0134 OoC04l 
lo Cb Oo32 Co24 000830 CoCl'ilr Oo0l41o OoOOSC 
lo C 7 Co2'i Oo22 C.C73C toc2c2 OoCl51 0.0051 
lo Ce Oo21o Col9 ooooe coc1c;3 000155 000038 
loO'i Oo22 Co 17 OoClr41r CoCl95 Oo0155 000040 
lo l 0 Ool! Ool5 •OoCC51 CoClio'i Do 0151r -000005 
loll Oo lC Oo 14 -000318 CoCl15 000150 •Oo0035 
lol2 CoC 8 co12 -o.cn1 coc100 0.0145 -00001o5 
lo 13 CoC7 Ooll •Co C409 cocoe5 Oo 0139 •Oo0053 
lo I lo t'oC6 Oo09 •Oo0!35 coooe1o Oo 0131 •Oo0047 
lo l 5 Co05 c.ce •Oo0!22 CoC075 o. 0124 •Oo0048 
lo lei OoOio Oo07 -0.0289 Co Cece; 000115 •OoC04'6 
l.17 CoC<o C,C6 -0.0242 CoC066 000107 -0.0041 
lo Ui c. (\4 OoC5 ·Co0182 CoC066 OoCC99 •Oo0033 
lo2 c OoC3 c.01o •Oo0068 C,C069 Oo0CB3 •Oo001" 
lo 21 CoO 3 c. 04 ·Co0052 C.CC64 O,OC75 •OoOOll 
l.Z2 OoC:; c.o •CoCC23 CoCC63 0.0068 -OoCCC5 
lo23 Co CZ CoC3 •Oo0037 oocos2 oooce.1 -ooooce 
lo 24 o.cz c.c2 -cocc1e c.CC5C o.ocs1o -000001o 
lo25 cocz Oo02 -cocco3 cocc1oe Oo0C48 •OoOOOl 
lo Zt. OoC2 OoC2 c.cc211 CoCC5C 000043 000007 
lo27 Oo02 OoOl Co CC SC cocos; OoOC38 000014 
lo28 c.02 OoCl OoOC37 CoC044 Oo0t'33 Ooco10 
lo 29 o.c2 c.01 o.oos5 CoC045 cooc29 000016 
loll c.c1 c.c1 OoCCH C.CC37 000026 OoOCll .... 
VI 
co 
T~IS IS •N •t fU~CTlC~, ~ • 8 
T~E E~UATIGN Of THE~EIBULL FUNCTICN IS EXPI- lbo9lbl•IR - Oo841•• 1~59491 
THIS 11 -~ AD FUhCTICh, ~ • 9 
THE EQUUION OF ThEllEIBULL FUlllCTICN IS EXPI- l6ol781•CR - Oo84t .. lo559C.t 




llEIBULL IC TU Al CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
Oo84 Oo92 loOO -ooc8n -Col4U -001c.oo OoOUJ 
o.85 Oo92 Oo'i9 -o.01oc. -Ool315 -Oo 1481 Oo0lC6 
OoB6 Oo92 Oo96 -OoC462 -co12n -0.1348 Oo0065 
Ooll7 Ool4 Oo9J -Oo0865 -Co lO'iB -Oo 1211 000112 
0.11 0.14 Ooi9 -0.0491 -Ool014 -001on 0.0060 
0.19 Ool4 0.15 -Oo0092 -CoC929 -Oo09J9 OoOOlO 
Oo90 o.B4 Ooll Oo0J40 -CoCl45 -oootll -oooon 
Oo9l 0.14 o.n OoC190 -Co0760 -000689 -000011 
Oo93 Oo 7.8 Oo61 Oo lCl4 -Co0541 -0.0472 -0.0076 
Oo94 Don Oo-6J 000993 -000436 -ooon1 -Oo0060 
Oo95 OolJ c.51 Oo 1444 -C.C364 -Oo0291 -0.0012 
Oo96 Oo61 o.54 ooun -c.0211 -Oo0216 -0.0056 
0.97 Oo64 0.50 001381 -OoCl91 -Oo0149 -0.0042 
0.91 Oo56 Oo46 0.1055 -OoCll2 -0.0091 -0.0021 
0099 o.u 0.42 Oo 1125 -c.oou -Oo0042 -0.0011 
loOO Oo5C OoJI Oo lZOJ CoO OoO OoO 
loOl Oo50 OoJ4 OoU51 OoCOSO OoOOJ4 000016 
1002 Oo45 Oo3l o.1367 000090 000062 0.0021 
lo04 Oo3!i Oo25 OoC'ilO Co0l41 0.0101 0.0039 
lo05 0029 Oo23 0.0611 CoC147 0.0114 OoOOJ4 
1.06 OoZl Oo20 OoC675 c.01u 0.0122 0.0040 
lo07 0.24 0.11 000516 Co0168 000127 000041 
1.01 Oo20 Dolf> 000367 CoCl59 Oo.0129 000029 
lo09 Doll Ool4 OoOJU CoCl60 000129 000031 
lolO OolZ OoU -oooon coo120 000127 -0.0001 
loll o.oe Coll •Oo0216 000092 OoOlZJ -0.0031 
lol2 0.01 0010 -0.0321 c.0010 OoOlll -Oo0039 
lol3 o.05 Oo09 -OoOJ45 C.CC67 0.0112 -Oo0045 
lol4 0.05 Co Cl -0002111 Co0067 000106 -oooon 
1.u oooto ooc1 -0.0266 C.0059 OoCC99 -0.0040 
lol6 0.03 Oo06 -ooozn CoC054 OoC092 -0.0031 
loll Oo03 Co CS -Oo0197 CoC052 ooooes -Oo0033 
loll 0.03 Oo04 -Oo0l47 CoC05Z- 000078 -0.0026 
i.zo o.c3 OoOJ -0.0054 0.0054 000065 -OoOOll 
lo21 o.c2 O.OJ -Oo004l CoC05C 000059 -000009 
lo22 OoOZ o.c2 -CoOOll C~CCto'i 0.0053 -o.ooc.r, 
loZ3 0.02 o.cz -0.0021 c.ooo 0.0047 -000006 
1024 o.cz 0.02 -OoCOlZ Co0039 0.0042 -Oo0003 
1025 OoOl 0.01 -0.0000 c.ccn 0.0037 -OoOOOO 
lo26 OoOl 0.01 o.oczz CoC039 o.oon 000006 
1.27 0.01 0.01 O.OC<tl CoCC40 Oo00Z9 0.0011 
lo28 0.01 OoOl 000030 O.OOJlo o~oozc. OoOOOI 
1029 0.01 OoOl OoCOloto 000035 OoOCZJ Cooon 
l.o30 OoOl 0.01 Oo0.030 CoCOZ9 000020 000009 ~ 
g 
THIS IS AN At fUNCTICN, ~ t 10 
THE EQUATICN Of T~EWEl!Ull FUNCTICN IS EXP(- lc.e30l•IA - Oo84l•• 1052791 
Tt'IS IS A CCl'PARISO.N CF THE PROBAell!TJES AND Tl-!E EXPECTED PROFIT USP•G ACTUAL DATA POINTS ANO THE WEIBULL FUNCTION 
EXPECTEC EXP EC TED 
1.11LllV UTIUTY 
"E!Bl':.l 
a El BULL ACTUAL CALC.l!1.ATEO 
~ p PRCB CI FFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
c.e .. C,91 l.oo -o.oc;17 -C.1453 -o. lbOO O.Cl4T 
o.es c.-.1 C.99 -O.C771 -c .1362 -0.1'tT8 OoOllb 
0086 C.91 c.c;e. -C.0500 -c.1212 -O.l31t2 0.0010 
o.sT c.el Co92 -O.C93l -Co lC BC -0.1201 0.0121 
Co BB C.83 o. 88 -o.os37 -C.C9'i7 -o.1ou 0.0064 
o.eri C.63 o.e1o -C,ClOb -C.C914 -O.C925 0.0012 
0.90 0.83 o.so o.031o9 -C.C831 -O.C7'16 -0.0035 
o.91 C.83 o. 75 o. ceu -c~C71t7 -0.0671t -0.0011, 
0.93 O.H1 o.ts c.1099 -C.C535 -O.Olo58 -a.con 
0.9 ... o. 71 0.1>1 o.cc;es -O.Olt2'• -0.036" -0.0059 
0.95 c. 71 o.5c. 0.141,5 -C.C35l -0.0281 -0.0012 
0.96 0.1>6 o.52 C.1380 -C.C262 -0.0207 -0.0055 
c.c;1 C,61 ' 0.1,7 0.1351 -0.0183 -O.Ol1t2 -O.OOltl 
C.98 0.53 Oolt3 o.1ocs -C.0107 -o.ooe1 -0.0020 
0.99 o.so 0.40 o. 1071 -C.CC50 -o.001to -0.0011 
l.oo C.47 Oolb o. 11"3 c.c o.o o.o 
loOl Oo47 0.33 Col483 c.0047 0.0033 o.oou 
lo02 o.1o2 0.29 o.1291o c.coe5 O.OC59 0.0026 
lo Cit 0.33 o.21o C.C9C9 c.Cl31 0.0095 000036 
lo05 0.21 0.21 o.ou2 CoCl37 o.0106 o.oon 
1.06 0.25 CoH o.0616 0.0150 o.0111t 0.0037 
lo07 0.22 0.11 o.C532 C.Cl55 o.011e 0.0037 
i.ce o.1s o.u OoC327 Co01"b 0.0119 0.0026 
lo09 Ool6 o.u 0.030,. C.Ch6 0.0119 0.0021 
lolO 0.11 0.12 -O.OC77 c.01cc; 0.0117 -o.oooe 
loll o.oe 0.10 -0.0210 c.ocu 0.0113 -0.003C 
lo 12 c.cc. o.C9 -o. 0 300 CoC072 o.01ca -0.0036 
1.13 o.o5 o.os -0.0320 c.CC61 0.0103 -o.001o2 
lo lit 0.01, o.C7 -0.0200 c.0060 0.0097 -0.0036 
lo 15 O.Olt o.Cb -o. C21t5 C.CC51t OoC090 -0.0031 
lol6 0.03 o.o5 -0.0211 c.cc1tc; o.oos1o -0.0035 
lol7 c.03 a.cs -0.0179 C .CClt 7 o.oon -0.0030 
1.18 0.03 O.Olt -o. Ol31t C .COit 7 0.0011 -0.002" 
i.20 o.c2 0.03 -o.001te c.001tci o.oosa -0.0010 
l o21 0.02 0.03 -C.0036 CoCOltS o.0053 -o.ooos 
1.22 0.02 0.02 -o.co1s Co COit it Oo CC1t7 -C.OOC3 
l.23 0.02 0.02 -o.0021t 0.0037 o.001t2 -0.0006 
lo21o 0.01 0.02 -o.oc10 C.C035 o.oou -0.0002 
lo25 0.01 0.01 c.ooco C.CC3" o.oo31t 0.0000 
lo26 0.01 0.01 o.co2c C.0035 0.0030 0.0005 
l.27 0.01 o.Cl O.OC37 C.OC36 o.0026 o.001c 
lo28 0.01 0.01 0.0028 c.0031 0.0023 o.coce 
i.2c; o.c1 o.Cl o. oc ... o c.C032 0.0020 0.0012 




COMPUTED RESULTS FOR THE UTILITY FUNCTION 
(1 -100(r - 0.91,i,)) ( . ) u = -e p win 
THIS IS AN LO FUNCTION 
TliE EQUATION OF THE WEIBULLFUNCT ION IS EXPI- 90.257b*IP. - 0.81tl** 3. 05391 
U2 a 1.0 - EXPl-100.0•IRlll - 0.91tll 
TliE OBJECTIVE IS TO MAXIMIZE THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING s.r. LOSS LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 6, 




WEIBULL ACTUAL CALCULATED 
P. p PP.DB DIFFERENCE DATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
0.81t 0.97 1.00 -0.0300 ••••••• • •••••• ••••••• 
o.e5 C.97 1.00 -o.o·z9-i ••••••• ••••••• ••••••• 
0.86 0.95 1.00 -0.0494 ••••••• • •••••• •••••••• o. 87 0.95 1.00 -<l.0480 ••••••• ••••••• 52.5740 
o. 68 0.95 1.00 -0.0452 ••••••• ••••••• lBol 719 
0.89 0.95 0.99 -O.Olt04 ••••••• • •••••• 5.9624 
C. 'lO o.95 0.98 -0.0331t ••••••• • •••••• l.7895 
0.91 0•92 o.'l7 -0.0535 ••••••• • •••••• 1.0211 
0.92 C.90 0.96 -0.01>05 -5. 7502 -6.1365 0•3861t 
c • .;3 C.90 0.91t -0.0"39 -1. 51tb5 -l .1>218 0.0753 
0.94 0.85 0.92 -0.0731t o.o o.o o.o 
0.95 0.82 0.90 -0.0788 o.51e3 .Q.5682 -O.Olt98 
0.91> 0.82 0.87 -o. 0501 0.7090 0.7524 -0.003 
0.97 o.75 O.Slt -0.0872 o. 7127 o.195b -0.0829 
0.'98 o. 72 a.so -0.0803 0.7068 o.7857 -0.0788 
0.'9'l 0.67 o. 71> -0.0896 0.6655 0.751t5 -0.0890 
1.co 0.65 o·.12 -O.Ol>51t 0.6481o o. 7136 -0.0652 
1.01 0.65 o.67 -0.0183 o.i.1t94 0.6677 -0.0183 
1.02 0.60 0 ·1>2 -0.0188 o.5998 0.6186 -0.0188 
1. 03 o.s2 o.57 -0.0478 0•5199 o.5i.11 -0.008 
1.04 0.52 o.52 0.0042 0.5200 0.5158 0.0042 
1.05 0.47 0.46 0.0063 0.4700 0.4637 0.0063 
1.06 0.45 0.41 0.0376 0.4500 O.U24 0.0376 
1.01 0.40 o.3i. 0.0374 0.4000 0.3626 0.0374 
lo ce 0.35 0.31 0 .0350 0.3500 0.3150 0.0350 
l.C9 0.32 0.21 o. 0498 0.3200 0.2702 0.0499 
1.10 0.24 0.23 0.0113 0.2400 o. 2287 0.0113 
i.11 0.22 0.19 0.0290 0.2200 0 .1910 0.0290 
1. 12 0.14 o. 16 -o. 0173 0.1400 0.1573 -0.0173 
lo 13 0.13 . 0.13 0.0024 0.1300 0.1216 0.0024 
1. 1'i 0.13 0.10 0.0281 0.1300 0.1019 0.0281 
1.15 c.n o.oe 0.0299 0.1100 0.0801 0 .0299 
1.16 o.os 0.06 -o .0120 0 .0500 0;01>20 -0.0120 
1.17 0.04 0.05 -o. 0071 0.0400 0.0471 . -0.0011 
1.18 0 .• 02 0.04 -0.0152 0.0200 o. 0352 -0.0152 
1. 19 0.02 0.03 -0.0058 0.0200 0.0258 -,0.0058 
1.20 0.02 0.02 c. 0014 0.0200 o. 0186 0.0014 




JHIS IS AN AD FUNC11Ch 1 N = 
THE EOUAl!ON OF THEWE!BULL FUNCTlON IS EXP!- l6oC45l*CR - 0.841** 2.30961 
UZ * l.O - EX?l-lOOoO*IRll! - Co9411 
THE OBJECTIVE IS ro ~AXl~IZE THE PROBAS1LITY OF klNNING s.r. LOSS LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 6, 




llEIBULL ~CTUlL CALCULATED 
R p PROB ClfFERENCE CATA OATA DIFFERENCE 
o •. &4 0.99 1.00 -0.0100 ••••••• ••••••• • •••••• 
0.85 0.99 1.00 -0.0096 ••••••• ••••••• 77. 898lt 
o.86 0.99 l.oo -O. CC81 ••••••• ••••••• 24.1086 
o.a7 0.98 1•00 -0.0151 ••••••• ••••••• 16.5828 a.as C.98 c.99 -0.0106 ••••••• ••••••• 4.2529 
o.89 Oo'i8 c.o;e -0.001t3 •••••••• ••••••• 0.6277 
0.90 o.98 0.98 0.0039 ••••••• ••••••• -0.2083 
0.9i C.'i8 o.c;1 0.0139 ... _ ..... ••••••• -0.2658 0.93 0.97 O."l'+ 0.0298 -1.6667 -l.6155 -0.0512 
0.94 o.96 Oo92 0.0356 ll.O o.o o.o 
0.95 0.96 C.91 0.0534 C.6068 o. 5731 0.0337 
0.96 0.95 o.e9 0.0629 c.8214 o. 7670 0.0544 
0.91 C,94 0.87 o.011o3 o.e932 0.8226 0.0706 
o.9e 0.92 0.84 0.0113 c. 9031 o. 8273 o.015e 
0.99 0.91 o.82 0,0918 c.c;on 0.8121 0.0912 
1.00 0.90 0.19 0.1018 c.en8 0.7903 0.1015 
i.01 0.9C o. 7.6 0.1350 C.8992 C. 7643 o.131o9 
1.02 o.ae o. 74 O. l43it 0.8797 o. 7363 O. llt34 
1.04 0.83 0.68 0.1529 C.8300 0.6771 0.1529 
i.os 0.19 0.65 0.1437 c.1900 0.6463 0.1437 
1.06 0.11 0.62 0.15it9 o.noo 0.6151 D.151t"l 
1.07 o.74 o.58 0.1564 c.71tOO c. 5836 0.156it 
i.oe 0.69 o.55 o, 1390 Co6900 o.s520 o. uao 
l.O"l 0.66 o.sz 0.1395 C.6600 o.5205 0.1395 
1.10 o.55 O.lt9 o. 0607 c.5500 0.4893 0.0607 
l.11 0.45 o.1t6 -0.0085 C.4500 0.4585 -0.0085 
1.12 0.39 0.43 -0.0382 C.3900 004282 -0.0382 
lol3 o.33 o.1oo -0.0686 C.3300 o. 3986 -0.0686 
1.14 0.31 0.31 -0.0598 C.3100 0.3698 -o.05~e 
1.15 0.21 o.34 -o.c12c c.2100 0,3420 -0.0120 
1 •. 16 0.24 o.32 -0.0752 t.2400 o. 3152 -0.0752 
1.11 0.22 o.zc; -O,C695 c.2200 0.2895 -0.0695 
1.18 0.21 0.26 -O.C550 c.2100 C.2650 -0.0550 
1.20 0.20 0.22 -0.0197 c.2000 0.2191 -o. 0197 
1.21 0.18 0.20 -O.Cl90 c.1800 0.1990 -0.0190 
1.22 o.17 o.1a· -o.ccc;c. ·C.1700 o. 1796 -0.0096 
t.23 0.14 0.16 -0.0215 () o 1400 0.1615 -0.0215 
1.24 o.u o.11o -O.Ol47 C.1300 0.1447 -0.0147 
1.25 0.12 o.u -0.0092 c.1200 0.1292 -0.0092 
1.26 0.12 0.11 o.oos1 c.1200 0.1149 o.0051 
1.2 7 0.12 0.10 c. 0182 c.1200 0.1016 (}.0182 
i.zs 0.10 0.09 0.0101 c.1000 o.oac;9 o.01c1 
l. 2 q o.1c o.oa C •. C?C9 c.1000 l\.C7<1l l\ .• MllQ ..... 
°" .;-
T~IS IS AN AD FUNCTICN, N • l 
THE EQUATION OF THEWEleULL fUNCTICN IS EXPI- l6.7360*1R - 0.841** 2.05031 
U2 • loO - EXP(-100.C•IRlll - 0,9411 
THE OBJECTIVE IS TO MAXIMIZE THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING S.T. LOSS LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 61 




llEIBULL ACTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFfERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
o.e4 Oo98 1.00 -0.01'18 ••••••• • •••••• • •••••• a.es o.9e i.oo -O,Olf5 ••••••• • •••••• • •••••• 0086 0.98 0,99 -0.0143 ••••••• ••••••• 4206658 
o.e7 0.96 0.99 -0.0267 ........ ••••••• 29.2175 
a.es 0.96 o.o;e -0.0167 ••••••• • •••••• 6. 7192 
0.89 0.96 0.96 -0.0039 ••••••• ••••••• o.5699 C,90 0.96 0,95 000117 ••••••• ••••••• -006294 
Oo9l Oo96 Oo93 0.0300 ••••••• • •••••• -0.5728 
C.93 Oo94 Oo89 0,0549 -10082 -1.5238 -000944 
0.94 Oo'l2 0086 000616 c.o OoO OoO 
Oo95 Oo92 ooe3 o.C888 Oo~835 0.5273 Oo0562 
Oo96 0,90 Oo8l OoC995 c.7823 006963 000861 
Oo97 Oo89 Oo77 Oo 1121 C.E426 Oo 7361 Dol065 
Oo98 o.es 0,74 Oo 1089 Co83t2 Oo7293 0.1069 
Co99 C.83 Oo71 001247 Oo8292 007054 Ool239 
i.oo o.s2 0068 0.1416 Co81t2 006749 001413 
1.01 0.82 0.64 Oo 1757 C.U74 006419 0.1756 
lo OZ Oo79 Oo6l Oo l 176 007855 o,6079 0.1776 
lo04 0.71 Oo54 0.1101 Oo 7C91t o. 5393 0.1100 
1o05 Oo65 Oo5l 0,1475 C,6529 o. 5054 Oo 1475 
lo06 Oo63 0,47 Oo 1540 C.6260 0.4721 Ool540 
lo07 Oo59 Oo44 Oo 1479 c.5e73 004394 Ool479 
1.08 o.53 Oo4l Ooll90 Co5267 004077 Ooll90 
l.09 Co'i9 Oo38 Oo 1156 C.4925 0.1110 0.1156 
lo 10 Oo38 Oo35 000319 to11-;1 Ool'illt 0.0319 
loll Oo29 Oo32 -0.0288 Co2903 0.3191 -0002ee 
1.12 Oo2't 0.29 -0.0498 Co2422 002921 -0.0498 
1.13 Oo20 Oo27 -000688 Col'l76 0.2665 -0.0688 
lol4 0.18 Oo24 -Oo 0588 Col834 Oo2'i23 -000588 
lol5 Ool6 0.22 -OoC634 Col561 o. 2195 -0.0634 
1ol6 Ool4 Oo20 -Oo0619 Co l361t 0.1982 -Oo0619 
lo l 7 Ool2 0.18 -OoC548 Co1236 Ool7e4 -000548 
lo 18 0.12 Ool6 -000427 Coll 73 001600 -0.0427 
lo20 o.u o.u -Oo 0163 Oollll Oo 1274 -000163 
lo2l o.1c Ooll -0.0142 C. C9 89 Oo 1131 -Oo0142 
lo2Z Oo09 0.10 -0.0012 C.C929 001001 -000072 
1o23 o.c8 OoC9 -0.0130 CoC753 Oo0882 -0.0130 
1.24 0.01 o,ce -o.ooso C.C6~5 o. 0715 -000080 
lo25 0006 o.c1 -Oo004l 000638 0.0679 -0.0041 
lo26 0,06 OoC6 0,0046 CoC638 Oo0592 Oo0046 
1.21 Oo06 o.os 000123 C.C~38 000515 000123 
lo28 o.os Oo04 0,0080 Co0526 000446 000080 
lo29 0.05 0.04 o •. o 141 C.C526 o.0.386 000141 .... 
()'\ 
Vl 
THIS IS AN AO FUNC11Ch, h • 3 
THE EQUATICN OF THEWE!BULL FUNCT!CN IS EXPI- lt.926l•IR - Co84l** 1090871 
U2 • l.C - EXP(-100.0•IRlll - C.9411 
THE OBJECTIVE IS TO MAXIMIZE THE PR05ABILllY CF •INNING s.r. LOSS LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO &, 
THIS JS l COMPlRIStN CF THE PR08A61LIT1ES AND ThE EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS ANC THE WEIBULL FUNCTION 
EXPECTEC EXPECTED 
~Till lY UTILITY 
•El BULL 
ioEIBULL "TUH CALCULATED 
R p PRCB CIFFERENCE DATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
0.84 0.97 1.00 -O.C294 ........ • •••••• **••••• o. 85 C.'97 1.co -0.02b8 ••••••• • •••••• • •••••• 
0.86 c.97 C.99 -o. Cl<;B ••••••• • •••••• 58.9456 
o.87 0.94 o.98 -0.0369 ••••••• ••••••• 40.4590 
o.8e C0 94 0.96 -0.0220 ••••••• • •••••• 8.856.r, 
Oo89 0.9.r, o.95 -0.0036 ••••••• • •••••• 0.5276 
0.90 0.9.r, 0.92 o.o 181 ••••••• • •••••• -0.9686 
C.91 C.94 0.90 o. 0426 ••••••• ••••••• -0.8140 
0.93 0.92 o.e4 o. C721 -1.!72" -1.4.r,95 -0.1239 
c. 94 o.89 o.e1 O.C774 o.c o.o o.o 
0.95 0.89 c. 78 o. 1105 c.5619 o • .r,920 0.0699 
0.96 0.86 o.74 0.1197 C. H68 o. 6"32 0.1035 
0.97 c.84 o. 71 0.1308 c. 7'l15 0.6732 0.12.r,3 
0.98 0.19 0.67 o. 1208 c.11e6 0.6600 0.1186 
0.99 0.11 0.6 ... C.1354 0.166C 0.6315 0.13.r,5 
l.oc 0.75 C.60 0.1509 C.1481 o.5977 0.1505 
1.01 o.75 0.511 0.1874 C.1493 O. 56Zl 0.1812 
1.02 o.n 0.53 0.1831 c. 7C94 0.5264 0.1831 
la04 0.62 o • .r,6 0.1629 Ce6l91t 0.456" 0.1629 
1.05 o.sc. 0.42 o. 1335 c.5563 o • .r,228 o.1335 
1.06 0.53 o.39 0.1371 0.5274 0 • .3903 0.1371 
1.07 C.49 o.36 0.1277 c • .r,86E 0.3591 0.1211 
l.oe o • .r,3 Oa33 o.C966 c.4259 0.3293 O.C96b 
1.09 C.39 0.30 0.0919 C.3929 0.3010 0.0919 
1.10 0.29 0.27 0.0153 C.2895 0.2742 0.0153 
1.11 0.21 o.2s -0.0346 C.2143 0.2.r,99 -0.03.r,6 
1.1z o.1e 0.23 -o.o.r,96 C.1757 0.2252 -o.o.r,96 
lo 13 0.14 0.20 -0.0621 c.1410 o.2on -0.0621 
1.14 0.13 c.18 -0.0524 C .13C3 0.1826 -0.0524 
lol5 c.u o.1b -O.C!34i Col098 0.1636 -0.0539 
1.16 0.10 0.15 -0.0509 C.C952 0.1461· -0.0509 
1.11 0.09 o.u -o.O.r,41 o.oe59 0.1301 -0.04.r,1 
1.18 o.oe 0.12 -0.0.340 C.C814 0.1154 -0.03.r,o 
1.20 0.08 0.09 -O.Dl31 CoC769 0.0900 -0.0131 
1.21 0.01 o.oe -0.0109 c.06e2 o.0791 -0.0109 
1.22 0.06 0.01 -0.0053 OoC639 0.0693 •0.0053 
1.23 0.05 o.oe. -0.0090 0.0515 0.0605 -0.0090 
lo 2.r, o.o5 o.os -o. 0052 c.c474 0.0526 -0.0052 
1.25 0.04 o.05 -0.0022 0.0435 0.0457 -0.0022 
1. 26 0.04 o.04 o.0040 C.0435 0.0395 o.oo.r,c 
1.21 0.04 0.03 0.0094 c.0435 0.0340 0.0094 
l.2e 0.04 0.03 0.0065 c.0351 Oa0Z'l2 0.0065 
1.29 0.04 0.03 0.0101 C.0357 0 .0?51 0.0107 
!-" 
°' °' 
THIS 1.5 AN .. AD FuNcfrc,; .• " • 4 
THE EQUATUiN OF THEllEIBULL· FUNCTICN lS EXPC- :l6o9913•CA - OoHI•• l. 81301 
U2. i.o - EXPc-100.o•IRlll - 009411 
THE OBJECTIVE 1s· TO ,AXlllIZE THE PROeABILITY OF lllNNING s.T. LOSS LESS THAN OR ECIUAL TO 6, 
THIS 15 A COllPARJSON Of THE PROBABILITIES AND T~E EXPECTED !ROFIT USING .ACTUAL DATA POINTS AND THE WEIBULL FUNCTION 
EXPECT EC EXPECTED 
lJl ILITY UTILITY 
llEIBULL 
WEIBULL "TUAL CALCULATED 
R ·p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
Do84 0.96 1.00 -o.o:ue ••••••• ••••••• • •••••• Oo85 0.96 1.00 -0.0348 ••••••• ••••••• ••••••• o.&6 0.96 o.H -o.021oa ••••••• ••••••• 73.9304 
ooe7 Oo92 Oo97 -Oo0464 ....... • •••••• 5008811 
Ooee c.92· 0~95 -0.0270 ••••••• • •••••• 1008857 
Oo89 Oo92 0.93 -0.0038 ••••••• • •••••• .0.55Blo 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.0229 ••••••• ....... -1.2258 Oo91 0.92 o.n 000525 ••••••• •••••••• -1.0014 
o.93 Oo89 0081 o.ce41 -lo!291 -lo3846 -Ool445 
Oo94 0.•86 Oo77 000871 o.o OoO OoO 
Oo95 0086 oon· Co 1242 c.5418 004633 000785 
Oo96 Oo83 Oo70 o. u10 co no 006010 Ooll33 
Co'i7 Oo80 0066 0.1399 Co t569 006240 Ool330 
Oo98 Oo74 0.62 0.1238 e. 728!1 ·Oo6068 001215 
Oo·99 Oo72 Oo58 001368 Co7117 005759 Ool358 
loOO Oo69 Oo54 Oo 1505 Co6906 0.5405 oouo1 
loOl o.69 o.50 Ool877 C:o6917 Oo504l Ool875 
lo02 Oo65 Oo47 Ool788 Oo6io68 0.04681 oonn 
lo04 0.55 0.40 Oo 1505 Go5496 Oo3992 Ool5C5 
lo05 0.48 Oo37 Oo 1180 Ci.4847 Oo3667 001180 
lo06 00~6 Oo34 0.1199 004556 Oo.3357 Ool199 
loC7 0.42 Oo31 Ool094 co.U57 003063 0.1094 
1·ooa Oo36 Oo28 o.c789 Co3$l5 0.2786 000789 
lo09 Oo33 0.25 o.C742 0.3267 o.2525 ·Oo0742 
1.10 Oo23 Oo23 o.co.59 Oo2340 0~2282 000059 
1.11 0.11 .0.21 -0.0357 Ool698 Oo2055 -Oo0357 
lol2 0.14 o.u -Oo0467 Col378 ooi845 -Oo0467 
1.13 0.11 oon -0.0555 CelC96 Oo 1651 -0.0555 
lol4 OolO o.1s -0.0463 OolOl.O 001473 -0.0463 
1.15 0.08 0.13 -Oo0"63 CoC·846 oou10 -000463 
lol6 0.01 Ool2 -000429 cocn2 Ooll61 -000429 
1.17 OoOl 0.10 -000368 Oo06.59 0.1026 -Oo0368 
1.u 0.06 0.09 -0.0281 CoC623 Oo0904 -0.0211 
1.20 0.06 0.01 -0.0101 c.c5ee o.o·696 -Oo0107 
b21 o.os 0.06 -ooocn CoC520 Oo0607 -o.oon 
lo22 o.os o.os -Oo0041 CoC487 · 0.0529 -Oo0041 
·1.23 Oe04 Oo05 -Oo006·8 0.0391 0.0459 -0.0068 
1·.24 0.04 0.04 -o.oon c.C360 0.0397 -0.0037 
lo25· 0.03 0.03 -o.oou CoC330 0.0342 -0.0013 
1.26 0.03 0.03 0.0035 c.0330 0.0294 o.oon 
1.27 o.c3 0.03 o.ocn c.0330 0.0253 o.0077 
lo28 0.03 0.02 O.DD54 GoC27C ·0.0216 0.0054 
1.29 O.C3 0.02 OoCC86 cocz7c O.OlB'o 0.0086 ~ O'I 
.-.J 
THIS IS AN AD fU~CTICh, h • 5 
THE EQUATION OF ThEWEIBULL fUNCT!CN IS EXPI- 17.00ll•IR ~ 0.841** 1,74101 
U2 • l.O - EXPl-lOOeO*IRlll - Oe9411 
THE OBJECTIVE IS TO MAXIMIZE THE PROaABILITY Of lllNNING s.T. LOSS LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 6, 
THIS 15 A CO~PARISON OF THE PROBABILITIES ANO THE EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS AND THE WEIBULL FUNCTION 
EXPECTED EXP EC TEO 
UllLITY liTILITY 
llEIBULL 
liEIBULl lCTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
0.84 o.95 1.00 -0.0481 ••••••• ••••••• • •••••• 
o.es C.95 0.99 -0.0425 ••••••• • •••••• • •••••• 
0.86 0.95 c.~e -o. 0295 .... , ... ••••••• 87.9(>70 o.s1 0.91 c.96 -0.0554 ••••••• • •••••• 60.6521 
o.88 c.91 C,94 -0.0319 ••••••• • •••••• l2.U64 
0.89 0.91 0.91 -0.00..;4 ••••••• • •••••• 0.6464 
0,90 C.91 c.88 0.0265 ••••••• ••••••• -i. .. 221 
0.91 C.91 o.e5 0.0603 ••••••• ••••••• -1.1502 0,93 o.e1 0.11 0.0927 -1.1tee2 -1.3290 -0.1592 
0.94 0.83 o. 73 0.0932 c.o o·.o o.o 
C.95 0.83 0.69 0.1330 c. 5231 0.091 0.0840 
0,96 Oo79 0.65 0.1372 Ce681t5 o.5659 0.1187 
0.97 0.76 C.61 o. l't38 c. 72.03 o.5837 Oel367 
o.r;9 0.10 o.57 0.1226 C.681t2 o. 5638 o.1201t 
0.99 0.67 o.54 0.1340 0.661t6 o. 5315 0.1331 
l.oo 0.6 .. a.so Oo 1"61 Ce bit 13 O.lt955 0.1457 
1.01 0.6 .. o.46 0.1833 Oe6423 0.4591 0.1831 
1.02 o.59 0.42 Ool709 o. 5944 0.4235 Ool7C9 
1.04 Oelt9 0.36 o, 1311. C.494C 0.3564 o.u11 
1.os 0.43 0.33 0.10"1 0.4293 o.3252 o.101t1 
le06 O.ltC 0.30 o. 1052 c.1to10 002958 0.1052 
1.01 o.36 0.21 o.cc;1os C.3627 002682 0.0945 
1.08 0.31 0.24 0.0656 t.3080 Oo2't24 o.0656 
1.09 Oo28 0.22 O.Oti3 0.2191 0.2184 o.o&l3 
1.10 0.20 0.20 0.0003 C, 1964 0.1961 0.0003 
1.11 0.14 0.18 -0.0349 C.1406 0.1756 -0.0349 
1.12 0.11 . 0.16 -O.Olt33 Col134 0.1567 -0.0433 
1.13 0.09 0.14 -0.0497 CeC897 0.1394 -0.0497 
le lit 0.08 0.12 -o. 0•412 C.C824 0.1237 -0.0412 
1.15 0.01 o.u -0.0405 CeC689 0.1094 -0.0405 
1.16 0.06 0.10 -0.0371 0.0594 0.0965 -0.0371 
lel 7 0.05 c.c8 -0.03llt c.c534 o.081te -0.0314 
lel8 o.os 0.01 -0.0239 C.0505 0.0744 -0.0239 
1. 20 o.os Q,06 -0.0090 CeC476 0.0567 -0.0090 
1.21 0.04 o.cs -o.co12 C.0421 0.0492 -0.0012 
1.22 0.04 O.Olt -0.0033 c·.0394 0.0427 -0.0033 
1.23 0.03 0.04 -0.0053 C.0315 0.031>9 -0.0053 
le24 0.03 0.03 -0.0028 .C.C290 0.0319 -0.0028 
1.25 0.03 0.03 -o. coos o.oits 0.0273 -0.0008 
l.26 0.03 0.02 0.0031 OeC265 0.0234 0.0031 
le27 0.03 0.02 O.C065 0.0265 0.0200 0.0065 
1.28 0.02 0.02 0.0041 c.0211 0.0111 0.0047 
1. 2"l 0.02 0.01 o.oon o.on1 O.Ql45 0.007' >-""' 
"' co 
THIS IS AN AC FUNCTIC~, ~ z 6 
THE EQUATION OF THEWEIBULL FUNCTICN IS EXP!- l6oS779•1R - 0.841•• 1068311 
U2 • loO - EXPl-100.0•lRlll - 0.9411 
THE OBJECTIVE IS TC ~AXIMIZE THE PROeABILITY OF ~INNING s.T. LOSS LESS THAN CR EQUAL TO 6. 
THIS IS A COMPARlSON OF THE PROBABILITIES ANO THE EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS ANO THE WEIBULL FUNCTION 
EXPECTED EXPECTED 
UTILITY UTIL ITV 
aEIBULL 
aEIBULL j(TUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
Oo84 Oo94 l.Oo -0.0571 ••••••• • •••••• • •••••• 
o.es 0.94 0.99 -o.c1,·99 ••••••• • •••••• • •••••• 
C.86 Oo94 o.s8 -O.C340 ••••••• ••••••• • •••••• 
o. 87 0.89 o.95 -0.0637 ••••••• • •••••• 69.&l 96 
o. 88 o. 89 c. 93 -o. 0365 ......... ••••••• 14.6943 
0.89 Oo89 0.90 -0.0052 ••••••• • •••••• 0.7672 
c.90 o.89 0.86 0.0294 ••••••• ••••••• -1.5764 
0.91 0.89 0.82 O.C666 ••••••• ••••••• -1.2716 
0.93 0.84 o. 74 Oo01l89 -1 ..... 113 -1.2793 -0.1100 
0.9 .. o.ec C.7C O.C969 o.o o.o o.o 
C.95 c.80 0.66 Oo 13E7 C.5057 004180 0.0911 
0.96 o.76 Do62 Oo 1404 C.6571 0.5357 0.1214 
0.97 c.12 o.5e 0.1448 C.6871 o.54115 0.1376 
o.s8 Co66 o.54 0.1195 c.e,,51 o.s2n 0.1113 
0.99 0.63 0.50 o. 1295 C.6234 o.,,948 a.1286 
1.00 0.6a 0.46 0.1,,02. C.5985 0.4587 0.1398 
1.a1 0.60 0.42 0.1110 C.5995 0.4226 0.1768 
1.a2 a.55 C.39 a.1622 Co5498 o.3e11 a.1621 
1.a4 a.45 C.32 o. 1259 c.,,486 a.3227 a.1259 
lo05 a.3<; 0.29 a.C924 C.3854 a.2929 0.0924 
lo06 0.36 0.21 0.0931 C.3581 0.2651 a.0931 
1.01 c.32 a.24 O.C827 C.3217 a.2391 a.ae21 
1.as a.21 a.21 a.0556 Co2706 o.215a o.a556 
1.09 0.24 o.n 0.0517 c.24"4 0.1927 0.0517 
1.1a a.11 a.11 -a.aa30 C.1692 a.1122 -a.a030 
loll 0.12 a.15 -0.0335 c.1200 0.1535 -o.a335 
1.12 0.10 Oo 14 -a.o4aO C.0963 0.1363 -0.0400 
1.13 a.as a.12 -0.0449 c.c159 o.12oe -O.O'o49 
1.14 o.a7 a.11 -a.031a 0.0697 o.1067 -o.a370 
1.15 c.a6 a.09 -0.0359 o.05ei 0.0940 -0.0359 
lol6 a.a5 o.os -a.0325 c.C5CC 0.0825 -a.a325 
1.11 o.a .. o.c1 -0.0274 C.C-lt49 a.a723 -O.a274 
1.1s a.o .. a.06 -a.a201 C.0424 o. 0631 -0.0201 
lo2a a.o .. o.os -o.oa78 C.04aO o.0,,78 -o.aa1s 
1.21 a.a4 0.04 -0.0061 C.C353 0.0414 -a.aa61 
1.22 o.a3 a.a,, -0.0021 CoC33C a.0357 -0.0021 
1.23 a.a3 a.C3 -a.a044 Co02to4 a.C3CB -o.Oa44 
1.2" o.a2 a.03 -0.0022 C.OH3 o. a265 -0.0022 
1.25 o.a2 o.a2 -0.0005 c.c222 0.0221 -o.oac5 
1. 26 0.02 0.02 0.0028 0.0222 a.0194 0.0028 
1.21 0.02 0.02 0.0051 c.0222 a.0165 a.ac57 
1.28 a.02 o.a1 o.ao41 o.01s2 a.0141 a.oa41 
i.2o; c.02 0.01 O •. OC62 c.oie2 0.0.119 0.0062 ..... 
Q'\ 
-.[) 
THIS IS AN AC FUNCTIC~, ~ • 7 
THE EQUATION OF THEWEleULL FUNCTION IS EXP(- 16.9475•1R - o.841•• 1.63531 
U2 a 1.0 - EXPl-100.0•IRlll - 0.9411 
THE OBJECTIVE IS TO MAXIMIZE THE PROBABILITY OF ~INNING s.T. LOSS LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 6, 




WEIBULL ACTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
0.84 0.93 l.oo -0.0660 ••••••• ···=-··· • •••••• 0.85 0.93 0.99 -0.0570 ••••••• ••••••• • •••••• 
o.86 0.93 C.97 -0.0382 ••••••• • •••••• • •••••• 
o.87 0.87 0.95 -o. 0717 ••••••• ••••••• 78. 5349 
o.88 0.87 C.92 -0.0410 ····-··· ••••••• 16.5098 o.89 Oo87 Ooee -Oo0063 ••••••• ••••••• 0.9313 
0.90 Oo87 o.84 000315 ••••••• ••••••• -l.6896 
0.91 Oo61 c.80 Oo07l 7 ••••••• ••••••• -1. 3684 
o.93 0.82 Oo72 Oo 1034 -104125 -1.2349 •0.1116 
Oo94 0011 0068 o.c988 o.o o.o OoO 
Oo95 Oo11 Oo63 o. 1"21 Co4894 003996 0.0898 
o.96 Oo73 Oo59 0.1415 c.t319 Oo5096 Ool223 
0097 Oo69 0055 0.1439 Co6568 005201 Ool367 
Oo98 Oo62 Oo5l Oo lH2 C.6102 Oo4'l7l Oo 1131 
c.99 Oo59 0.47 Oo 1240 Co5869 o.4637 0.1232 
loOC Co56 Oo43 Oo 1336 c.5611 0.4279 0.1332 
loOl Oo56 Oo39 Ool698 Co5620 003924 Ool696 
lo02 Oo5l Oo3b 001533 Co5115 003582 Ool532 
lo04 0.41 Co30 001154 Co4109 002954 Ooll54 
lo05 Oo35 0.21 000825 c.3496 Oo21>70 000825 
lo06 0.32 Oo24 0.0830 0.3235 0.2405 000830 
1.07 0.29 0.22 Co C730 C.2891 002160 0.0130 
1.oe Oo24 0.19 000478 Oo2'il3 0.1935 0.0478 
lo09 Oo22 0.11 0.0444 0.2111 0.1121 000444 
lolO 0.15 Oo 15 -0.0051 Ool486 0.1537 -0.0051 
loll OolO o.14 -000318 o.101o1 0.1365 -O.C318 
i.12 o.ce Ool2 -o. 0371 c.ce37 Ool208 -0.0371 
loll Oo07 Ooll -000409 o.0657 0.1066 -0.0409 
lo 14 Oo06 Oo09 -000335 C.C603 000938 -0.0335 
1.15 Co05 Oo08 -0.0322 c.csoz 0.0924 -0.0322 
loll> Oo04 0.01 -0.0289 Co 0432 0.0121 -000289 
lo 17 0.04 OoC6 -000242 C.C387 o.0630 -0.0242 
1.18 .0.04 o.o5 -0.0182 C.C366 000548 -0.0182 
1.20 Oo03 0.04 -000068 c.031o5 000413 -0.0068 
i.21 0.03 Oo04 -o.oC52 CoC304 000356 -0.0052 
1.22 Oo03 0.03 -0.0023 o.02e4 0.0307 -000023 
1.23 Oo02 0.03 -0.0037 000227 0.0264 -0.0037 
1.24 0.02 Oo02 -0.0018 c.0209 000227 -0.0018 
1.25 0.02 0.02 -·c.0003 c.c1c;1 0.019'9 -0.0003 
lo26 0.02 0.02 0 .• 0026 C.0191 0.0165 0,0026 
1.27 Oo02 o.c1 o.OO!>O c.c1u O.Ol'tl 0.0050 
1.28 c.02 OoOl 0.0031 0.0156 0.0120 o.oon 
1.29 0.02 0.01 O •. CC.55 C.0156 O.O}Ol Oo0055 j....>. 
-....] 
0 
THIS IS AN AD fUNCTIC~, ~ • 8 
THE E•QtsATJON OF THEWElBULL FUNCTICN IS EXPI- l6.9l61•CR - D.81t).. l.59it91 
UZ • 1.0 - EXPl-100.0•CRCII - 0.91tll 
THE OBJECTIVE IS TO MAXIMIZE THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING S.T. LOSS LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 6 1 
ThlS IS A COMPARISCN CF THE PROBABILITIES AND T~E EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS ANO THE WEIBULL FUNCTION 
EXPECT EC EXPECTED 
IJllLITY UllLITY 
WEIBULL 
WEIBULL ACTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
0.84 0.93 1.00 -0.CHB ••••••• • •••••• • •••••• 
o.e5 0.93 0.99 -0.063CJ ••••••• • •••••• • •••••• 
0.86 0.93 o.97 -0.0423 ••••••• ••••••• • •••••• o.8T o.e6 O.'llt -0.0793 ••••••• ••••••• 86.8601 
o.88 c.86 0.91 -O.Clt55 ••••••• • •••••• 18.2917 
0.89 0.86 o.n -o.ocn ••••••• ••••••• lol331t 
C.9C 0.66 o.e3 0.0330 ••••••• • •••••• -1. 7680 
0.91 0.86 o.n 0.0757 ••••••• • •••••• -l.41tit8 
0.93 0.80 0.10 0.1061t -1.3775 -1.1947 -0.1828 
0.94 0.15 C.H O.C994 c.c o.o o.o 
0.95 0.75 0.61 o. 1438 C.471tl o.3n2 0.0909 
0.96 0.10 c.56 o.11t10 C.6085 o.1t865 0.1219 
o.97 0.66 o.52 o. l'tl 7 c.6290 0.491tit O.l31t6 
0.98 0.59 0.48 o.1101t c.51aCJ 0.4706 o.1oa1t 
0.99 o.56 O.lt4 o. uaz o.551t5 o.1t37l o.1111t 
1.00 o.53 o.1to 0.1268 t.!ZBl 0.4016 0.1265 
1.01 o.53 0.37 0.1623 c.~289 0.3667 0.1622 
1.02 0.48 0.33 O. l'ilt7 C.4781 0.3335 o.11t1t6 
1.04 0.38 0.21 0.1061 C.379C 0.2129 0.1061 
1.05 C.32 0.25 O.C71t2 C.3198 0.2457 o.011t2 
1.06 0.30 0.22 O.C1't5 C.2950 0.2205 0.0745 
le07 0.26 0.20 0.0651 c.2624 o.19n 0.0651 
1.08 0.22 0.18 0.0416 c.2111 0.1160 0.0416 
1.09 o.zo 0.16 Q,C386 c.19'3 0.1566 0.0386 
1.10 o.u o.11t -o.0064 c.1325 0.1390 -0.0064 
l· ll 0.09 0.12 -C.C302 C.C92B 0.1230 -0.0302 
1.12 0.01 0.11 -0.0345 C.C740 0.1095 -0.0345 
1.13 0.06 0.10 ,.0.0375 c.o5eo 0.0955 -0.0375 
1.14 0.05 a.ca -0.0306 c.0532 0.0838 -0.0306 
1.15 0.1)4 o.c1 -0.0292 C.OltltZ 0.0733 -0.0292 
1.16 o.o .. 0.06 -0.02111 0.0380 0.061t0 -0.0261 
1.11 C.!l3 0.06 -0.0217 C.03111 0,0558 -0.0217 
lel8 0.03 o.05 -0.0163 c.0322 o.0484 -0.0163 
1.20 0.03 0.04 -0.0060 C.0303 0.0363 -0.0060 
1.2·1 0.03 o.o3 -o.001t6 C.0267 0.0313 -0.0046 
le22 a.oz Q,03 -0.0020 c.0250 0.0269 -0.0020 
1.23 o.c2 o.c2 -0.0032 C.Cl99 0.0231 -0.0032 
1.24 0.02 0.02 -o. 0014 C.ClE3 0.0198 -0.0014 
1.25 0.02 c.02 -0.0001 c.0168 0.0169 -0.0001 
1.26 a.oz c.01 o.0021t C.Cl68 o·.011t1t o.0024t 
1.21 0.02 0.01 o.001ts C.0168 0.0122 o.001t5 
1.ze 0.01 0.01 o.ocn c.0137 0.0104 0.0033 
1.29 0.01 0.01 O.OC49 CoCl37 o.ooee O.OOlt9 t...>. 
"'1 
t...>. 
THIS IS AN AO FUNCTICN, ~ • 9 
THE EQLATICN OF THEWEIBULL FUNCTICN IS EXPI- 16.S78l•IR - o.e41•• 1.55961 
U2 • l.C - EXPl-100.0•IRCll - C.9411 
THE OBJECTIVE IS TO MAXl,IZE THE PROeABILITY OF WINNING s.T. LOSS LESS THAN CR EQUAL TO 6, 




WEIBULL ACTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
0.84 0.92 l.co -O.C833 ••••••• • •••••• ••••••• 
a.es 0.92 0.99 -O.C706 ••••••• ••••••• • •••••• 
0.86 0.92 0.96 -0.0462 ........ ........ ••••••• 
o.n 0.94 C.93 -C.C865 ••••••• ••••••• 94.7568 
o.8e C.84 o.e9 -O.C497 ••••••• • •••••• 20.0032 
0.99 c.81t c.e5 -0.0092 ••••••• ••••••• 1.3495 
0.90 o.e1t C.81 O.C340 ••••••• ••••••• -1.8250 
0.91 o.84 0.11 O.C790 ••••••• ••••••• -1. 5073 
0.93 0.78 Co67 0.1084 -1.3441 -1.1578 -0.1863 
0.94 Oo73 o.u C.0993 c.o o.o o.o 
0.95 0.13 o.sa 0.1444 c.4597 0.3684 0.0913 
Oo96 0.68 o.54 0.1397 c.5867 004659 0.1208 
0.97 Oo61t 0.50 Oo 1388 C.6035 0•4716 0.1319 
c.98 o.56 0.46 0.1055 c.5507 0.4472 Oo 1035 
0,99 o.53 0.42 0.1125 c.5255 0.4138 0.1111 
1.00 a.so 0.38 0.1203 C.4988 o.3787 0.1200 
1.01 a.so 0.34 0.1551 C.4995 o.3446 0.1549 
i.02 o.1ts 0.31 0.1367 C.4488 0.3122 0.1366 
1.04 o.3s 0.25 O.C980 0.3517 0.2~37 0.0980 
1.05 0.29 0.23 o.C671 C.2948 002276 0.0.611 
1.06 0.21 0.20 OoC675 c. 2711 0.2031 o.o67S 
lo07 Co24 o.1s 0.0586 c,2403 0.1817 o.o5a6 
1.08 0.20 0.16 OoC367 Co 1983 Ool616 0.0367 
1.09 o.ie 0.14 0.0341 C.1774 0.1434 0.0341 
lo lC 0.12 0.13 -0.0073 c.ll96 o.1Z68 -0.0073 
1.11 o.oe 0.11 -0.0286 C.C833 Colll9 -0.0286 
lolZ 0.01 0.10 -0.0321 C.C663 o.0985 -0.0321 
1.13 0.05 CoC9 -0.0345 c.C519 0.0864 -0.0345 
1.14 o.os c.ca -C.OZ81 C.C475 0.0757 -o.02e1 
lol5 C.04 0.01 -C.OZ66 C.0395 0.0661 -O.CZ66 
1.16 o.c3 a.co -<i.oz37 C.C339 o.os10 -0.0237 
1.17 c.03 o.os -0.0197 c.0304 o.osoo -o.Cl97 
1.1a C.03 0.04 -0.0147 c.02n 0.0434 -0.0147 
loZO OoC3 c.03 -C.0054 c.021c 000324 -O.OOS4 
1.21 a.oz 0.03 -o.co41 c .c23e 0.0279 -O.OOltl 
1.z2 a.oz 0.02 -0.0011 c .oz23 o.oz39 -0.0011 
1.23 o.oz o.oz -a.ooze CoCl78 0.0205 -a.ooze 
lo24 0.02 a.oz -0.0012 0.0163 0.0175 -0.0012 
1.25 0.01 0.01 -0.0000 C.Cl49 0.0150 -0.0000 
lo26 0.01 0.01 o.002z CoCllt'l o. 0127 o.002z 
1.27 0.01 0.01 0.0041 0.0149 o.01oe 000041 
loZ8 0.01 0.01 O.OC3C o.012z O.C092 0.0030 
lo29 0.01 0.01 0.0044 c.c122 0,0078 o.C044 .... 
-,j 
[\;) 
THIS IS AN AD FUNCTIC~, ~ a 10 
THE EQLATICN OF THEllEIBULL FU~CTICN IS EXPI- l6.830l*IR - 0.841** 1. 52791 
U2 a l.O - EXPl-100.0•IRlll - C.9411 
THE OBJECTIVE IS TO MAXl~IZE THE PROBABILITY OF WINNING S.7o LOSS LESS THAN CR EQUAL TO 60 




WEIBULL ACTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
0.84 0.91 l.cc -0.0917 ••••••• • •••••• • •••••• 
o.s5 0.91 o.99 -OoC771 ••••••• ••••••• • •••••• 
0.8b 0.91 0.96 -0.0500 ••••••• ••••••• • •••••• ~ C.87 Oo83 C.92 -000933 •••••••• • •••••• • •••••• o.aa 0.83 o.88 -0.0537 ••••••• • •••••• 2106086 
Oo89 Oo83 o.84 -000106 ••••••• • •••••• lo 5585 0.9C o.83 o.eo 0.0349 ••••••• • •••••• -1.8713 
Oo91 o.83 0.75 000818 ••••••• ••••••• -105610 0.93 0.76 0.65 0.1099 -103124 -lol235 -0.1889 
0.94 o.n o.u o.cu8 CoO o.o o.o 
0.95 o.n o.56 0.1445 Co"462 003549 000913 
0.96 0066 0.52 Co 1310 c.5665 Oe4472 0.1193 
Oo97 0.61 Oo47 Oo 1357 Co58CC 0.4510 0.1290 
0.98 0.53 o.43 0.1008 c.5251 004261 0.0990 
0.99 o.50 0.40 0.1071 C.4994 0.3930 Ool064 
1.00 o.47 o.36 0.1143 c.025 003585 0.1140 
1.01 Oo47 0.33 001483 Co4733 0.3251 0.1482 
lo02 0.42 0.29 0.1294 c.422c; 002936 Ool293 
1.04 0.33 0.24 0.0909 c.~2eo 0.2371 000909 
l.os c.21 0.21 000612 c. 734 0.2121 000612 
1.06 Oo25 Oo19 OoC616 Co25C8 0.1992 000616 
lo07 0.22 0.17 000532 C.2216 0.1683 Oo0532 
1.08 0.18 a.is 0.0327 Co 1821 0.1493 0.0327 
1.09 Ool6 Ool3 C.0304 C.1626 Oo 1321 000304 
1.10 Ooll 0.12 -Oo0077 0.1089 0.1166 -0.0077 
loll 'CoC8 0.10 -000270 CoC756 Ool026 -0.0270 
1.12 0.06 0.09 -0.0300 CoObOl C.0901 -C.0300 
loll o.os 0.08 -0.0320 C.0469 0.0789 -0.0320 
lo 14 0.04 0.01 -0.0260 CoC43C Oo 0690 -0.0260 
1.15 0.04 0.06 -000245 000357 0.0601 -0.0245 
1.16 Oo03 o.cs -000217 Co0306 0.0523 -Oo0217 
1.11 Oo03 0.05 -Oo0179 c.c211i Oo0454 -Oo0179 
1.18 Oo03 0.04 -Oo0134 C.C259 0.0393 -0.0134 
1.20 Oo02 Oo03 -Co0048 CoC244 OoC292 -0.0048 
1.21 0.02 0.03 -000036 c.c21s 000251 -0.0036 
lo22 0.02 0.02 -000015 000201 0.0216 -Oo0015 
lo23 Oo02 0.02 -000024 C.0160 0.0184 -0.0021. 
1.24 OoOl Oo02 -000010 Co01't7 000158 -0.0010 
lo25 0.01 OoOl CoOOOO CoC135 Oo0134 OoOOOO 
lo26 OoOl 0.01 000020 c.0135 000114 000020 
lo27 OoOl OoOl 0.0037 C.0135 OoCC97 000037 
lo28 OoOl OoOl o.C028 coouc o.oc82 o.ooze 
1.29 0.01 0.01 0.0040 coc11c 0.0010 0.0040 ...... 
""" w 
APPENDIX D 
COMPUTED RESULTS FOR THE UTILITY FUNCTION 
u = (r - 1.06)p(win) 
1 ...,,, 
T~!S IS AN LO FUNCTION 
THE EQUATION OF THE WE!BULLFUNCT!ON IS EXPI- 90.2576*1R - 0.841** 3.05391 
U3 • ( R - l ,O 6 1 
TH! S IS A CO"PAR!SON OF THE PROBABILITIES ANO THE EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS AND THE WEIBULL FUNCTION 
EXPECTED EXPECTED 
UTIL !TY UTILITY 
WEIBULL 
WEIBULL ACTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB DIFFERENCE DAfA DATA DIFFERE.NCE 
o. e" 0,97 1.00 -0.0300 -0.213" -0.2200 0.0066 
o.es C.97 1.00 -0.0299 -0.2037 -0.2100 0.0063 
0.8b 0.95 1.00 -0 ,0,,94 -0.1900 -0.199'1 0.00'19 
o.n C,95 l.oo -0.0480 -0.1805 -0.1896 0.00•1 
o.8e 0.95 l.oo -0.0,,52 -0.1110 -0.1791 0.0081 
O, 8'l C,95 0.99 -o.0404 -0,1615 -0 .168" 0.0069 
0.90 0.95 0.'18 -o. 033" -0.1520 -0.1573 0 .0053 
0.91 0.92 0.97 -0.0535 -0.1380 -0.1460 0.0080 
o. 'l2 0.9C 0.9b -O.Ob05 -0.1260 -0.13 ... 5 0.0085 
0.93 0.90 0.94 -0•0439 -0.1170 -0.1221 0.0057 
o.c;i,, 0.85 0.92 -o.0734 -0.1020 -0.1108 o.ooae 
C,95 C.82 0.90 -o. 0788 -0.0902 -0.0989 0.0087 
0.96 0.82 0,87 -0.0501 -0.0820 -o. 0870 o.ooso 
0.97 0.75 0.84 -o. 0872 -0.0675 -0.0754 0.0079 
0.98 0.72 0.80 -o. 0803 -0.0576 -0.0640 0.0064 
0.99 0.67 o.76 -o.0896 -0.0469 -0.0532 0.0063 
l.oo 0.65 0.12 -0.0654 -0.0390 -0.0429 0 .0039 
1.01 0.65 0.67 -0.0183 -0.0125 -0.011" 0.0009 
1.02 O.bO 0,62 -o.0188 -0.021t0 -0.0248 0.0008 
1.c1 0.52 0.51 -0.0"78 -0.0156 -0.0170 0.0014 
1.04 o.52 o.s2 0.00"2 -0.0104 -0.0103 -0.0001 
l.os 0.47 0.46 0.0063 -0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0001 
1.06 D.45 0.41 0.0376 o.o· o.o o.o 
1.01 0.40 o.36 0.0374 0.0040 0.0036 0.0004 
l.cs o.35 0.31 o.03so 0.0070 0.0063 0.0001 
1.09 0.32 0.21 0.0498 0.0096 o. 0081 0.0015 
lolO 0.24 0.23 0.0113 o.0096 0.0091 0.0005 
1.11 0.22 0.19 o. 0290 0.0110 0.0096 0.001" 
1.12 0.1 .. 0.16 -0.0173 0.0084 o. 009" -0.0010 
1. 13 C.13 0,13 0.0024 0.0091 0.0089 0.0002 
1.14 o. u 0.10 o. 0281 0.0104 0.0082 0.0022 
1.15 0.11 0.08 0.0299 0.0099 0.0012 0.0021 
1.16 0.05 0.06 -0.0120 0.0050 0.0062 -0.0012 
1.11 0.04 o.os -0.0011 0.004" 0.0052 -0.0008 
1.18 0.02 c.o ... -0.0152 0.0024 0.0042 -0.0018 
1.19 0.02 0.03 -o. 0058 0.0026 0.003" -o.oooa 
1.20 0.02 0.02 0.001" 0.0028 0.0026 0.0002 




THIS IS AN AC FUNCTIC~, N • 
THE EQUATION OF THEWEIBULL FUNCTICN IS EXPI- 16.045l•IR - 0.841** 2.30961 
U3 • IR - l.C61 
THIS IS A COMPARISON Of THE PRO&A&ILITIES AND THE EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS ANO THE WEIBULL FUNCTION 
EXPECT EC EXPECTED 
UllLITY UTILITY 
WEIBULL 
WEIBULL lCTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
o.84 D.99 l.oo -0.0100 -C.2178 -0.2200 0.0022 
0.85 0.99 i.oo -0.0096 -C.2079 -0.2099 0.0020 
0.86 0.99 i.oo -o.cc51 -C.1980 -0.1996 Do0D16 
o.87 0.98 i.oo -0.0151 -C.1862 -0.1891 0.0029 
o.88 0.98 c.99 -0.0106 -0.1764 -0.1783 0.0019 
Oo8'il o.se o.~e -O. CC43 -C.1666 -0.1673 0•0007 
0.90 0.98 0.98 0.0039 -C.1568 -0.1562 -0.0006 
0.91 c.98 o.n 0.0139 -C.14 70 -O.llo49 -0.0021 
C.93 0.97 0.94 0.0298 -C.1261 -0.1222 -0.0039 
C.94 0.96 0.92 0.0?56 -C.1152 -0.1109 -0.0043 
C.95 0.96 0.91 O. C534 -C.1056 -0.0997 -0.0059 
0.96 0.95 o.89 o.ctZ9 -C.C95C -0.0887 -0.0063 
0.97 0.94 c.e1 O.C7it3 -C.C846 -0.0779 -0.0067 
Oo98 c.92 0.84 O.C773 -C.C736 -0.067lt -0.0062 
0,99 0.91 o.82 O.C918 -C.C637 -0.0573 -0.0064 
1.00 0.90 0.79 0.1078 -0.0540 -0.0475 -0.0065 
1.01 C.90 0.76 o. 1350 -O.C450 -0.0382 -0.0068 
1.02 o.88 0.14 O. l't34 -C.0352 -0.0295 -0.0057 
1.01t 0.83 0.68 o. 1529 -C.Cl66 -0.0135 -0.0031 
l.05 0.19 0.65 o. 1437 -C.C079 -0.0065 -0.0014 
1.06 0.11 0.62 0.1549 o.o o.o o.o 
1.07 o.74 0.58 0.1564 CoCC74 0.0058 o.oou. 
1.08 0.69 o.55 0.1380 C.0138 0.0110 0.0028 
1.09 0.66 o.52 0.1395 0.0198 0.0156 0.0042 
1.10 0.55 Oo49 O,C6C7 c.0220 o.cl96 o.D024 
1.-11 0.45 O,lt6 -o.ooe5 c.0225 0.0229 -0.0004 
1.12 o.39 0.43 -0.0382 c.0234 0.0257 -0.0023 
1.13 0.33 0,40 -O.C686 0.0231 o. 0279 -0.0048 
lo llo 0.31 0.37 -o. 0598 0.0248 0.0296 -0.0048 
1.15 0.21 o.34 -o. C72C o.021o3 0.0309 -o.oobs 
lol6 o.24 0.32 -O.C752 c.c21oo 0.0315 -0.0075 
l.17 0.22 0.29 -0.0695 o.021o2 0.0319 -0.0076 
l.18 0.21 0.211 -0.0550 c.c2s2 0.0318 -0.0066 
1.20 0.20 0.22 -C,0197 c.c28c 0.0308 -o.002e 
l. 21 O.l 8 0.20 -0.0190 0.0210 0.0298 -0.0028 
lo22 0.11 0.18 -O.CC96 c.c212 c. 0287 -0.001 s 
1.23 0.14 0.16 -0.0215 0.0238 o.021s -0.0031 
lo2lt 0.13 0.14 -0.0147 C.0234 0.0260 -0.0026 
1.25 0.12 0.13 -c. 0092 c.c22e o.021ts -0.0011 
lo26 0.12 0.11 0.0051 0.0240 0.0230 0.0010 
i.2 7 0.12 0.10 o. Cl 82 c.0252 0.0214 0.0039 
lo28 0.10 0.09 0.0101 c.0220 0.0198 0.0022 
1. 29 o.1c o.c8 o.02oci 0.0230 0.0192 0.0048 
lo3C o.c8 0.01 0.0101 c.c1s2 0.0166 0.0026 ... 
-....] 
CJ'> 
HIS IS AN AO FUNCTlCr., f\ • 2 
THE EQUATION OF THEWEIBULL FUNCTICN IS EXPt-.l6o7360•1R - Oo841** 2005031 
U3 • IR - loC61 
THIS IS A CO"PARISCN CF THE PROBAeILITIES AND THE EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS AND THE WEIBULL Fur.tTION 
EXPECT EC EXPECTED 
UTILITY UTILITY 
i.EiBULL 
llEIBULL .IC TU AL CALCULATED 
R p PROB DIFFERENCE CAT& DAU DIFFERENCE 
Oo84 Oo98 loOO -0.0198 -Co2l56 -002200 Oo0041t 
Oo85 Co98 loOO -Oo01E5 -Co2058 -002097 000039 
0086 Oo98 0.99 -Oo0l1t3 -Col960 -Ool989 000029 
Co87 Oo96 Oo99 -Oo0267 -Ool825 -Ool876 000051 
Oo88 Oo96 0.98 -0.0167 -c.1729 -0.1759 o.0030 
o.e9 Oo96 Q.96 -0.0039 -C.1633 -Oo 1640 0.0001 
0.90 0.96 C.95 0.0111 -C.1537 -0.1518 -0.0019 
Oo91 0.96 0.93 0.0300 -C.lltltl -0.1396 -0.001t5 
Oo93 0,91t o.e9 0.0549 -co1221t -0.1153 -o.oon 
Oo91o Oe92 0.86 0.0616 -c.1108 -0.1031o -0.0074 
0.95 Oo92 o.u o.o8sa -C.1015 -0.0918 -0.0098 
Oo'l6 0.90 0.81 0.0995 -C •. 0905 -0.0805 -0.0100 
0.97 Oo8'ii 0.11 Oo 1121 -C.C798 -Oo0697 -0.0101 
Oo98 o.85 Oo7" Co lC89 -C.C681 -O.C591o -0.0087 
0.99 o.83 0.11 Oo 1247 -0.0584 -0.001 -0.0087 
1.00 0.82 0068 0.1 .. 16 -C.0491 -Oolllt06 -Oo0085 
leOl o.e2 0,64 0.1757 -Co04C9 -0.0321 -o.ooaa 
1.02 o.1c; Co6l O. l 776 -C.0314 -0.0243 -oooon 
le04 0.11 o.54 0.1701 -C,0142 -0.0108 -0.0034 
le05 Oo65 o.s1 Ool475 -C.C065 -0.0051 -0.0015 
loC6 Oo63 Q,47 0.1540 c.c o.o o.o 
le OT o.59 Oolo4 Oo 1479 CoC059 o.0044 000015 
loC8 Oo53 Oo4l 0.1190 0.0105 o.ooe2 0.0024 
le09 Oo49 Oo38 Oo 1156 c.0148 000113 Oe0035 
lolO 0.38 0.35 0.0319 c.c152 OoOl39 0.0013 
loll Oo29 0.32 -0.0288 Co01't5 000160 -000014 
1.12 0.2.r, Oo29 -CoOl,98 C.Cl45 000175 -Oo0030 
lol3 0.20 0.21 -0.0688 CoC138 o.ou1 -000048 
lo 14 0.18 Oo2" -o.cs88 C.C147 000194 -0.0047 
lol5 0.16 Oo22 -000634 c.0140 000198 -Oo0057 
lo 16 0.1 .. 0.20 -000619 Q,Cl36 Oo0198 -0.0062 
lol7 0.12 Ool8 -o. C548 Co0136 Oo0l96 -0.0060 
lol8 0.12 OoU. -0.0.r,21 C.C1"1 o. 0192 -oooos1 
lo20 o.u 0.13 -O.OU.3 Co0156 OoOl78 -Oo0023 
lo2l o.1c Ooll -O,Cllt2 c.c11o8 000170 -0.0021 
1.22 0.09 0.10 -o.oc12 OoCl49 0.0160 -0.0011 
lo23 0.08 OeC9 -o.ouo c.0128 o.01so -0.0022 
lo24 a.or o.ca -ooocao c.0125 o. 0140 -OoOOl" 
lo25 Oo06 0.01 -Oo004l 0.0121 000129 -0.0009 
lo26 0.06 Oo06 o.001t11 c.c12e 0.0118 0.0009 
1.27 Oo06 o.os 0.0123 CoCl3" 000108 0.0026 
le28 0.05 0.04 o.ooao 0.0116 OoC098 o.oou 
lo29 0.05 c.o ... 0.0141 c.0121 o.cc89 0.0032 
1.30 Oo04 0.03 o.ooe5 coc100 o.ooao 0.0020 
'""' -.J
-.J 
TnJS IS AN AC FUNCTICI\, I>• 3 
THE EQUATICN OF THEWEIBULL FUNCTICN IS EXPI- 16o926l•IR - Oo841•• lo9CB71 
U3 • IR - loC61 
THIS IS A CO~PARISON Of THE PROBABILITIES AND THE EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS AND THE WEIBULL FUNCTION 
EXPECTED EXPECTED 
111 ILITY UTILITY 
WEIBULL 
WEIBULL •CTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROS CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
0.84 0.97 i.oo -O.C294 -C.2135 -0.2200 0.0065 
o.a5 o.97 i.oo -0.0268 -C.2038 -0.2095 0.0056 
o.e6 c.c;1 c.99 -0.0198 -C.1941 -0.1981 0.0040 
o.a1 C.94 Oo'!l8 -0.0369 -c.11c;o -0.1861 0.0010 
0088 0.94 Oo96 -0.0220 -C.1696 -0.1736 o.0040 
0.89 0.94 0.95 -0.0036 -C.1602 -0.1608 0.0006 
0.90 c.94 c.c;2 o.01e1 -C.1508 -0.1479 -0.0029 
0.91 0.94 0.90 0.0426 -C.1413 -0.1349 -0.0064 
0.93 C.92 o.a4 o, C121 -C.1190 -0.1096 -0.0094 
0,94 C.69 o.e1 o.c774 -C.1C67 -o.oc;14 -0.0093 
0.95 c. 89 c.18 o. uos -C.C978 -0.0856 -0.0122 
0.96 0.86 o.74 o. 1197 -C.C864 -0.01~ -0.0120 
0.97 o.84 0.11 0.1308 -c.c755 -0.0638 -0.0118 
0.98 0.79 0.67 0.1208 -C.0634 -0.0538 -0.0097 
0,99 0.11 Oo64 o. 1354 -C.C540 -0.0445 -0.0095 
i.oo o.75 C.60 0.1509 -0.0450 -0.0359 -0.0091 
loOl 0.15 c.56 Ool874 -C.C375 -0.0281 -0.0094 
1.02 o. 71 0.53 o.1831 -C.0264 -0.0211 -0.0073 
lo04 0.62 0.46 0.1629 -C.0124 -0.0091 -0.0033 
lo OS o.s6 0.42 Col335 -CoC056 -0.0042 -0.0013 
1.06 o.53 o.39 o. 1371 c.c o.o o.o 
lo C7 c • .r,c; 0.36 0.1277 C.0049 0.0036 0.0013 
1.08 0.43 0.33 o.C9b6 o.coes 0.0066 0.0019 
lo09 0.39 o.3o 0.0919 o.011e OeC090 o.002e 
1.10 o.z9 0.21 O, C'153 c.0116 o.ouo o.0006 
1.11 0.21 0.25 -0.0346 c.0101 0.0124 -0.0011 
1.12 0.16 0.23 -0.0496 c.01os 0.0135 -0.0030 
lo 13 0.14 0.20 -0.0621 c.cC9'J 0.0142 -0.0043 
lo 14 0.13 0.18 -0.0524 c.010,, 0.0146 -0.0042 
1.15 c.11 0.16 -0.0539 OoCC99 0.0141 -0.0048 
lol6 0.10 0.15 -o. 0509 C.CC'i5 o. 0146 -o.oD51 
1.1 7 o.c9 0.13 -o. 04" 1 C oOC'i5 0.01"3 -0.0049 
1.18 c.os 0.12 -o. 03"0 CoC098 0.0138 -0.0041 
lo20 o.oe 0.09 -0.0131 CoCl08 C.0126 -0.0018 
1.z 1 0.01 0.08 -0.0109 c.0102 0.0119 -0.0011> 
1.22 0.01> o.c1 -0.0053 c.0102 0.0111 -0.0009 
1.23 0.05 O.Ob -0.0090 c.cc88 0.0103 -0.0015 
1. 24 o.C5 c.cs -0.0052 o.cc8s o.t095 -0.0009 
1.25 Oo04 o.os -0.0022 c.oce3 O.CCS7 -0.0004 
lo26 Oo04 0.04 0.0040 C.0087 0.0079 0.0008 
lo27 0.04 0.03 0.0094 C.CC91 0.0011 0.0020 
1.28 Oo04 OoC3 0,001>5 C.C079 0.006" 0.0014 
1.29 0.04 0.03 0.0101 c.coe2 o. 0058 0.0025 




THIS IS AN AC FUNCTIC~, ~ r 4 
THE EQuATION OF THE•EIBULl FUNCTICN IS EXPI- l6,9913•1R - Oo841•• lo81301 
U3 • IR - lo061 




WEIBULL •CTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
o.e4 0.96 i.oo -0.0388 -c.2115 -0.2200 o.oo8s 
0.85 0.96 1.00 -0.0348 -C.2018 -0.2092 0.0073 
c.8& 0.9& 0,99 -0.0248 -C.1922 -0.1972 0.0050 
0.87 Oo9Z O.H -0.046't -C.1757 -0.1845 0.0088 
o.88 0,92 0.95 -0,0270 -0.1664 -0.1713 0.00.r,9 
0.89 0.92 0,93 -O.OC38 -C.1572 -C.1578 0.0006 
0.90 0.92 0.90 0.0229 -c.1.r,19 -0.1.r,43 -0.0037 
0.91 0,92 C.67 0.0525 -0.1387 -0.1308 -0.0079 
0.93 0.89 0.81 c. C81o l -C, 1157 -0.10.r,5 -0.0109 
0,9.r, 0.86 0.11 0.0811 -C.1029 -0.0924 -0.0105 
o.95 0.8& o. 73 0.1242 -C.0943 -0.0806 -0.0137 
0.96 o.83 0.10 0.1310 -c,C826 -0.0695 -0.0131 
0.97 o.80 0066 0.1399 -0.0717 -0.0591 -o. 0126 
0.98 o. 74 C.62 0.1238 -C.C594 -0.0495 -0.0099 
0.99 0.12 0.58 Ool368 -C,0502 -O.Oio06 -0.0096 
l.oc 0.6t; 0,54 o.1so5 -0.0415 -0.0325 -0.0090 
1.01 0.6t; a.so o. 1877 -C.0346 -0.0252 -0.0094 
1.02 0.65 0.47 o.1788 -C.C259 -0.0187 -0.0012 
1.04 o.55 C.40 o.15os -o.c110 -0.0080 -0.0030 
1.05 0.48 0.37 0.1180 -C.C048 -0.0037 -0.0012 
lo06 0.46 0.34 0.1199 o.c o.o o.o 
1.01 0.42 0.31 0, 1094 C.C042 0.0031 0.0011 
1.08 0.36 0.28 o.C789 C.CC72 Oo0056 0.0016 
1.oc; 0.33 0.25 O,C742 O.C098 0.0076 0.0022 
1.10 0.23 0.23 O.CC59 C.CC94 0.0091 0.0002 
1.11 0.11 0.21 -0.0357 C.0065 0.0103 -0.0018 
lol2 0.14 OolB -0.0467 C.0083 0.0111 -0.0028 
1.13 0.11 0.11 -0.0555 C,CC77 o. 0116 -0.0039 
1.14 0.10 0.15 -0.0463 c.0081 o.ou8 -0.0037 
lo 15 0.08 o.13 -0.04t3 C.CCle. 0.0118 -0.0042 
1.16 0.01 0.12 -o. 0429 c.co73 o. 0116 -0.0043 
1.17 0.01 c.10 -0.0368 C.OC72 o. 0113 -0.0040 
1.18 0.0.1 0.09 -o.02a1 C.CC75 0.0109 -0.0034 
l.2c 0.06 0.01 -0.01C7 C.0082 o.coc;1 -0.0015 
l. 21 o.os c.011 -0.0091 0.0018 o.0091 -0.0013 
1.22 0.05 o.os -O,OO'tl c. 0078 o.ooa5 -0.0007 
lo23 0.04 o.os -0.0068 0.0066 0.0078 -0.0011 
1.24 C.04 o.04 -0.0031 C,0065 0.0011 -0.0001 
1.25 0.03 0.03 -0.0013 CoC063 0,0065 -o.cooz 
i.211 0.03 c.03 0.0035 0.0066 o.0059 0.0001 
1.27 0.03 0.03 0.0011 C.CC69 0.0053 0.0016 
l.ze 0.03 0.02 0.0054 C.CCS9 o.oo4e 0.0012 
1.29 0.03 0.02 0.0086 C.0062 0.0042 0.0020 
1.30 0.02 0.02 o.ocsc C,C051 0.0038 o.0011t .... 
-..J 
'° 
THIS IS AN AO FUNCTIC~, ~ s 5 
THE EQUATION OF THEWEleULL FUNCTICN IS EXPI- 17.00ll*IR - 0.841•• t.74101 
U3 • IR - 1.061 
THIS IS A COMPARISON OF THE PROBABILITIES ANO T~E EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS ANO THE WEIBULL ·FUNCTION 
EXP EC TEO EXPECTED 
UTILITY UTILITY 
Ii El BULL 
WEIBULL ACTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
0.84 o.95 i.oo -0.0481 -C.2C94 -0.2200 000106 
0.85 0.95 0.99 -0.0425 -C.1999 -0.2088 0.0089 
0086 C.9~ Co98 -0.0295 -0.1904 -0.1963 0.0059 
0.81 0,91 o.96 -0.0554 -C.1724 -0.1829 0.0105 
o.e8 0.91 0.94 -0.0319 -C.1633 -0.1691 0.0057 
0.89 0.91 Q.91 -0.0044 -C.15"3 -0.1550 0.0001 
0.90 0•91 o.88 0.0265 -0.1"52 -0.1409 -0.0042 
Oo9l Oo91 0.95 o.0603 -C.1361 -0.1211 -0.0090 
0.93 0.81 c. 77 O,C927 •Coll26 -0.1005 •0.0120 
0.94 0.83 o.73 0.0932 -C.C9•i3 -0.0881 -0.0112 
0,95 0.83 0.69 0.1330 -0.0910 -0.0764 -0.0146 
0.96 o. 79 Oo65 Oo 1372 -C.0792 -o .• 0654 -0.0137 
C.97 0.76 Oo6l Oo 1438 -C,C682 -0.0553 -0.0129 
o.<ia 0.10 o.s1 0.1226 -c.cs5e -0.0459 -0.0098 
0•99 0.67 o.54 0.1340 •CoC468 -0.0375 -0.0094 
i.oo 0.64 o.so Oo 1461 •CoC386 -0.0298 -0.0088 
1.01 0.64 o.1t6 Oo 1833 -0.0321 -0.0230 -0.0092 
1.02 0.59 Oo42 Co 1709 -C.C238 -0.0169 -0.0068 
lo04 0.49 0.36 0, 1377 -0.0099 -0.0011 -0.0028 
1.os 0.43 0.33 o.1ou -0.0043 -0.0033 -0.0010 
lo06 Oo4C 0.30 o.1os2 c.c o.o o.o 
1..01 0.36 0.21 0.0945 0.0036 0.0021 0.0009 
i.ce 0.31 0.24 O.C656 c.0062 o.004a 0.0013 
lo09 0.28 0.22 0.0613 C.CCE't 0.0066 o.oou 
lolO 0.20 0.20 o.o0.03 CoCC79 o.0078 0.0000 
loll Ool4 0.18 -0.0349 c.0010 c.oC88 -0.0017 
1.12 0.11 Ool6 -O,Olt33 o.oo6a O.C094 -0.0026 
1.13 0.09 o.11o -o. 0497 c.0063 0.0098 -0.0035 
loH o.c8 0.12 -0.0412 · C .C066 0.0099 -0.0033 
lo 15 0.01 0.11 -0.0405 Co0062 0.0098 -0.0036 
t.16 Oo06 0.10 -o.cn1 CoC059 O.CC96 -0.0037 
l.c l. 7 ·o.os o.oa -0.0!14 c.co59 000093 -0.0035 
Ld:! o.os a.in -0.0239 C.C061 OoOC89 -0.0029 
l.-i--C 0.05 0.06 -0.0090 C.0067 0.0019 -0.0013 
h2l 0.04 0.05 -0.0012 o.o063 O.OOl4 -0.0011 
t.22' o·.04 0.04 -0.0033 CoC063 000068 -o.ooos 
1.23 0.03 o.01o -0.0053 CoC051t o.ooc.3 -0.0009 
lo21t 0.03 0.03 -0.0028 0.0052 000057 -0.0005 
1.2s o.c3 o.o3 -o.oooa c.C()50 0.0052 -0.0001 
1.26 o.o3 0.02 0.0031 c.co53 0.0047 0.0006 
1.27 c.c3 0.02 0.0065 C.0056 000042 0.0014 
lo28 0.02 0.02 0.0047 c.co1o8 0.0038 0.0010 
lo29 0.02 0.01 0.0012 o.ooso O.OC33 0.0011 
lo30 0.02 0.01 o. 001t8 C.C041 0.0029 0.0012 ..... 
g> 
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T~IS IS AN AO FUNCTICN, N • 7 
THE EOLATICN .OF THENEIBULL FUll.CTICN IS EXPI- 16.91t75•1R - Oo81tl•• 1063531 
u·3 • IR - 1.061 




•EIBULL .CTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB Clff'ERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
o.s1t 0.93 1.00 -O.C66a -C.2055 -o.22aa 0.0145 
a.es 0.93 a.'i9 -o.as10 -0.1961 -a.2C81 a.a12a 
a.S6 a.93 c.n -0.0382 -C.1868 -a.1941t OoD076 
o.87 o.a1 a.95 -O.C717 -C.1662 -0.1799 0.0136 
o.s8 Do87 C.92 -0.0"10 -C.1575 -0.161t9 o.'0011t 
0.89 o.e1 o.ee -o.oalf:3 -C. lltel -O.l1t98 a.con 
0.90 o.87 a.a1t a.a31S -c.11taa -D.1350 -o.a050 
0.91 c.er a.ea O.C717 -C.1312 -,o.12os -o.01aa 
o.93 o.sz a.12 o.1a31t -C.la69 -O.a931t -O.Ol31t 
Oo9't 0.11 a.68 Oo0CJ88 -c.a9z9 -0•0810 -0.0119 
a.95 o. 71 Oo63 a.1'i21 -o.cs5z -o.a695 -o.a156 
Oo96 0.13 o.59 a. l'tl!i -C.C731 -a.0589 -o.011t1 
a.91 C.69 a.55 0.11,39 -c.0622 -O.Olt93 -0.0129 
0.9S a.62 0.51 0.1H2 -C.Clt'il -0.0405 -0.0092 
o.99 0.59 a.1tl o.121to -C.C'ollt -O.D327 -o.oon 
1.oc c.56 Oo43 o.1336 -C.C337 -0.0257 -0.008a 
1.01 o.s6 0.39 Co l6CJ8 --c.c2ei -0.0196 -0.0085 
1.02 a.s1 0.36 0.1533 -o.02as -0.010 -0.0061 
1.01t o.1o1 0.30 o. ll51t -c.cc82 -0.0059 -a.0023 
1.05 C.35 0.21 o.cezs -C.C035 -0.0021 -0.0008 
1.06 0.32 a.21t 0~083a a.a 11.0 o.o 
1.a1 o.2c; 0.22 o.cno c.oc2c; 0.0022 0.0001 
1.oe o.21o 0.19 0.01tlS C.C01t8 0.0039 0.0010 
loC'i a.22 c.n a.c""" C.CC65 0.0052 o.oou 
1.10 a.15 c.1s -0.0051 c.oc59 0.0061 -0.0002 
1.11 a.10 o.11t -0.0318 o.oa52 O.DD6S -o. 0016 
1.12 a.cs 0.12 -o. C37l C.C050 0.001? -0.0022 
1.13 0.01 a.u -a~Olt09 CoCC46 a.ao1s -a.ca29 
1.11t O.C6 o.o9 -0.0335 O.COltB a.C075 -0.0021 
1.15 a.as t.C8 -0.0322 CoCOltS 0.0014 -0.0029 
1.16 0.04 0.07 -a.0289 C.CD43 0.0012 -0.0029 
1.11 o.01t O.C6 -0.0242 c.coo 0.0069 -0.0021 
1.18 o.o,, 0.05 "'0.0182 CoCClti, 0.0066 -0.0022 
1.20 0.03 o.a1t -O.Ca68 c.0049 0.0058 -0.0009 
1.21 0.03 D.O.lt -0.0052 C.C01t6 0.0053 -0.0008 
1.22 0.03 0.03 -O.C023 c.co1,5 O.OC49 -O.OOOlt 
1.23 0.02 0.03 -0.0037 0.0039 0.0045 -0.0006 
lo24 0.02 Co02 -o.oon c.0038 0.0041 -0.0003 
1.25 0.02 0.02 -0.0003 C.OD31f: 0.0037 -0.0001 
1.26 0.02 0.02 0.0026 C.CD38 0.0033 0.0005 
1.21 0.02 0.01 0.0050 c._001,0 0.0030 0.0011 
.1.28 0.02 a.01 a.con 0.0034 o.OD26 o.oooa 
1.29 0.02 0.01 0.0055 C.C036 0.0023 0.0013 
1.30 c.01 0.01 o.oon CoC029 0.0021 0.0009 
""" 00 
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T~IS IS AN AC FiJNCTICN, N .. 8 
T~E EQ~ATION OF THEWEJ!ULL FUNCTICN. IS EJFI- 1609161*1~ - Oo841** 1059491 
u·3 • CR - loC61 




WEIBULL ICTUAL CILtUUTED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
Oo84 Oo93 loco -0.0748 -Co2036 -Oo2200 000164 
Oo85 Oo93 Oo99 -OoC639 -Co 1943 -002011 000134 
0086 Oo93 Oo97 -Oo0'o23 -CoU50 -Oo1935 000085 
Ooe7 '0086 ooc;1o -OoC793 -Col633 -Oo1784 0•0151 
0088 0086 0091 -Oo0'o55 -Col547 -Ool629 Oo0082 
Oo89 0086 Oo87 -0.0011 -C ol4Cll -O.;lO'o 000013 
Oo9C Co66 Oo83 Oo 0330 -C.1375 -Oo 1323 -0000.53 
Oo9l 0086 Oo78 OoC757 -co uec; -Oo 1176 -Oo0114 
Oo93 ooeo O·o70 Ool06'o -oo 101o2 -Co090'o -ooOU8 
Oo94 Oo75 Oo65 OoC99'o -CoC900 -Oo0781 -Oo0ll9 
Oo95 o.75 Oo61 Oo lto38 -CoC825 -000667 -Oo0l58 
coc;i. Co TC Oo56 o.11o10 -coo1c .. -Oo0563 -0.0141 
Oo97 0066 Oo52 o.11o11 -CoC596 -0.0468 -Oo0127 
Oo98 Oo59 Oo48 OollO'o -C.0472 -000383 -oooo·BB 
Co99 Oo56 Oo4'o Co 1182 -C.C391 -000308 -'Oo0083 
loOO Oo53 OoloO Oo 1268 -CoC3l8 -Oo0242 -0.0076 
loOl Oo53 Oo37 Ool623 -OoC265 -Oo0184 -ooooe1 
lo02 Oo48 Oo33 Oo 1447 -C.Cl91 -OoOl.33 -oooose 
lo04 Oo38 Oo27 0.1061 -CoC076 -o.CC55 -000021 
lo05 Oo32 Oo25 O. C742 -OoC032 -000025 -Oo0007 
loC6 Co3C 0022 o.C745 CoC OoO OoO 
lo07 Oo26 Oo20 0.0651 CoC026 0.0020 000007 
lo CB Oo22 0018 ooc1o11. CoC04'o 000035 oooooe 
lo09 Oo20 Col6 OoC386 CoC059 Oo004.7 000012 
lolO cou Ool4 -Oo006'o 0.0053 Oo0056 -Oo0003 
loll Oo09 Ool2 -Co0302 Co0046 0.0061 -Oo0015 
lol2 Oo07 Coll -Oo0345 CoC044 000065 -Oo002l 
lol3 Oo06 OolO -Oo0375 000041 oooon -Oo0026 
lo 14 Oo05 oooe -Oo0306 Co00to3 OoC067 -Oo002'o 
lo 15 OoOlo Oo01 -Oo0292 CoC04C 000066 -Oo0026 
lol6 Co04 00.06 -o. 02"1 CoC038 Oo006" .. 000026 
loll Oo03 0.06 -0.0211 CoC037 OoOC6l -000024 
lol8 Oo03 Oo05 -Oo0163 C.0039 Oo0058 -Oo0020 
lo20 Oo03 Oo04 -Oo0C60 CoC042 oooos.1 -OoOOOB 
lo21 Oo03 Oo03 -oo0046 CoCO'oO 000047 -Oo0007 
lo22 Oo02 Oo03 -0.0020 000040 OoCOO -000003 
lo23 OoC2 0.02 -000032 CoC034 000039 -0.0005 
lo24 Oo02 Oo02 -Oo0014 CoC033 Oo0036 -000003 
lo25 Oo02 Oo02 -OoOOOl CoC032 000032 -0.0000 
lo26 0.02 OoOl 000024 c.0034 o.0029 0.0005 
lo27 0.02 0.01 0.0045 CoGO!l5 o.OOZ6 000009 
1.za c.01 0.01 o.0033 CoC030 0.0023 0.0001 
lo29 0.01 0.01 o.oc;.r,9 C.C032 0.0020 0.0011 




T~IS IS AN AC FwNCTIC~, ~ • 9 
THE EQwATICN OF THEWEl!ULL FUNCTICN IS EXPI- l6ol78l•IR - Oo841•• 1 0 ~5961 
U3 • IR - lo061 
THIS IS A CCMPARISCN CF THE PROBAelLITIES A~C T~E EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS AND THE WEIBULL FUNCTION 
EXPECTED EXPECTED 
I. TILITY llTILITY 
WEIBULL 
loEIBULL ICTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PllOB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
D.84 o,9z l.ao -O,C833 -c.2011 -0.2200 0.0183 
a.es a.92 C.99 -O,C706 -Col9Z5 -0.2073 0.0141 
a.86 a,9z Oo96 -0.0462 -c.un -O. l9Z6 000092 
Oo87 c.&4 Oo93 -OoC865 -Col6a5 -0.1769 a.0164 
a.as o.84 0.89 -0.0497 -o.1s21 -0.1610 000089 
a.at 0.84 c.es -0.0092 -C.1436 -0.145Z o.oou. 
C.90 Oo84 0.11 0.0340 -o.1352 -0.1297 -o.o054 
Oo9l o.e4 0.11 OoC790 -C.1267 -0.1149 -0.0118 
Co93 o•ra C.67 a.1C84 -c.1011 -0.0876 -0.0141 
Do94 0,73 Oo63 O,C993 -C.0873 -0.0754 -0.0119 
c,95 0.13 Oo·58 0,1444 -c.osoo -0.0641 -0.0159 
Oo96 0068 o.54 Oo 1397 -a.C679 -0.0539. -0.0140 
Oo97 Oo64 o.50 o. u88 -a.C57Z -0.0447 -0.0125 
0.98 Oo56 Oo46 o.1ass -a.C449 -0.0364 -0.0084 
Oo99 Oo53 Oo4Z Oo llZ5 -O.C370 -0.0292 -0.0079 
loOO o.so Oo38 Oo 1203 -C,C3CO -0.0221 -0.0012 
loOl Oo5C 0.34 Ool5H -C.C250 -o.ouz -0 •. 0011 
i.02 Oo45 0.31 0.1367 -c.ouo -O.Cl25 -0.0055 
lo04 Oo35 o.z5 000980 -c.co7o -0.0051 -0.0020 
lo05 Oo29 Oo23 OoC671 -c.0029 -0.0023 -0.0007 
lo06 Oo27 o.zo o.cc.1s c.o o.o o;.o 
.lo CT Oo24 0 .• 11 0.0586 OoOOZ4 0.0011 0.0006 
lo OB o.2c Oo 16 0.0367 CoC040 Oo003Z 0.0001 
l.O'i 0.18 Ool4 OoC341 C.C053 o.oou 0.0010 
lo 10 o.1z o.u -O.OC73 c.0041 0.0051 -0.0003 
loll o.os Doll -c.aza6 CoC04Z 0.0056 -0.0014 
lol2 0.01 0.10 -O.C321 CoCOltO 0.0059 -a.0019 
loll a.05 c.09 -0.0345 C.Ca36 0.0061 -0.0.024 
lol4 0.05 a.ca -0.0211 CoC038 Oo006l -0.0023 
lo 15 0.04 a.er -0.0266 C.0036 o.aOS9 -o.0021o 
lo 16 0.03 0.06 -o.oz:n a.0034 0.0051 -O.OOZ4 
lo 17 0.03 0.05 -0.0197 c.con o.oa55 -o.oozz 
lo 18 Co03 a.04 -0.0147 CoC031t o.oosz -o.oou 
lo2C 0.03 Oo03 -c.oa54 c.cou o.001t5 -0.0007 
lo2l 0.02 0.03 -o.aou C.CO!l6 OoOOloZ -0.0006 
l~Z2 0.02 o.cz -C.C017 CoC036 o.0038 -0.0003 
lo23 0.02 0.02 -o.oaza C.C030 OoOC35 -o.ooas 
lo21t 0.02 0.02 -0.0012 c.aoz9 OoOC32 -a.ooc2 
loZ5 0.01 0.01 -a.oooo c.co21 o.oozs -c.oooo 
lo26 0.01 0.01 0.0022 CoC030 0.0025 0.0004 
lo27 0.01 a.01 0.0041 CoC031 Oo00Z3 0.0009 
lo28 0.01 0.01 o,CC30 c.aozr o.oozo 0.0007 
loZ9 a.01 . 0.01 OoOOltlt o.oaze 0.0018 0.0010 




TttlS IS AN AP FU~CTIC~, ~ • lC 
THE EOLATIO~ OF THENEIBULL fUNCTICN IS EXPI- 16.B3Cl•IR - C.841•• 1052791 
U3 • IR - lo061 
THIS IS A CO~PARISON CF THE PROBABILITIES ANO T~E EXPECTED PROFIT USING ACTUAL DATA POINTS ANO THE NEIBULL FuhCTION 
EXPECTEt EXPECTED 
UTILITY ~TIL ITV 
WEI BULL 
•E !BULL ACTUAL CALCULATED 
R p PROB CIFFERENCE CATA DATA DIFFERENCE 
O. Bit 0.91 l.co -0.0917 -C.1998 -0.2200 0.0202 
a.as 0.91 0.99 -o. C77l -C.1907 -0.2069 0.0162 
O.Bb 0.91 0.96 -c.csoc -c.1e11 -0.1916 0.0100 
Oo S7 0.83 c. 92 -O.C933 -C.1578 -0.1755 0.0177 
o.88 0.63 o.ee -0.0537 -C.1495 -0.1592 0.0091 
o,8c; o.83 o.s4 -0.0106 -C.1412 -0.1430 0.0015 
0.90 C.83 o.ec 0.0349 -0.1329 -0.12 73 -0.0056 
Co91 OoE3 0.15 0.0818 -C.1246 -0.1123 -o. 0123 
0.93 c.76 0.65 0.1099 -C.0993 -0.0850 -0.0143 
0.94 0.11 0.61 c.cc;88 -C.C847 -0.0729 -O.Oll9 
0.95 0.11 o.56 Oo l41t5 -C.C776 -0.0618 -0.0159 
0.96 Co66 0.52 C.1380 -C.0655 -0.0517 -0.0138 
0.91 0.61 0.47 Ool357 -CoC549 -0.0427 -0.0122 
Oo98 o.~3 0.43 o.1ooe -C.0428 -O.C347 -0.0081 
,C.99 o.50 0.40 o. 1C7l -C.C352 -0.0277 -0.0075 
1.00 0.47 0.36 Oo lllt3 -C.C2S4 -0.0216 -0.0069 
lo 01 0.47 C.33 0.1483 -0.0237 -0.0163 -0.0074 
1.02 0.42 0.29 0.1294 -C.0169 -0.0111 -0.0052 
1.04 0.33 Oo24 O.C909 -C.0066 -o.001o1 -a.aou 
1.05 c.21 c.21 0.0612 -C.CC27 -0.0021 -0.0006 
lo06 0.25 c.19 a. 0616 c.c o.o a.o 
1.01 c.22 c.11 o.os32 0.0022 0.0011 0.0005 
i.c9 0.18 o.1s O.C327 c.0036 0.0030 0.0007 
1.09 o.1b 0.13 0.0301t C.CC4'l 0.0040 0.0009 
lo 10 0.11 0.12 -o.ccn 0.0044 o.0047 -0.0003 
loll c.t8 0.10 -0.0210 c.co3e 0.0051 -0.0014 
lol2 0.011 0.09 -0.0300 C.C03b o.oos1o -o.oou 
lo 13 0.05 c.08 -0.0320 CoCC33 o.0055 -0.0022 
lol4 OoC4 0.01 -0.0260 c.0034 o.ooss -0.0021 
1.15 C.04 0.06 -0.0245 c.0032 0.0054 -0.0022 
lo lb o.C3 o.os -0.0211 C.C03l 0.0052 -0.0022 
1.11 o.c3 o.os -O.Cl79 CoC03C o.ooso -0.0020 
1.1e c.c3 OoC4 -O.Ol31t C.0031 O.OOt,7 -0.0016 
lo 2C c.02 0.03 -c.004e C.OC34 o.ooo -0.0001 
i.21 0.02 0.03 -O.OC36 C oC032 0.0038 -o.ooos 
1.22 0.02 0.02 -0.0015 c.0032 0.0034 -0.0002 
lo23 0.02 0.02 -O.Cli2" 0.0021 o.oon -0.0004 
lo24 0.01 0.02 -0.0010 c .oc21 0.0029 -o.coc2 
lo25 c.01 0.01 c.ccoo CoC026 o.002t. 0.0000 
1.26 0.01 0.01 0.0020 C.C027 0.0023 o.ooc1o 
lo27 0.01 O. Cl o. 003 7 l:.0028 0.0020 o.oooe 
1.28 c.01 0.01 o.co2e o.oc21o o.oou 0.0006 
lo29 0.01 0.01 0.0040 c.002s C.0016 0.0009 
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